34-f-1 The Right Not to Be Punished

34-F-1. The Right Not to be Punished

(a) Punishment for Underlying Crime

The purpose of detaining you prior to or during trial is not to punish you, but to ensure your presence at trial.¹⁸⁸ Thus, under Bell v. Wolfish, you cannot be punished for the crime that you are accused of while you are a pretrial detainee.¹⁸⁹ Under Wolfish, therefore, the central question is whether the conditions that you are subject to constitute punishment.¹⁹⁰

(i) Intent to Punish

The most direct way to show that the conditions constitute punishment is to show that they were intended to punish you. For example, in a case involving a pretrial detainee who was confined in a restraint chair for eight hours after fighting with prison guards, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the jury should have been allowed to determine whether the guards confined the prisoner in the chair for the purpose of maintaining prison order and security or for the purpose of punishment. If the guards' intent was to maintain order, their actions were constitutional; if their intent was to punish, then their actions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁹¹

(ii) Not Related to Non-Punitive Government Goals

It is often difficult to prove the intent of a prison imposing a set of conditions. Without proof of intent, the conditions will be considered punishment if you can show that they are not reasonably related to a legitimate, non-punitive government goal. This involves answering two questions:

(1) is the goal of the conditions legitimate and non-punitive (establishing what the goal is and whether it is a valid goal that is not meant to punish); and

(2) are the conditions an excessive way to achieve that goal (establishing whether the conditions were proportional to the goal).¹⁹² It is difficult but not impossible to show that the conditions or restrictions of your pretrial detention amount to punishment under this two-part test. If the goal of the conditions is punitive (to punish) or otherwise not legitimate, then the conditions amount to punishment. Likewise, if the goal is legitimate but the conditions are an excessive way to achieve that goal, then the conditions amount to punishment.

In applying the first part of the test, the Wolfish court found that the maintenance of order and security in a detention facility is a legitimate non-punitive government goal.¹⁹³ Jail officials will generally claim that whatever they did to you was for legitimate purposes of maintaining order and security-not for punishment-but a court may find the conditions impermissible despite these jail officials' claims.¹⁹⁴ For example, if one prison official makes up a false charge against you, and then other guards take measures that they legitimately believe to be non-punitive, you may be able to show that the officer who falsely accused you intended to punish you. If you can trace back the harmful treatment to any prison official who intended to punish you, you may be able to establish unconstitutional pretrial punishment.¹⁹⁵

In examining whether the measures taken were excessive, the Wolfish court stated that courts should grant prison authorities "wide-ranging deference" for their judgments about what practices are needed to maintain order and security in a prison or detention facility.¹⁹⁶ This means that even if the prison's methods for maintaining order and security are unpleasant for inmates, the court is unlikely to substitute its own judgment for that of the prison officials. ¹⁹⁷ Overly harsh conditions and restrictions are, nevertheless, violations.¹⁹⁸ For example, where a detainee was kept in isolation lockup for nine months without any apparent reason, the court held that, on its face, such treatment "smacks of punishment."¹⁹⁹ The court remanded the case to determine whether there was a legitimate reason to justify the lockup in the isolation wing.²⁰⁰

In another case, prisoners were chained and handcuffed for over twelve hours and deprived of access to toilets after a failed escape attempt. The court held that such restraints would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if the jury found that the restraints were not a reasonable method of preventing prisoners from escaping again, or if "alternative and less harsh methods" could have been used.²⁰¹ Furthermore, "a severe curtailment" of pretrial detainees' out of cell time may be evidence of punitive intent and constitute punishment,²⁰² even when dealing with prisoners who "are determined to be prone to: escape; assault staff or other inmates ... or likely to need protection from other inmates [sic]."²⁰³

The Wolfish case itself involved a wide range of prison practices, all of which the Court upheld as reasonably related to a legitimate need...