2.9 APPELLATE REVIEW OF SANCTION AWARDS
2.901 Abuse of Discretion Standard. Appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court's determination that Section 8.01-271.1 (or the rules) has been violated. 198 However, an appellate court should not simply rubber stamp every discretionary decision of a trial court. 199
An issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question of law which is reviewed de novo. When the language of a statute is unambiguous, the reviewing court is bound by the plain meaning of that language. Furthermore, it must give effect to the legislature's intention as expressed by the language used unless a literal interpretation of the language would result in a manifest absurdity. If a statute is subject to more than one interpretation, the reviewing court must apply the interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent behind the statute. 200
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In reviewing a trial court's award of sanctions under Section 8.01-271.1, the reviewing court applies an abuse of discretion standard, using an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a litigant and his attorney, after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a reasonable belief that the pleading was well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and not interposed for an improper purpose. 201
Appellate courts are usually confronted with a mixed question of law and fact in these cases and the "inquiry into a person's actual state of knowledge in the light of applicable principles of law can seldom present a clear-cut issue of fact, but requires the exercise of sound judicial discretion." 202
When the issue is one of law, and not fact, the Virginia Supreme Court does not accord the trial court's ruling the same weight it would be accorded if reached upon conflicting factual evidence. 203
"The factual determinations of the [circuit] court, like those of a jury, are binding on [the Supreme Court]" and will be reversed only if they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. 204
2.902 Contempt.
A. Generally. Contempt is defined as an act in disrespect of the court or its processes or which obstructs the administration of justice or tends to bring the court into disrepute. 205 Any act that is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the administration of justice is contempt. 206
B. Basis for Contempt Findings. Section 18.2-456(1) permits a court to issue "attachments for contempt and punish them summarily" in
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cases involving "[m]isbehavior in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct or interrupt the administration of justice." 207
It has long been recognized that all courts in Virginia have the power to impose penalties for contemptuous conduct. 208 A court's authority to punish contemptuous conduct is exercised to reserve the power of the court and to vindicate the court's dignity. The exercise of this power, however, "is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions." 209 Thus, in criminal contempt proceedings, it is essential to consider whether the accused intended to undermine the court's authority. 210 "The limits of the power to punish for contempt are 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.'" 211
The Virginia Constitution authorizes the legislature to regulate the court's power to punish for contempt. The Virginia courts construe this provision as permitting the legislature to regulate contempt only to the extent the regulation does not abridge the court's inherent contempt powers. The specific legal standard is whether the statute destroys or so far diminishes the court's contempt powers that they become ineffectual. 212
Virginia courts have held contempt statutes unconstitutional when they have provided contemnors with a right to jury trial for all summary contempt proceedings 213 and for all indirect contempt proceedings. 214
Summary contempt statutes have been upheld when the right to a jury trial has been narrowly limited. 215
In a district court contempt proceeding under section 18.2-458, where the accused was convicted of failure to appear in district court, where summary contempt is punishable by a fine not to exceed $250 and/or imprisonment
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of no more than 10 days, on appeal the circuit court's appellate jurisdiction is derivative of the district court's jurisdiction and is limited to the punishment available to the district court. 216
Sections 16.1-69.24 and 18.2-459 address the specific subject of appeals from summary contempt adjudications in the district courts, and the legislature did not include the right to a trial de novo or its attendant Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation for summary contempt appeals. 217
C. Civil Contempt or Criminal Contempt. It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that distinguishes civil and criminal contempt. 218
Criminal contempt is punitive in nature and is characterized by fines and unconditional determinate sentences based on a defendant undertaking a prohibited act and in order for the court to vindicate its authority. 219
Civil contempt generally is remedial and for the benefit of the injured party. Civil contempts have conditional sentences and the contempt is in order to coerce compliance with a court order or to compensate for a loss. 220 Civil contempts can often be purged, that is, the contemnor has the keys to the jailhouse which can be unlocked by obeying the court order. Civil contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with a court order or to compensate for losses or damages sustained by reason of noncompliance with the order. 221
[A]n accused may be tried simultaneously for criminal and civil contempt under certain circumstances. Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42, 47, 461 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1995). "Although the criminal and civil contempt matters [are] tried together, prejudice [is] avoided so long as 'the defendants [are] . . . accorded all the rights and privileges owing to defendants in criminal contempt cases.'" Id. (quoting
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United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 298 (1947). 222
"A court may not convert a civil contempt hearing into a criminal trial without notice to the accused." 223
There are two distinct types of contempt, direct and indirect. 224
"Direct contempt occurs when the contemptible conduct 'is committed in the presence of the court.' In that circumstance, the court 'is competent . . . to proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts, and to punish the offender without further proof, and without issue or trial in any form.'" 225
"[D]irect contempts in the presence of the court traditionally have been subject to summary adjudication 'to maintain order in the courtroom and the integrity of the trial process in the face of an "actual obstruction of justice."'" 226
"Summary punishment always, and rightfully, is regarded with disfavor and, if imposed in passion or pettiness brings discredit to a court as certainly as the conduct it penalizes." 227
"Indirect contempt, however, takes place when the contemptible conduct is 'committed not in the presence of the court.' In that circumstance, 'the offender must be brought before the court by a rule or some other sufficient process.'" 228
"[P]rocedural protections are afforded for contempts occurring out of court, where the considerations justifying expedited procedures do not pertain." 229
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D. Petty Contempt. Petty contempt, which may be direct or indirect, is punishable under a statute that authorizes no more than six months' imprisonment. 230
The Supreme Court has emphasized that Sixth Amendment rights do not apply to adjudications for contempt, including those of petty, direct contempt. While contempt may be an offense against the law and subject to appropriate punishment, certain it is that since the foundation of our government proceedings to punish such offenses have been regarded as sui generis and not criminal prosecutions within the Sixth Amendment or common understanding.
Because criminal contempt proceedings are not "criminal prosecutions," the protections of the Sixth Amendment do not apply to such proceedings. Instead the safeguards applicable in such cases are protections of fairness guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Summary adjudications for petty, direct contempt repeatedly have been held to provide due process of law. 231
E. Due Process Requirements. In Scialdone v. Common-wealth, 232 the court stated that
Except for a narrowly limited category of contempts, due process of law . . . requires that one charged with contempt of court be advised of the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf either by way of defense or explanation. The narrow exception to these due process requirements includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment is essential to prevent "demoralization of the court's authority" before the public. If some
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essential elements of the offense are not personally observed by the judge, so that he must depend upon statements made by others for his knowledge about these essential elements, due process requires . . . that the accused be accorded notice and a fair hearing as above set out.
"[U]nless the contempt is 'committed in open court,' due process 'requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet...
