7.2 RIGHTS WARNINGS
7.201 In General. Rights warnings derive from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona. 1 In Miranda, the Court, using the common law's voluntariness doctrine 2 as a foundation, found that custodial police stationhouse interrogation is inherently coercive in a psychological sense. Rather than holding that all statements made pursuant to such interrogation are inadmissible, however, the Court drafted a set of requirements that it felt sufficiently balanced the oppressive atmosphere of the interrogation so as to ensure that any resulting statements would be voluntary and admissible. 3 These are the famous Miranda rights warnings requiring, inter alia, that a suspect be told of the right to remain silent and of the right to have counsel present at a custodial interrogation. The Court, believing that a warning of the right to remain silent alone would be insufficient to ensure voluntariness, found a Sixth Amendment right to have the assistance of counsel. Only an independent defense counsel was believed sufficient to rectify the imbalance found inherent in custodial interrogation. Although
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Miranda has been greatly criticized and has been limited somewhat in its effect, 4 the case is likely to remain a permanent part of the law for the indefinite future. 5
In Dickerson v. United States, 6 the Court held that the Miranda warnings and the Miranda decision are constitutionally based; accordingly, Congress has no authority to overrule the decision. As a threshold matter, Miranda is based primarily on the Fifth Amendment; it is inapplicable to attempts to obtain voice and handwriting exemplars, bodily fluid samples, or similar items that are not protected by the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 7
7.202 When Rights Warnings Are Required.
A. In General. According to Miranda, warnings are required when there is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 8 Rephrased for purposes of analysis, the rule is that warnings are required before (i) interrogation (ii) by governmental officers (iii) of a suspect in custody, whether for a felony or misdemeanor. 9 A "public safety" exception to the warning requirement permits the warnings to be omitted when the police or the public is exposed to an immediate danger associated with a weapon. The exception must be based on an objectively reasonable concern for safety. 10 B. Interrogation. No Miranda warnings are required unless there is an "interrogation." 11 Consequently, warnings are clearly not required if an individual volunteers a statement. 12 The difficulty is in determining
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what action constitutes "interrogation." In Brewer v. Williams, 13 the United States Supreme Court rejected Chief Justice Burger's views that actual questioning was required before Miranda warnings were necessary. The Brewer decision, however, did not purport to provide a definitive answer to the problem. Not until the decision in Rhode Island v. Innis 14 did the Court define the term "interrogation":
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. 15
Clearly, then, warnings are required whenever the police either question a suspect or should know that their words or conduct are reasonably likely to produce an incriminating response. 16 The Virginia Court of Appeals has held that the test of whether police conduct is the functional equivalent of questioning is whether an objective observer would view the officer's words or actions as being designed to elicit an incriminating response. Interrogation does not include words or actions that are normally attendant to arrest and custody. 17 The absence of warnings during routine inmate classification procedures
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does not require suppression of the defendant's statements unless the questions asked were designed to elicit incriminating statements; routine booking procedures include those common to all inmates and those required to facilitate orderly operation of the jail. 18 A number of court decisions have upheld the admissibility of incriminating information supplied in response to standard booking questions. 19 An officer's failure to read the defendant his Miranda warnings before administering a field sobriety test did not require suppression of the results of the field sobriety tests when none of the physical components of the tests involved testimonial communication and the officer's question about whether the defendant had any physical problems, and the defendant's response, were necessarily attendant to a legitimate police procedure: administering the field sobriety test. 20 Whether conduct that does not consist of express questions requires warnings is a question of fact to be determined by the judge in resolving a suppression motion. 21
C. Governmental Officers. Miranda warnings must be given before custodial interrogation by law enforcement officials. 22 Generally, this requirement applies to police officers, but it also extends to all those exercising law enforcement duties of whatever definition. Consequently, warnings must be given by prosecutors who interrogate a suspect otherwise entitled to warnings. Difficulties arise when dealing with persons who may be considered to be acting as agents of the police or when dealing with private police or security guards. In the first case, a sufficient nexus to establish a law enforcement function justifies treating an individual as a law enforcement officer for Miranda purposes. 23 In the second case, the question concerns the status of the particular individual under the law of the Commonwealth. If the individual exercises police-type powers—such as the power of arrest—that individual will be treated as a law enforcement agent.
Private citizens not acting as police agents are not required to give Miranda warnings. 24 The Virginia Court of Appeals has ruled that school officials
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who question students about violations of law or school rules are not required to administer warnings. 25 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that even if law enforcement officers are present, questioning by a defendant's mother, voluntarily undertaken by her, does not constitute official questioning by the police. 26 However, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 27 where a seventh-grade student was removed from class and questioned by school administrators and law enforcement, the United States Supreme Court determined that a child's age is a factor to be considered in the Miranda custody.
D. Suspect in Custody. Miranda warnings are required for a person who is interrogated after having "been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of . . . freedom of action in any significant way." 28 The totality of the circumstances must be considered in determining whether the suspect is "in custody" when questioned, but the ultimate inquiry is whether there is a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest. 29 Clearly, not all questioning of suspects who have been detained by the police constitutes "custodial interrogation" for Miranda purposes. Only when a suspect's freedom of movement is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest is the suspect entitled to the full protections of Miranda. 30 The question is how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have viewed the situation, including whether a suspect is questioned in neutral or familiar surroundings, the number of officers present, the
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degree of physical restraint, and the duration and character of the interrogation. 31
Other factors to be considered include the manner in which the individual is summoned by the police and the extent to which the officer's beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the individual were manifested to the individual. 32 No single factor is determinative of custody. The point at which the officer develops probable cause to arrest does not determine whether the suspect is in custody but is only one factor to consider. 33 Though informing a suspect that he or she is not under arrest is one factor, it is not a talismanic factor. 34 Even though an officer told the suspect that he was not under arrest during an investigation of an accident, placing the suspect in handcuffs and in the front seat of a locked patrol car was the functional equivalent of an arrest, and a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have so viewed the circumstances. 35 A police officer's undisclosed view that the person being questioned is not a suspect does not affect the determination of whether the person is "in custody" and thus entitled to warnings. 36
A suspect may be entitled to Miranda warnings even though not questioned at police headquarters. 37 Warnings, however, are not required merely because the questioning occurs at police headquarters or because the investigation has focused on the person being questioned. 38 It is the custodial
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nature of the interrogation, not its location, that triggers the need for warnings. 39
The Supreme Court has held that a motorist stopped by the police for a routine traffic infraction is not, without more, "in custody" for Miranda purposes. 40 Questioning in a "coercive" environment alone is insufficient to trigger the need for warnings since any interview with police officers may have coercive aspects to it. There must first be a restriction on freedom of movement. 41
7.203 Miranda ...
