§ 5.5 Court Action
§ 5.5-1 Constitutionality of § 6-206(10) Upheld Properly
Horvath v. White, 358 Ill. App. 3d 844, 832 N.E.2d 366, 295 Ill. Dec. 215 (1st Dist. 2005). Defendant, James Horvath, was arrested in Iowa and when the police searched him they found an Illinois State identification card belonging to plaintiff's brother, Daniel Horvath. The brother was above the legal drinking age on 8/21/00. After another matter was disposed in Iowa (public intoxication), the Iowa police sent notification to the Secretary of State that defendant had been arrested for intoxication and possession of another's identification. The Secretary of State pursuant to 625 ILCS 5/6-206(10) issued a notice of suspension to defendant. Defendant filed a motion to rescind the suspension or alternatively to have a hardship license issued during the period of suspension.
In a written motion, plaintiff filed a written motion alleging sec. 2-206(10) was unconstitutional based upon due process grounds and also violated the proportionate penalties of the Illinois Constitution. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that he had not used his brother's card and he had the card because his brother had left it at plaintiff's residence after sleeping over on a couch in plaintiff's domicile. The hearing officer denied plaintiff's request for a restricted driving permit and for rescission of the suspension.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County. The circuit judge affirmed the order of the Secretary of State, found the Secretary of State's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and sec. 2-206(10) was not unconstitutional on its face and the punishment received by plaintiff did not violate the proportionate penalties clause.
The appellate court affirmed finding that sec. 2-206(10) was rationally related to the safe and legal operation of a motor vehicle, was not unconstitutional on its face nor was it applied unconstitutionally upon plaintiff, and was not in violation of the proportionate penalties clause.
§ 5.5-2 Constitutionality of § 6-206(a)(43) Upheld
People v. Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d 1, 932 N.E.2d 998, 342 Ill. Dec. 537 (2010). The Illinois Statutes under 625 ILCS 5/6-206(a)(43) authorize the Secretary of State to suspend a person's driving privileges for 90 days upon receiving court supervision for unlawful consumption of alcohol by a minor under the age of 21 years.
Defendants pled guilty to consumption of alcohol and they received supervision for 90 days. The following day, the defendant's alleged sections 6-206(a)(43) violated their right to due process and equal protection. The circuit court declared section 6-206(a)(43) unconstitutional. The trial court rationalized the suspension of these individuals was improper because the use of a motor vehicle was not involved in the commission of the offense.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The court determined that suspending defendant's driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol was rationally related to the legitimate public interest in the safe and legal operations of motor vehicles. There was no violation of due process. The rational basis test is satisfied if there is a conceivable basis for finding a statute rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The statute also did not violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The legitimate state interest was to promote safe highways not to punish licensees for underage consumption of alcohol. The proportionate penalties clause did not apply here because the suspension of the driver privileges was not a direct action by the government to inflict punishment.
§ 5.5-3 Continuance Denied Improperly
People v. Elder, 162 Ill. App. 3d 417, 515 N.E.2d 413, 113 Ill. Dec. 604 (3d Dist. 1987). A trial court denied the State's motion for continuance, denied a motion to dismiss with leave to refile and ordered the State to proceed to trial. The State did not offer any evidence and defendant was discharged. This procedure was held to be error since the State's motion for dismissal was not vexatious nor would the defendant be prejudiced by the court granting a continuance. Further, the procedure followed by the court was in violation of ch. 38, sec. 14-4(c) which requires a court to grant one more court date for the State to commence its prosecution and that date is to be within the 14-30 day time constraint stated in the statute.
§ 5.5-4 Denial of Krankel Hearing Regarding Claim of Ineffective Counsel
People v. Whitaker, 2012 IL App 4th 110334, 974 N.E.2d 445, 362 Ill. Dec. 924. The defendant pleaded guilty to driving while license was revoked. He received a sentence of 3 years. The defendant attempted to vacate his plea of guilty Following the failure of his attorney to file a 604(d) certificate, the matter was remanded. On remand the defendant filed a letter raising claims about his counsel and requesting to be present at a "pre-trial." At a hearing the defendant stated his attorney told him his sentence would be 18 months, attempted to withdraw his plea of guilty, and it was denied. He appealed claiming the trial court failed to conduct a hearing on his postplea claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The appellate court affirmed noting the letter sent by the defendant raising concerns about his counsel did not request new counsel or claim he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.
§ 5.5-5 Dismissal
§ 5.5-5(a) Denied Properly
People v. Platts, 274 Ill. App. 3d 753, 655 N.E.2d 300, 211 Ill. Dec. 397 (2d Dist. 1995). Defendant's license was revoked in Illinois. He move to Canada and was able to obtain a driver's license. While driving in Illinois, he was arrested for DUI and DWLR. The trial court's ruling that the charge would stand even though defendant had obtained a license from Canada was affirmed.
People v. Barrett, 307 Ill. App. 3d 812, 718 N.E.2d 341, 240 Ill. Dec. 860 (4th Dist. 1999). Defendant was convicted of driving while license was revoked in 1991. The appellate court mandate was issued, however action to enforce the sentence did not occur until 1998. The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. The appellate court affirmed. The court found that the appropriate procedure would have been for defendant to file a writ of habeas corpus.
§ 5.5-5(b) Granted Improperly
People v. Madsen, 196 Ill. App. 3d 220, 553 N.E.2d 436, 142 Ill. Dec. 922 (2d Dist. 1990). A trial court dismissed a charge of driving while license was revoked, equating a jury demand to be the same thing as a speedy trial demand. The appellate court reversed, finding defendant had not complied with the statute and holding a jury demand is not the same as a speedy trial request.
People v. Brandow, 213 Ill. App. 3d 665, 572 N.E.2d 350, 157 Ill. Dec. 281 (2d Dist. 1991). Defendant was charged with a felony driving while license is revoked, misdemeanor driving while license is revoked, and speeding. The facts surrounding these charges were used as aggravation in a sentencing hearing on unrelated charges. The trial court on its own dismissed the above charges on double jeopardy grounds. The appellate court reversed finding the trial court's consideration of and reliance upon evidence relating to the factual circumstances of pending charges as aggravating factors in imposing sentence does not constitute a violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights against double jeopardy.
People v. Masten, 219 Ill. App. 3d 172, 579 N.E.2d 27, 161 Ill. Dec. 770 (5th Dist. 1991). Defendant was convicted of DUI on 3/25 / 76 and his license was revoked on 5/18/76. On 4/7/89 defendant pled guilty to DUI and while no sentence was given, a summary suspension was entered for the period of 5/13/89 to 11/13/89. Defendant obtained a license from Virginia, a compact state, on 6/9/89. Based upon the issuance of the Virginia license, the trial court dismissed a felony driving while license was revoked.
The appellate court reversed finding that Virginia could not issue a license to defendant because at the time the Virginia license was issued, defendant's license was still suspended in Illinois.
People v. Focia, 287 Ill. App. 3d 767, 679 N.E.2d 121, 223 Ill. Dec. 177 (3d Dist. 1997). Defendant was charged with DUI occurring on January 13, 1995. Her statutory summary suspension was to take effect on March 1, 1995. On September 27, 1995, she filed a motion to rescind. On November 1, 1995, defendant was ticketed for driving while license was suspended. On November 13, 1995, defendant was successful at rescinding the summary suspension. The trial court then dismissed the suspended license charge, accepting defendant's argument that the rescission on November 13, 1995 allowed for the retroactive reinstatement of her license as of March 1, 1995. The appellate court reversed finding that the suspension was in effect until it was removed from defendant's driving record.
People v. Martinez, 296 Ill. App. 3d 330, 694 N.E.2d 1084, 230 Ill. Dec. 806 (2d Dist. 1998). Defendant was indicted for driving while license was suspended. The trial court dismissed the indictment on the ground the all-terrain vehicle (ATV) defendant was driving was not a "motor vehicle" as contemplated by section 6-303. The appellate court reversed and remanded the matter, finding that the driving of an ATV is covered by provisions in the Illinois Vehicle Code. An ATV is a motor vehicle regardless of the fact that one can drive it without a license, that the legislature defines what an ATV is, and that there is a separate offense of driving an ATV on the public highway.
People v. Lenz, 301 Ill. App. 3d 557, 703 NE 2d 971, 234 Ill. Dec. 812 (2d Dist. 1998). In 1997, defendant was charged with driving while license was revoked. He moved to dismiss the charge because he had a valid Iowa driver's license that was issued in February of 1995. The trial court granted the motion. The appellate court reversed...
