§ 2-7 Voluntary Manslaughter
The defendant is charged with voluntary manslaughter. What is voluntary manslaughter?
Section 16-3-50 of the South Carolina Code defines manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of another without malice, express or implied." Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice, in sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation.
To prove voluntary manslaughter, the State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully killed another, without malice, in sudden heat of passion based on sufficient legal provocation.
Heat of passion alone will not suffice. Both heat of passion and sufficient legal provocation must be present at the time of the killing to constitute voluntary manslaughter.
The sudden heat of passion, upon sufficient legal provocation, while it need not dethrone reason entirely, or shut out knowledge and volition, must be such as would naturally disturb the sway of reason, and render the mind of an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection, and produce what, according to human experience, may be called an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. The passion need not be so overpowering as for the time to shut out knowledge and destroy volition.
To constitute sufficient legal provocation, the provocation must come from some act of or related to the victim. The provocation of the deceased must be such as naturally and instantly produces in the mind of a person ordinarily constituted the highest degree of exasperation, rage, anger, sudden resentment, or terror, rendering the mind incapable of cool reflection.
If sufficient legal provocation does not exist, the killing, even if committed during the heat of passion, is not voluntary manslaughter. The provocation must deprive one of the powers of self-control, but it need not entirely dethrone reason.
Where death is caused by the use of a deadly weapon, words alone, however opprobrious, are not sufficient to constitute a legal provocation. Rather, when death is caused by the use of a deadly weapon, the opprobrious words must be accompanied by the appearance of an assault—by some overt, threatening act—which could have produced the heat of passion. Thus, although words alone may not constitute sufficient legal provocation, words accompanied by some overt, threatening act may be sufficient.
The exercise of a legal right, no matter how offensive to another, is never sufficient legal provocation for voluntary manslaughter.
In determining whether the act which caused death was impelled by heat of passion, all the surrounding circumstances and conditions are to be taken into consideration, including previous relations and conditions connected with the tragedy, as well as those existing at the time of the killing.
In order for an intentional and unlawful killing to constitute voluntary manslaughter, the killing must occur during the heat of passion aroused by adequate provocation and before the passion has cooled or has had time to cool. Even if sufficient legal provocation has aroused a defendant's passion, if at the time of the killing those passions had cooled or a sufficiently reasonable time had elapsed so that the passions of the ordinary reasonable person would have cooled, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter. If sufficient time has elapsed, under all the circumstances of the case, for the defendant to cool, that is to say, time within which an ordinary man under like circumstances would have cooled, before the fatal blow is struck, then the killing is not voluntary manslaughter.
In determining whether a reasonable time for cooling off had elapsed, you should consider all the circumstances surrounding the event; the nature of the provocation; the defendant's physical and mental constitution; the defendant's conversation throughout the entire incident; and the circumstances and condition in life; the defendant's education, habits, conduct, manner, and relationships between the parties.
? State v. Burdette, 427 S.C. 490, 501, 832 S.E.2d 575, 581 (2019) (Finding the trial court should instruct the jury that malice is not an element of voluntary manslaughter. "After consideration of the jury instructions as a whole, we are compelled to agree with Burdette. When the trial court instructed the jury that malice was not an element of involuntary manslaughter, but did not instruct the jury that malice was not an element of voluntary manslaughter, the jury was left with the incorrect impression that malice is an element of voluntary manslaughter, which allowed the jury to use the improperly charged inference of malice from the use of a deadly weapon to find Burdette guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The prejudice stemming from the erroneous and confusing instructions was compounded when, during deliberations, the jury requested the trial court to provide a 'better understanding' of the charges of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter, and the trial court repeated its original instructions which (1) included the erroneous inferred malice instruction and (2) did not include an instruction that malice is not an element of voluntary manslaughter. The charge as a whole necessarily resulted in confusion that contributed to the verdict that Burdette was guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, we cannot conclude the trial court's erroneous instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Additionally, the court in Burdette overruled prior "precedent to the extent it permits a jury instruction that malice may be inferred from the defendant's use of a deadly weapon."
? State v. Smith, 391 S.C. 408, 413, 706 S.E.2d 12, 15 (2011) ("In determining whether the act which caused death was impelled by heat of passion or by malice, all the surrounding circumstances and conditions are to be taken into consideration, including previous relations and conditions connected with the tragedy, as well as those existing at the time of the killing." (citing State v. Norris, 253 S.C. 31, 35, 168 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1969); State v. Gardner, 219 S.C. 97, 105, 64 S.E.2d 130, 134 (1951))).
? State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 548, 647 S.E.2d 144, 154 (2007) ("A court may eliminate the offense of manslaughter where it clearly appears that there is no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter." (citing State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 264, 513 S.E.2d 104, 109 (1999)) ("Recklessness is a state of mind in which the actor is aware of his or her conduct, yet consciously disregards a risk which his or her conduct is creating.") ("Recklessness has also been defined as 'something more than mere negligence or carelessness ... a conscious failure to exercise due care or ordinary care or a conscious indifference to the rights and safety of others or a reckless disregard thereof.'" (quoting State v. Tucker, 273 S.C. 736, 739, 259 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1979))).
? State v. Cottrell, 376 S.C. 260, 262, 657 S.E.2d 451, 452 (2008) ("In determining whether voluntary manslaughter should be charged as a lesser offense of murder, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.") ("The charge need not be given 'where it clearly appears that there is no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter.'" (citing State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144 (2007))).
? State v. Wharton, 381 S.C. 209, 214, 672 S.E.2d 786, 788 (2009) ("Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in sudden heat of...
