57 Broad St. Stamford, LLC v. Summer House Owners, LLC

184 Conn.App. 834

195 A.3d 1143

57 BROAD STREET STAMFORD, LLC, et al.

v.SUMMER HOUSE OWNERS, LLC

AC 39912

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 5, 2018

Officially released September 18, 2018

Matthew B. Woods, Norwalk, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

James R. Fogarty, Old Greenwich, for the appellee (defendant).

Lavine, Prescott and Harper, Js.

HARPER, J.

In this easement dispute, the plaintiffs, 57 Broad Street Stamford, LLC, and 59 Broad Street Stamford, LLC, appeal from the judgment rendered by the trial court, following a trial to the court, in favor of the defendant, Summer House Owners, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in concluding that (1) the defendant's construction of a 1500 square foot service access structure within a 6900 square foot easement area did not materially interfere with the plaintiffs' reasonable use and enjoyment of the easement area, and (2) the defendant had the unilateral right to determine the method, timing, and location by which the plaintiffs might use the easement area. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as set forth in the court's memorandum of decision or otherwise in the record and undisputed, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In a complaint dated January 11, 2016, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant materially and substantially had interfered with their use and enjoyment of an easement, titled "Easement A" (easement).¹ The plaintiffs sought both compensatory damages and injunctive relief. The easement is "contained in the recorded documents [declaration] establishing the entity known as the Broad Summer Condominium [condominium] located in downtown Stamford .... The [c]ondominium is described as an ‘air rights condominium,’ and consists of six units. Unit 1 contains what is described as an almost forty year old, 30,000 square foot three story building with full basement fronting on Broad Street .... The building has been vacant for several years. Unit 1 is jointly owned by the plaintiffs .... Unit 2 ... is the beneficiary of most of the air rights and the present site of a recently constructed [twenty-one] story residential apartment building that includes four parking levels, owned by the defendant and known as Summer House....²

"The area of [u]nit 2, which has an undivided interest in the [c]ondominium of 25.97 percent, includes an easement area ... for the benefit of [u]nits 1, 3 and 4.... The [easement] area consists of a little less than 6900 square feet....

"The [d]eclarant of the [c]ondominium is Tolari, LLC [Tolari]. Thomas Rich, the chief executive officer of F.D. Rich Co[mpany], a long time real estate developer in Stamford, is Tolari's managing member, and also an owner of Summer House [condominium]. F.D. Rich Co[mpany] is described as the primary developer of Summer House.... Tolari and the principals of the plaintiffs, Kostas Alafoyiannis (principal of 57 Broad [Street Stamford, LLC] ) and Alexander Todorovic (principal of 59 Broad [Street Stamford, LLC] ) signed a contract, dated June 19, 2012, for [the plaintiffs'] purchase of [u]nit 1.... Because the [c]ondominium [d]eclaration and the plans for the apartment building were not complete at that time, the contract contained an ‘out’ clause allowing the [u]nit 1 purchasers a period of time to rescind the purchase for ‘any reason or no reason.’ There followed negotiations between attorneys for the [u]nit 1 purchasers ... and the attorney for the seller-declarant ...."³ (Footnote added.) These negotiations concerned the easement language that is at issue in the present case. The language as negotiated is contained in [§] 12.2 of the declaration, which is dated October 24, 2012.⁴

Approximately one year later, the construction plans were finalized. "The construction contract for Summer House was dated August 28, 2013.... The plaintiffs were notified that construction would commence by letter dated January 7, 2014.... The progress of construction is shown by dated photographs ... taken between February, 2014 [and] October, 2015. The ... plaintiffs occasionally visited their building during the construction period." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) During this time, construction began on the service access structure at issue in this appeal. "[T]he service access structure is approximately [seventy-five] feet long running east to west and [twenty] feet wide. The structure effectively leaves three means of access to the south side of the plaintiffs' building on [u]nit 1. These means of access ... are: (1) a [ten] foot wide passage way between the Target Store and [u]nit 1 extending south from Broad Street to the light and air easement area south of [u]nit 1; (2) a seven foot wide sidewalk running east-west between the ‘service access structure’ and the Target Store garage; and (3) an entryway under the Summer House varying in width from [twenty to twenty-six] feet beginning at what is labeled ‘Loading Area’ ... and running east from the Target access way and turning north toward the back, or south side, of the plaintiffs' building on [u]nit 1."

Thereafter, "[i]n December, 2015, ... [the plaintiffs' attorney], on behalf of the plaintiffs in a letter to ... [the defendant's attorney], demanded the defendant cease and desist from building further structures located on [the easement] and demolish what had been built there.... [The defendant's attorney] responded a little over a week later, noting that the plaintiffs had information for over two years of the planned construction on [the easement] and in any event, the plaintiffs would have the access and parking called for in [§] 12.2 of the [d]eclaration."

The plaintiffs commenced the underlying action the following month, claiming that their easement rights encompassed the entirety of the easement area and that the construction of a service access structure in the center of the easement interfered with those rights. A five day trial to the court took place between June 15 and July 21, 2016.⁵ On November 30, 2016, the court issued its memorandum of decision. It concluded that the defendant had not interfered with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of the easement and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant.⁶ This appeal followed.

I

The plaintiffs first claim that the court improperly concluded that the defendant did not interfere with their reasonable use and enjoyment of the easement. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the court erred in concluding that the defendant's construction of the 1500 square foot service access structure within the 6900 square foot easement area did not violate their easement rights. We disagree.

We first set forth our standard of review.⁷ "[T]he determination of the intent behind language in a deed, considered in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, presents a question of law on which our scope of review is ... plenary.... Thus, when faced with a question regarding the construction of language in deeds, the reviewing court does not give the customary deference to the trial court's factual inferences." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Avery v. Medina , 151 Conn. App. 433, 440–41, 94 A.3d 1241 (2014). In contrast, "[t]he determination of [the] reasonableness [of the use of an easement] is for the trier of fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stefanoni v. Duncan , 282 Conn. 686, 701, 923 A.2d 737 (2007). "This court [has] observed that review of the court's conclusion that [certain] plantings violated ... easement rights involves a mixed question of fact and law. [S]o-called mixed questions of fact and law, which require the application of a legal standard to the historical-fact determinations, are not facts in this sense.... [Such questions require] plenary review by this court unfettered by the clearly erroneous standard." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zirinsky v. Carnegie Hill Capital Asset Management, LLC , 139 Conn. App. 706, 714–15, 58 A.3d 284 (2012) ; see also D'Appollonio v. Griffo-Brandao , 138 Conn. App. 304, 323, 53 A.3d 1013 (2012). "When legal conclusions of the trial court are challenged on appeal, we must decide whether [those] ... conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zirinsky v. Carnegie Hill Capital Asset Management, LLC , supra, at 715, 58 A.3d 284.

"It is well settled that [a]n easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the rules authorized by the easement.... [T]he benefit of an easement ... is considered a nonpossessory interest in land because it generally authorizes limited uses of the burdened property for a particular purpose.... [E]asements are not ownership interests but rather privileges to use [the] land of another in [a] certain manner for [a] certain purpose ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cheshire Land Trust, LLC v. Casey , 156 Conn. App. 833, 844, 115 A.3d 497 (2015). "In determining the character and extent of an easement created by deed, the ordinary import of the language will be accepted as indicative of the intention of the parties, unless there is something in the situation of the property or the surrounding circumstances that calls for a different interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stefanoni v. Duncan , supra, 282 Conn. at 700, 923 A.2d 737. "Except as limited by the terms of the servitude ... the holder of an easement ... is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude.... Likewise, [e]xcept as limited by the terms of the servitude ... the holder of the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servitude." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Zirinsky v....