Aaron v. Target Corp

1

MALIK AARON, an individual, GREGORY KIM, a minor, by and through his guardian ad litem, Angel Rufuerzo, Plaintiffs, v. TARGET CORPORATION, a Minnesota corporation; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a public entity; VINCENT KRUSE, an individual; RAFAEL MEJIA, an individual; MICHAEL RUSSELL, and individual; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-01237-MEMF-JPR

United States District Court, C.D. California

December 1, 2023

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT TARGET CORPORATION [ECF NOS 49, 52] AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES RAFAEL MEJIA, AND MICHAEL RUSSELL'S [ECF NO. 50, 56] MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment (the “Motions”) filed by (1) Defendant Target Corporation (“Target”); and (2) County of Los Angeles (the “County”), Rafael Mejia, and Michael Russell (collectively, the “County Defendants”). ECF Nos. 49, 50, 52, 56. For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby DENIES Target's Motion (ECF No. 49, 52) and GRANTS IN PART the County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50, 56).

BACKGROUND

I. Background

A. Factual Background

On January 17, 2021, three men robbed a Target store and fled. Target detained Plaintiffs Malik Aaron and Gregory Kim, as well as their friends, and called the police. Officers Mejia and Russell (the “Deputies”) of the Los Angeles County's Sheriff's Department (“LASD”) arrived on the scene and confronted Aaron and Kim. Aaron and Kim allege that Target violated their civil rights and the County through the Deputies violated their constitutional rights. Defendants deny all allegations and assert that their actions were lawful.

B. Procedural History

Aaron and Kim (“Plaintiffs”) filed their initial complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court on January 14, 2022, and Target removed the action to this Court on February 23, 2022, on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. ECF No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”). On June 17, 2022, the parties stipulated to allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint, which the Court granted on June 27, 2022. ECF No. 18, 19. On July 13, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint in this case. ECF No. 22 (“FAC”).

The FAC brings forth causes of action against Target for: (1) Violation of the Unruh Act, (2) Violation of the Bane Act, (3) Violation of the Ralph Act, (4) False Imprisonment, (5) Negligence, (6) Defamation, and (10) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief;^[1] it also brings forth causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County Defendants, as well as Deputy Vincent Kruse, for: (7) Excessive Force; (8) Municipal Liability under Monell; and (9) Unlawful Detention. Id. On July 28, 2023, the parties stipulated to dismiss Deputy Kruse from the action. ECF No. 51.

On July 26, 2023, Target filed notice of its Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 49. On July 27, 2023, the County Defendants filed notice of their Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 50. In compliance with the Court's standing order, the parties thereafter filed their joint briefs.

Target and Plaintiffs submitted their joint brief on Target's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 16, 2023. ECF No. 52 (“Target MSJ”). They also submitted a Joint Appendix of Evidence and Joint Statement of Uncontroverted Facts. ECF Nos. 52-1 (“Target Appendix”); 54 (“Target SUF”).^[2] Target submitted objections to Plaintiffs' submitted evidence. ECF No. 55 (“Evidentiary Objections”).

The County Defendants and Plaintiffs submitted their joint brief on the County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on August 17, 2023. ECF No. 56 (“County MSJ”). They also submitted a Joint Appendix of Evidence and Joint Statement of Uncontroverted Facts. ECF Nos. 57 (“County Appendix”); 58 (“County SUF”).^[3]

The Court heard both Motions on October 19, 2023.

II. Applicable Law

Summary judgment should be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Nat'l Ass 'n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A court must view the facts and draw inferences in the manner most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1992). “A moving party without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial-usually, but not always, a defendant-has both the initial burden of production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). To carry its burden of production, the moving party must either: (1) produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense; or (2) show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id.

Where a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Id. at 1102-03. In such cases, the nonmoving party may defeat the motion for summary judgment without producing anything. Id. at 1103. However, if a moving party carries its burden of production, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence showing a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. Under these circumstances, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the motion for summary judgment shall be granted. Id. at 322 (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”).

A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact simply by making assertions in its legal papers. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & Co., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, there must be specific, admissible evidence identifying the basis for the dispute. See id. “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact . . . the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). The Court need not “comb the record” looking for other evidence; it is only required to consider evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers and the portions of the record cited therein. Id. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. S.F. UnifiedSch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [the opposing party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

To carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

III. Findings of Fact^[4]

The Court finds the following material facts are established for trial under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(a) and 56(g):

A. Plaintiffs Enter the Store

At 6:58 p.m. on January 17, 2021, three Black men (the “Thieves”) approached the entrance of the Target store in Westlake Village, California (the “Store”). TSUF 1; PSUF 3. The first wore a black hoodie with the hood up and a backpack. TSUF 2, 4. The second wore a grey hoodie with the hood up. TSUF 3. The third wore a black hoodie with the hood up. TSUF 2. All three were approximately five feet and nine inches to six feet tall. TSUF 6. At the time, due to the Covid pandemic, the Thieves, and all customers and employees in the Store, were wearing face coverings. TSUF 5; ECF No. 52-1, Declaration of Caitlin E. Higgs (“Higgins Decl.”), Ex. D-1.^[5]

Aaron and Kim approached the Store with three of their friends (the “Teenage Shoppers”) at 6:59 p.m. and entered the store three seconds after the Thieves. TSUF 11.^[6] This group consisted of Aaron and Kim, who are both Black teenage boys, another Black teenage boy, one white teenage girl, and one Latina teenage girl. PSUF 1; TSUF 21. The three Black teenage boys among the Teenage Shoppers all wore black clothing, and Kim wore a backpack. TSUF 13-16. Like everyone else in the Store, all of the Teenage Shoppers wore face masks. TSUF 12. On January 17, 2021, Kim was 16 years old and approximately five feet nine inches tall; Aaron was 17 years old and between approximately five feet and seven inches to five feet and ten inches tall in height. TSUF 17, 19, 20.

B. Events Leading up to the Deputies Arrival

After entering the Store, both the Thieves and the Teenage Shoppers were headed in the same direction toward the back of the Store. TSUF 22. The Thieves went to the back of the Store and then turned right, toward the technology department. TSUF 23....