A zoning ordinance may impose time, place and manner regulations on activities protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment as long as the ordinance is content neutral, designed to serve a substantial governmental interest, narrowly tailored, and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, -- U.S. --, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2015) (Town of Gilbert's ordinance restricting the size, duration, and location of temporary directional signs (which differed from restrictions on ideological signs and political signs) is on its face content-based regulation of speech, subject to strict scrutiny; such restrictions single out subject matter for different treatment even if they do not target viewpoints within subject matter; content-based regulations stand only if they survive strict scrutiny, which requires the Town to prove that the regulations are narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest; the Town's reliance on aesthetic appeal and traffic safety to justify its code's distinctions "fail as hopelessly underinclusive"; a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order and justifying a restriction on truthful speech when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited; calls into question all content-based regulations of signs and other speech)
City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts, LLC, 541 U.S. 774, 124 S. Ct. 2219, 159 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2004) (adult business zoning/licensing ordinance that provided for appeal of license denial to the state district court but which did not by its terms mandate prompt judicial review was held to satisfy the requirement of a prompt judicial determination set forth in FW/PBS; the state's ordinary judicial review rules suffice to assure a prompt judicial decision, as long as the courts remain sensitive to the need to prevent First Amendment harms and administer those procedures accordingly)
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 122 S. Ct. 1728, 152 L. Ed. 2d 670 (2002) (an ordinance banning multiple-use adult businesses survived summary judgment; a plurality of the Court concludes that the city may reasonably rely on a 1977 study finding that concentrations of adult businesses are associated with higher crime rates to demonstrate that the ban of multiple-use adult businesses serves its interest in reducing crime; Justice Kennedy separately opines that on remand the city must show that its 1977 study demonstrates that the ban has the purpose and effect of suppressing secondary effects, while leaving the quantity and accessibility of speech substantially intact)
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 121 S. Ct. 2404, 150 L. Ed. 2d 532 (2001) (Massachusetts' outdoor advertising regulations prohibiting smokeless tobacco and cigars advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground violate the First Amendment; the uniformly broad sweep of the geographical limitation and the range of communications restricted demonstrate a lack of tailoring)
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 129 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1994) (ordinance banning virtually all residential signs, including those containing political anti-war messages, held to violate First Amendment by eliminating that medium to political, religious or personal messages)
FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 110 S. Ct. 596, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990) (a content- and viewpoint-neutral license requirement applicable to businesses engaged in activities protected by the First Amendment (1) must expressly limit the time the licensor has to decide whether to grant or refuse a license, and (2) must allow prompt judicial review in the event of denial)
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1989) (municipal noise regulation designed to ensure that music performances in public park band shell do not disturb surrounding residents or other park users not facially invalid by requiring performers to use sound system and sound technician provided by city, because ordinance was content-neutral and did not vest unbridled discretion in city officials)
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S. Ct. 925, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1986) (court upheld zoning ordinance concentrating adult theatres in one area of the city)
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1984) (ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property held constitutional as applied to the posting of political campaign signs on public property)
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1981) (billboard ban held unconstitutional because ordinance permitted some types of commercial signs but prohibited all noncommercial signs)
Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S. Ct. 2176, 68 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1981) (ordinance which prohibited all live entertainment in city was held to violate the First Amendment)
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S. Ct. 2440, 49 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1976) (court upheld zoning ordinance dispersing adult businesses)
Real v. City of Long Beach, 852 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2017) (tattooing is a purely expressive activity fully protected by the First Amendment; a tattoo artist is not required to first apply for and then be denied a conditional use permit before bringing a facial challenge to a permitting system that allegedly gives city officials unfettered discretion over protected activity; a prior restraint claim may consist of a licensing scheme that places unbridled discretion in the hands of a government official or agency and need not be an outright prohibition; a prior restraint that does not limit the time to issue a license is impermissible)
Recycle for Change v. City of Oakland, 856 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2017) (an ordinance regulating unattended collection of personal items for distribution, reuse, and recycling, without regard to the charitable or business purpose for doing so, is content neutral to the extent it regulates speech or expressive activity at all; a city's regulation of the placement and upkeep of unattended donation collection boxes serves the stated interests of combatting blight, illegal dumping, graffiti, and traffic impediments endangering drivers and pedestrians; licensing fees that defray administrative costs do not facially violate the First Amendment)
Lone Star Security and Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 827 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2016) (upheld municipal ordinances regulating mobile billboards as content neutral regulations, narrowly tailored to eliminate visual blight and promote the safe and convenient flow of traffic; leaving open adequate alternative channels for communication)
Charles v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2339 (2013) (a temporary offsite sign advertising a television program that involved constitutionally protected speech was properly characterized by city officials as strictly commercial in nature and, thus, not within an exemption in the sign code for noncommercial speech; where the facts present a close question, strong support that the speech should be characterized as commercial speech is found where the speech is an advertisement, the speech refers to a particular product, and the speaker has an economic motivation; the core notion of commercial speech is that it does no more than propose a commercial transaction)
...Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los
