§ 4.7 Court Action
§ 4.7-1 Collateral Estoppel
People v. Stice, 168 Ill. App. 3d 662, 523 N.E.2d 1054, 120 Ill. Dec. 143 (4th Dist. 1988). The doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable between a rescission hearing and a DUI prosecution.
§ 4.7-1(a) Applied Improperly
People v. Filitti, 190 Ill. App. 3d 884, 546 N.E.2d 1142, 138 Ill. Dec. 87 (2d Dist. l989). Defendant successfully established at a rescission hearing that a police officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe defendant had been driving while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant then filed a motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his arrest for the criminal charge. The trial court granted the motion solely on the basis that collateral estoppel prohibited the State from re-litigating the issue of whether reasonable grounds existed to believe defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. The appellate court reversed, finding the trial court erred by applying collateral estoppel and granting the motion to suppress without allowing for a hearing on the motion to suppress.
People v. Flynn, 197 Ill. App. 3d 13, 554 N.E.2d 668, 143 Ill. Dec. 733 (1st Dist. 1990). On a summary suspension hearing, the trial court rescinded the summary suspension because the technician was unable to produce his valid license to operate the machines and because of the possibility there might have been a break in the 20-minute observation period. For the trial, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to exclude the breath test based upon collateral estoppel. The appellate court reversed, finding the State was not precluded from re-litigating the validity of the breath test at the criminal trial.
§ 4.7-1(b) Not Applicable
People v. Newman, 163 Ill. App. 3d 865, 516 N.E.2d 667, 114 Ill. Dec. 512 (3d Dist. 1987). At a summary suspension hearing, the State failed to lay a foundation for the admissibility of the breathalyzer results. Defendant claimed the ruling by the court at the implied consent hearing was collateral estoppel as to the admission of the results at the criminal trial. The appellate court held collateral estoppel did not apply because the foundation issue was a matter of law and collateral estoppel only applies to issues of fact. Secondly, the ruling at the implied consent hearing was not a final ruling on the merits and the State would have another opportunity to lay the foundation at the criminal trial.
§ 4.7-2 Contempt Order Improper
People v. Damkroger, 408 Ill. App. 3d 936, 946 N.E.2d 948, 349 Ill. Dec. 452 (2d Dist. 2011). The defendant was arrested for DUI June 21, 2009. Her breathalyzer result was .144. The arresting officer informed her, in accordance with statutory law, that her driver's license would be suspended effective on the 46th day following notice of the suspension. About 11 days later, July 2, 2009, the Secretary of State mailed her a notice confirming the effective date of the suspension, that being August 6, 2009. Less than 30 days after her first DUI arrest, July 17, 2009, she was arrested a second time for DUI with a breathalyzer result of .118. On the second case, her license suspension would go into effect on September 1, 2009. In the second case, she moved for the issuance of a monitoring device driving permit (MDDP). The Secretary of State refused to issue her one. The trial court found him in indirect civil contempt for not doing so.
The appellate court reversed finding to obtain a MDDP in the second case, she had to be, pursuant to 625 ILCS 5/6-206.1(a)(1) (2008), a first time offender. The court found that she was not a first time offender since, at the time of the second offense, her license had already been suspended by the Secretary of State in the first case through his mailing of a notice of suspension to her even though the effective date of that suspension was not until a few weeks after the arrest date in the second case. Accordingly the trial court was barred from ordering the Secretary of State to issue the MDDP and the Secretary of State should not have been held in contempt for failing to issue the MDDP
§ 4.7-3 Directed Finding
§ 4.7-3(a) Granted Improperly
People v. Bavas, 251 Ill. App. 3d 720, 623 N.E.2d 876, 191 Ill. Dec. 286 (2d Dist. 1993). At a rescission hearing the trial court granted a motion for directed finding in favor of the State. At the hearing defendant denied violating any traffic provision, stated he had only two beers within a four-hour period, and was not intoxicated. Additionally defendant claimed he was not given the warning to motorists concerning the consequences of refusing to submit to a breath test. All this testimony was uncontradicted. The trial court found defendant's testimony unbelievable when it granted the directed finding.
The appellate court reversed finding defendant had established a prima facie case for rescission. The cause was remanded for further proceedings presumably for the State to present evidence to contradict defendant's testimony.
§ 4.7-3(b) Granted Properly
People v. Keller, 168 Ill. App. 3d 426, 522 N.E.2d 909, 119 Ill. Dec. 247 (2d Dist. 1988). Defendant's attorney in a rescission hearing asked limited questions of the defendant and arresting officer. The questions did not relate to any of the issues named in the petition to rescind and the State's motion for a directed verdict was properly granted since defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case.
§ 4.7-4 Double Jeopardy
§ 4.7-4(a) Not Applicable
People v. Dvorak, 276 Ill. App. 3d 544, 658 N.E.2d 869, 213 Ill. Dec. 120 (2d Dist. 1996). Defendant was arrested for DUI. He successfully was able to have the statutory summary rescinded. He filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charge on the basis of double jeopardy because the rescission of the suspension amounted to an acquittal barring further prosecution. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The appellate court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings, holding the summary suspension of a driver's license pursuant to the implied-consent statute is fairly characterized as a remedial civil sanction rather than as punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Additionally, the court found a rescission in favor of the defendant is not tantamount to an "acquittal" for double jeopardy purposes. See People v. Eck, 279 Ill. App. 3d 541, 664 N.E.2d 1147, 216 Ill. Dec. 219 (5th Dist. 1996).
People v. Fasbinder, 278 Ill. App. 3d 855, 663 N.E.2d 1052, 215 Ill. Dec. 538 (4th Dist. 1996). Defendant unsuccessfully was able to rescind his summary suspension. The appellate court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Defendant sought to dismiss the criminal charges on the grounds that the summary suspension of his license was penal in nature and as a result his prosecution for DUI was barred by the double jeopardy clause. The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. The appellate court affirmed, finding the summary suspension statute does not attempt to deter conduct in the way a fine or a prison sentence deters individuals from committing crime, does not produce any financial gain for the government, and is merely a remedial civil sanction designed to keep unqualified persons from situations in which they have a special potential to harm the public. See People v. Lopeman, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 665 N.E.2d 881, 216 Ill. Dec. 623 (3d Dist. 1996); People v. Parmenter, 283 Ill. App. 3d 688, 670 N.E.2d 1171, 219 Ill. Dec. 283 (3d Dist. 1996).
People v. LaVariega, 175 Ill. 2d 153, 676 N.E.2d 643, 221 Ill. Dec. 840 (1997). Following an arrest for DUI, defendant's license was summarily suspended pursuant to the implied consent statute. He moved to dismiss the criminal charge, claiming the prosecution of the criminal charge constituted a violation of the double jeopardy clause. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the appellate court affirmed.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and the trial court. The court determined that the summary suspension of a driver's license is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes and does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol. The finding by the court was reached after it was determined the summary suspension procedure advances an important policy goal of keeping the roads safe from intoxicated drivers, Illinois courts have traditionally viewed the purpose of the driver's license suspension as being remedial and non-punitive, and there is no scienter element to the statutory summary suspension provision.
§ 4.7-5 Dismissal of Petition to Rescind Improper
People v. Holmes, 268 Ill. App. 3d 802, 644 N.E.2d 1, 205 Ill. Dec. 785 (3d Dist. 1994). Defendant filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. This was over four years after his arrest for DUI on April 1, 1989. Defendant's license was suspended from June 10, 1989 until September 10, 1989 and he had paid his fee to reinstate his license. The trial court dismissed defendant's petition for a hearing. The appellate court reversed, finding there is nothing in the statute stating that a time limit exists in which a petition must be filed before one can secure a hearing to rescind a summary suspension.
§ 4.7-6 Failure to Consider Sanction Destruction of Video
People v. Tsiamas, 2015 IL App (2d) 140859. Defendant had his license summarily suspended after a traffic stop and arrest on February 14, 2014. At the police station following defendant's arrest police asked the defendant to perform sobriety tests and submit to chemical testing. Defendant failed sobriety tests and refused to submit to chemical testing. The events, which took place in the booking room, were recorded on video.
Defendant petitioned to rescind the suspension and requested the video from the state for the recession hearing after the state failed to produce the video, which destroyed after defendant filed his petition. Defendant then moved for sanctions under People v. Kladis, 2011 IL...
