§ 3.7.2.6.2.1 Motions To Dismiss. For a period of time ending in 2012, there were inconsistent appellate court opinions concerning the standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss. In Dressler v. Morrison, 212 Ariz. 279, 281, ¶ 11, 130 P.3d 978, 980 (2006), the supreme court stated that an order granting a motion to dismiss is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Consistent with Dressler, for a period of time, decisions by the court of appeals stated a trial court’s order dismissing a complaint would not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Maricopa Cty., 227 Ariz. 323, 326, ¶ 14, 258 P.3d 141, 144 (App. 2011) (dismissal for failure to prosecute); Elm Retirement Ctr., LP v. Callaway, 226 Ariz. 287, 289, ¶ 5, 246 P.3d 938, 940 (App. 2010).
In Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355-56, ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 863, 866-67 (2012), however, the supreme court stated that review of the dismissal of a complaint for a failure to state a claim “is reviewed de novo” and, in doing so, “clarify[ied] the standard of appellate review . . . because our past statements have been inconsistent.” After discussing Dressler, Coleman concluded that “[b]ecause questions of law are reviewed de novo, the grant of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo.” Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 356, ¶ 8, 284 P.3d at 867 (citation omitted). Consistent with Coleman, more recent decisions by the court of appeals have stated that it reviews a trial court order dismissing a complaint de novo. See Peterson v. Newton, 232 Ariz. 593, 595, ¶ 4, 307 P.3d 1020, 1022 (App. 2013); Blankenbaker v. Marks, 231 Ariz. 578, 580, ¶ 6, 299 P.3d 747, 749 (App. 2013). It independently reviews motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Café Valley, Inc. v. Navidi, 235 Ariz. 252, 594, ¶ 6, 330 P.3d 1009, 1010 (App. 2014); Midtown Medical Group v. Farmers Ins. Group, 235 Ariz. 593, 594 ¶ 7, 334 P.3d 1252, 1253 (App. 2014); Mirchandani v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 235 Ariz. 68, 70, ¶ 7, 326 P.3d 335, 337 (App. 2014).
The appellate court will sustain a judgment of dismissal only if, assuming the truth of all material facts alleged by the plaintiffs, they would not be entitled to relief under any facts susceptible of proof in the statement of the claim. See Peterson v. Newton, 232 Ariz. 593, 595, ¶ 4, 307 P.3d 1020, 1022 (App. 2013); Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 355-56, ¶ 7, 284 P.3d at 866-67; Madison v. Groseth, 230 Ariz. 8, 11, ¶ 8, 279 P.3d 633, 636 (App. 2012). The appellate court must be satisfied as a matter of law that plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief on any interpretation of those facts. See Doe v. State, 200 Ariz. 174, 175, ¶ 2, 24 P.3d 1269, 1270 (2001); Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 202 Ariz. 481, 484, ¶ 9, 47 P.3d 1119, 1122 (App. 2002), aff’d, 206 Ariz. 9, 75 P.3d 99 (2003); Ariz. Soc’y of Pathologists v. AHCCCS Admin., 201 Ariz. 553, 557, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d 1218, 1222 (App. 2002). It also resolves all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Bank, N.A., 230 Ariz. 584, 586, ¶ 7, 277 P.3d 781, 783 (2012). However, an appellate court will affirm a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when the plaintiff should be denied relief as a matter of law given the facts alleged. See id.
Where the trial court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the appellate court assumes the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations. See Hogan, 230 Ariz. at 586, ¶ 7, 277 P.3d at 783; Grand v. Nacchio, 225 Ariz. 171, 174, ¶ 14, 236 P.3d 398, 401 (2010); Belen Loan Investors, L.L.C. v. Bradley, 231 Ariz. 448, 450, ¶ 2, 296 P.3d 984, 986 (App. 2012). It determines if the plaintiff is entitled to relief under any theory of law. See...
