AB v. SB (In re SB)

1

In re SB.

AB, Petitioner-Appellee, v. SB, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 367014

Court of Appeals of Michigan

June 27, 2024

Clinton Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2022-030774-PP

Before: Cameron, P.J., and N. P. Hood and Young, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent SB, appeals as of right the trial court's order finding him guilty of criminal contempt for violating a domestic personal protection order (PPO) concerning petitioner, AB. Respondent also appeals the court's order extending the duration of the PPO. We affirm both orders.

I. BACKGROUND

At the time of these contempt proceedings, petitioner and respondent were married, but in the process of divorcing. They do not have children together. Petitioner initiated divorce proceedings in early August 2022, and she left the marital home later that month. At the time of the instant proceedings, the parties lived in different houses in the same subdivision on a circular road. Respondent's house was located across the street and one house over from petitioner's house (the former marital home) ^[1]; they lived only 140 to 200 feet from each other.

In August 2022, petitioner filed a petition asking the trial court to issue an ex parte PPO against respondent under MCR 600.2950 (domestic PPO). Petitioner alleged numerous instances of improper conduct by respondent beginning in May 2022, when he allegedly screamed at her, falsely accused her of cheating, smashed holes in the walls, kicked a hole in a door, tore down window treatments, and destroyed bed sheets. She alleged various other threatening, violent, and harassing behavior by respondent in July and August 2022. Petitioner alleged that she feared respondent because he frequently used substances, stalked her, and was violent and unpredictable.

The trial court issued an ex parte PPO, prohibiting respondent from (1) "entering onto property where petitioner lives"; (2) "assaulting, attacking, beating, molesting, or wounding" petitioner; (3) "stalking[-]as defined under MCL 750.411h and MCL 750.411i[-]that includes but is not limited to . . . following petitioner or appearing within [her] sight," "sending mail or other communications to petitioner," and "approaching or confronting petitioner in a public place or on private property"; and (4) "interfering with petitioner at [her] place of employment or education or engaging in conduct that impairs [her] employment or educational relationship or environment." The PPO apprised respondent that violating the order would subject him to immediate arrest, to the criminal contempt powers of the court, and, if found guilty, to imprisonment for not more than 93 days and a fine of not more than $500. The PPO was immediately effective for six months, expiring on February 28, 2023.

In November 2022, petitioner filed a show-cause motion, seeking to hold respondent in contempt.^[2] Petitioner alleged that respondent was "continuing to stalk me, asking others to relay messages to me, and interfering with my employment." After the parties agreed to extend the PPO an additional six months, the motion did not move forward. The trial court entered an amended PPO extending the expiration date to August 27, 2023, and prohibiting the same conduct.^[3]

Relevant to this appeal, in March 2023, petitioner filed another show-cause motion, again seeking to hold respondent in criminal contempt for violating the PPO via continuing stalking and harassing behavior between November 2022 and March 2023. Petitioner filed a third show-cause motion in April 2023 seeking the same relief and alleging further harassment by respondent. Respondent was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to criminal contempt that same month.^[4]

At the conclusion of a hearing, the trial court found respondent guilty of criminal contempt for violating the PPO. The court initially stated:

So we have had our hearing on these allegations and the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. Now in looking at each and every allegation individually all by themselves I don't believe a finding could be made. In looking at all of them together, the totality of the circumstances, that is what I'm going to do. [Emphasis added.]

The court then provided its factual findings, beginning with petitioner's allegations involving surveillance equipment respondent installed facing her home:

So we will start with the video cameras because that that is the first thing that I wrote down that was of concern to me. [Respondent] testified that there were not video cameras that were placed at the house that he [previously] lived at with [petitioner]. . . . [T]here were no surveillance cameras on that home and [respondent] chose to put surveillance cameras on the home that he lives in now. One of them is on the front of the garage and the other one is pointed directly at [petitioner's] house. . . . Her testimony I found quite compelling. Her demeanor I found to be compelling . . . [.] [S]he testified to the emotional distress that having those cameras, at least the one, pointed at her house caused her . . . because she was told and there's evidence of that in text messages that [respondent] could see in her home. I would suffice it to say that even if [respondent] couldn't see directly in her home, having a camera pointed directly at someone's home in this type of situation where there's clearly hostility at best, hostility between the two would be very harassing and very intimidating and does go against the order of the court[. A]nd I will bring our attention to the order of the court where [respondent] is prohibited from stalking as defined by MCL 750.411(H) and MCL 750.411(I), which states it includes but is not limited to and there were certain things that the court marked off. Now, no, I didn't put on here you're not allowed to put security cameras up. I didn't do that and I think that's why this order says it's including but not limited to. It is behavior that would cause a reasonable person to feel distressed[. And it would evoke] emotional distress to have a camera of [sic, on] someone where there's hostility[,] whether it's a soon to be ex-spouse or if it's a neighbor that you're having conflict with. A reasonable person would feel intimidated and harassed by that . . . .

The court made additional findings concerning a window in respondent's garage, a sign reading "Ho Ho Ho" displayed in the car window of respondent's son, and golf balls allegedly hit into petitioner's yard:

That takes me to the window that was placed in [respondent's] garage. . . . [I]t is very concerning, at best, to this court that a wall was cut into to put a window that specifically faces the house of someone [petitioner] that has a PPO on you [respondent]. By itself[,] could [this] rise to the level [of intimidation or harassment? N]o, but I think taking [this] in conjunction with other issues . . ., I absolutely find that as a method used to intimidate and to harass [petitioner]. In terms of the sign, . . . that was one of those things that could have likely been avoided and probably should have. . . . [I]s it a criminal offense to put a sign in your car[? I]t's not, but the sign went up on March 1st, put in a place not once but twice in a car and then also in the garage facing [petitioner's] house with the words ho, ho, ho. Golf balls in the yard, I don't know. I'm not using that as one of my . . . findings because I don't know. I'm not sure. There was testimony that there weren't golf balls before in the yard[,] then there was testimony that there was. I'm-I'm not sure but I will say that if golf balls are being hit into [petitioner's] yard then that would absolutely be a violation of the PPO.

The court also discussed allegations that respondent screamed at petitioner's therapy dog and called her a slut:

Screaming at the dog, [petitioner's] therapy dog. . . . This dog is living with [petitioner] and if she's walking down the road and she has her dog and she's taking her dog for a walk and that person that has a PPO filed against them yells out to get the dog's attention, it absolutely goes towards intimidating and harassing [petitioner]. . . . Then we have the-the screaming slut[,] and I find this stuff to be extremely antagonistic, extremely harassing, intimidating. [Petitioner's] father testified and I found him to be very credible in his testimony. ["]I heard [respondent] say it. I know it was him. I know his voice.["] Of course [petitioner's father] knows [respondent's] voice. It was his son in law. He knows where it came from. . . . It's not necessary to stand outside and scream names at someone. I don't care that [respondent] didn't say [petitioner's name]. He said slut.

Lastly, the court made various findings concerning alleged electronic stalking and/or harassment by respondent:

Then we talk about LinkedIn. No, there's nothing in here that says you're not allowed to look at people's profiles but I am familiar with LinkedIn and I know what happens[,] and when someone clicks on your page and someone starts reading your information, a notification goes to that person that says hey, so and so is looking at your LinkedIn page. It seems to me if someone has a PPO against you, you don't go on their LinkedIn page. You don't go on any of their pages. You don't do that. That is stalking. That is continuous pattern of behavior where you're interfering in this person's daily life one way or another. The same with the Bible app comment. I absolutely believe that [respondent] knew that when he was putting that comment on that app that it would be directly related to [petitioner]. It's an app that they share together. They had used it together in the past[,] and [respondent] knows what he's doing. Again, by itself is it-is it all alone something that I can say is a violation of the

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