A.A. a minor, by Jenny Carroll, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
NANCY T. BUCKNER, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, in her official capacity, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 2:21CV367-ECM (wo)
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
October 29, 2021
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
EMILY C. MARKS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Now pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by the Defendant, Nancy Buckner (doc. 23); a motion to appoint next friends, filed by the Plaintiffs (doc. 30); and a motion to file surreply, filed by the Plaintiffs (doc. 36).
The Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (doc. 1), on May 20, 2021. They bring claims of discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)(count one) and discrimination in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (count two).
The Defendant, Nancy Buckner, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR) has moved to dismiss the complaint.
The Plaintiffs have moved for Jenny Carroll to be named next friend for Plaintiffs A.A. and B.B., for Christine Freeman to be named next friend for Plaintiff D.D., and for C.G. to be named next friend for Plaintiff C.C.
Upon consideration of the motions, the briefs, including the surreply filed by the Plaintiffs, the record, and applicable law, and for reasons to be discussed, the motion to appoint next friends is due to be GRANTED and the motion to dismiss is due to be GRANTED, but the Plaintiffs will be given time to file an amended complaint.
I. FACTS
The facts alleged by the Plaintiffs in the complaint are as follows:
The Plaintiffs are youths with mental impairments in the custody of the DHR who have been removed from their families and are placed in, or are at risk of being placed in, psychiatric residential treatment facilities (PRTFs). The Defendant Commissioner of DHR is sued in her official capacity.
PRFTs are non-hospital residential facilities that provide mental heath services to individuals who are Medicaid-eligible under the age of 21. (Doc. 1 at 2). The complaint alleges that youth in PRTFs are cut off from family and friends and have few opportunities to interact with persons without a disability. Placement is also alleged to prevent the formation of meaningful relationships with adults, leading to toxic stress. The complaint alleges that DHR overuses residential facilities for children in foster care, so that fifty-two percent of all children and youth in residential facilities are placed in PRTFs. The complaint further alleges that DHR unjustifiably places and maintains children in PRTFs because it fails to fulfill its duty to procure, support, and maintain family homes and integrated community settings. (Id. at 18).
The amended complaint cites to a 2018 report to the federal government in which the complaint alleges that DHR admitted that it has relied on institutional placements because it lacks sufficient community-based alternatives, and reports in 2019 and 2020 that DHR needs more resource families to lessen its dependence on congregate care facilities. (Id. at 21).
The complaint asserts that DHR has the framework for providing necessary mental and behavioral health services, but rather than expand programs, DHR continues a discriminatory policy of unnecessarily institutionalizing youth in segregated placements.
The complaint separately alleges that children who should have been evaluated and stepped down to family homes and other integrated community settings are discriminated against and forced to stay in facilities longer than necessary. The Plaintiffs challenge the PRTFs level system to determine whether a child has completed the program and can be stepped down to a less restrictive placement. The Plaintiffs also challenge the conditions within certain of the PRTFs.
The Plaintiffs allege that they are eligible for community-based placement. With regard to A.A., the complaint alleges more specifically that in August 2020, DHR determined that A.A. was ready to be moved to a less restrictive environment, but A.A. has not been moved. (Id. at 7).
The complaint asks the Court to award prospective injunctive relief requiring the Defendant to develop and sustain sufficient capacity of community-based placements and services to meet the needs of Alabama's children in foster care with mental impairments;
to implement and sustain an effective system to ensure youth in foster care with mental impairments are timely transitioned to integrated settings in the community; and to successfully transition Plaintiffs to integrated settings in the community. (Id. at 32-3).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Appoint Next Friends
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 provides that a minor may bring a lawsuit in federal court through a representative, such as a general guardian, a committee, a conservator, or a like fiduciary. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c)(1).
B. Motion to Dismiss
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 663 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations that are merely “conceivable” and fail to rise “above the speculative level” are insufficient to meet the plausibility standard.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678. Indeed, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id.
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, may be a factual or facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction. Barnett v. Okeechobee Hosp., 283 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2002). A factual attack permits the district court to weigh evidence outside the pleadings to satisfy itself of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Id. at 1237. However, a facial attack merely questions the sufficiency of the pleading. Id. Under a facial attack, the district court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true and need not look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Appoint Next Friends
The Plaintiffs originally sought appointment of next friends for A.A, B.B., C.C., and D.D. Plaintiff A.A. turned 19 while the motion was pending and no longer requires a next friend. (Doc. 40-1). The Defendant concedes that C.G., C.C.'s uncle, is an appropriate next friend. (Doc. 34 at 7). At issue, therefore, are the requests for Jenny Carroll (“Carroll”) to be named next friend for B.C. and for Christine Freeman (“Freeman”) to be named next friend for D.D.
The Defendant opposes the naming of these next friends, arguing primarily that while Carroll and Freeman are successful professionals, they are not appropriate next friends because they are “ideological next friends, ” and do not have a sufficiently significant relationship with the Plaintiffs. The Defendants also point out that the Plaintiffs are represented by guardians ad litem in state court.
In the Eleventh Circuit, proceeding by next friend is appropriate where the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf and the next friend is truly dedicated to the best interests of the person she represents. Shanchez-Valasco v. Sec'y of Dep't of Corr., 287 F.3d 1015, 1025 (11th Cir. 2022). A significant relationship is not required. See Lonchar v. Zant, 978 F.2d 637, 641 (11th Cir. 1992) (next friend must show “some relationship or other evidence that would suggest that the next friend is truly dedicated” to plaintiff's interest)(emphasis added). The Plaintiffs argue that where, as here, children lack significant ties with their parents and have been placed under the state's legal custody, a significant relationship is not required, citing Sam M. v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77, 87 (1st Cir. 2020).
The Plaintiffs support their motion to appoint next friends with declarations which state that the proposed next friends appear for the sole purpose of vindicating Plaintiffs' rights to be placed in non-segregated environments and to be free from harm, have no individual motivations, have met with each child on whose behalf they now appear, and have determined that they can genuinely represent the best interests of those children in this action. (Doc. 30-1 at 13-14, 25-26). The Plaintiffs also point to the statutory authority
of guardians ad litem in Alabama and take the position that guardians ad litem are not authorized to represent children in federal court litigation and so cannot serve as next friends here. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-304 (outlining responsibilities of guardian ad litem in dependency and termination of parental rights proceedings).
A similar next friend request has been approved by a court outside of this circuit, and this Court is persuaded by its analysis that a non-family member next friend is appropriate...
