1 Toms Point Lane Corp. v. N.Y.S. Div. of Human Rights

176 A.D.3d 930

112 N.Y.S.3d 250

In the Matter of 1 TOMS POINT LANE CORPORATION, Petitioner/Cross Respondent,

v.NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondent/Cross Petitioner,Virginia Hough, Respondent.

2016–13134

Index No. 5887/16

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued - May 28, 2019

October 16, 2019

Albanese & Albanese, LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Bruce W. Migatz of counsel), for petitioner/cross respondent.

Caroline J. Downey, Bronx, N.Y. (Toni Ann Hollifield of counsel), for respondent / cross petitioner.

Haber & Haber, LLP, Garden City, N.Y. (Stephen D. Haber of counsel), for respondent.

RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, HECTOR D. LASALLE, JJ.

DECISION & JUDGMENT

Proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298 to review a determination of the Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights dated June 24, 2016, and cross petition by the New York State Division of Human Rights to enforce the determination. The determination adopted the recommendation and findings of an administrative law judge dated April 13, 2016, made after a hearing, finding that the petitioner/cross respondent unlawfully discriminated against the complainant on the basis of disability, directing the petitioner/cross respondent to cease and desist from enforcing any rules or policies prohibiting the complainant from keeping a dog in her apartment, and awarding the complainant compensatory damages in the principal sum of $1,000 for mental anguish and attorneys' fees in the sum of $11,961.

ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, and the cross petition is granted, with one bill of costs to the respondent/cross petitioner and the respondent.

Virginia Hough filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (hereinafter the NYSDHR) against 1 Toms Point Lane Corporation (hereinafter the co-op), alleging a violation of the New York State Human Rights Law ( Executive Law § 296 ). Hough alleged that the co-op was discriminating against her on the basis of disability, as she was not allowed to keep an emotional support dog in her apartment to help ameliorate her generalized anxiety disorder. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (hereinafter the ALJ) made a recommendation and findings in favor of Hough, directing the co-op to cease and desist from enforcing against Hough any rules or policies prohibiting dogs and awarding Hough compensatory damages in the principal sum of $1,000 for mental anguish and attorneys' fees in the sum of $11,961. The Commissioner of the NYSDHR adopted the ALJ's recommendation and findings. The co-op commenced this proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298 to review the Commissioner's determination, and the NYSDHR cross-petitioned to enforce the determination.

Judicial review of an administrative determination made after a hearing required by law at which evidence is taken is limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence (see CPLR 7803[4] ; Matter of Fortuna v. City of White Plains, 170 A.D.3d 1011, 96 N.Y.S.3d 286 ; Matter of MVM Constr., LLC v. Westchester County, 150 A.D.3d 857, 51 N.Y.S.3d 898 ; Matter of Caulkins v. Town of Pound Ridge, 132 A.D.3d 863, 17 N.Y.S.3d 898 ). Substantial evidence consists of such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact (see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 ; Matter of Caulkins v. Town of Pound Ridge, 132 A.D.3d 863, 17 N.Y.S.3d 898 ; Matter of Garvey v. Sullivan, 129 A.D.3d 1078, 13 N.Y.S.3d 159 ).

To establish that a violation of the Human Rights Law occurred and that a reasonable accommodation should have been made, Hough was required to demonstrate that she is disabled, that she is otherwise qualified for the tenancy, that because of her disability it is necessary for her to keep a dog in order for her to use and enjoy the apartment, and that reasonable accommodations could be made to allow her to keep a dog (see Matter of Kennedy St. Quad., Ltd. v. Nathanson, 62 A.D.3d 879, 879 N.Y.S.2d 197 ). The term disability, as defined by Executive Law § 292(21), means "(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques or (b) a record of such an impairment or (c) a condition regarded by others as such an impairment."

Here, there was substantial evidence in the record to conclude that Hough suffered from generalized anxiety disorder, an impairment demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, and that she required the use of a companion dog to use and enjoy her apartment. There is sufficient evidence that having a dog would affirmatively enhance Hough's quality of life by ameliorating the effects of her disability, thus demonstrating necessity within the meaning of the Human Rights Law (see Hollandale Apts. & Health Club, LLC v. Bonesteel, 173 A.D.3d 55, 100 N.Y.S.3d 711 ; cf. Matter of Delkap Mgt., Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 144 A.D.3d 1148, 42 N.Y.S.3d 254, revd 33 N.Y.3d 925, 97 N.Y.S.3d 655, 121 N.E.3d 283 ; Matter of Kennedy St. Quad., Ltd. v. Nathanson, 62 A.D.3d 879, 879 N.Y.S.2d 197 ).

Where, as here, there is conflicting medical evidence, a hearing officer is vested with the exclusive authority to weigh such evidence and credit the opinion of one medical expert over another (see Matter of Neely v. DiNapoli, 71...