Abbas v. Woleben

HESHAM M. ABBAS, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER M. WOLEBEN et al., Defendant.

Civil Case No. 3:13CV147

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

Date: September 18, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on the defendants' motions to dismiss.¹ (Dk. Nos. 4, 10, and 20.)

The complaint contains three counts: (1) constitutional violations by the Medical College of Virginia, Health Sciences Division of Virginia Commonwealth University ("MCV"); (2) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Woleben, Wood, and Chen in their individual capacities; and (3) a breach of contract claim against MCV.

The alleged constitutional violations consist of: (1) deprivation of property without procedural due process of law, (2) deprivation of property without substantive due process of law (3) denial of equal protection, and (4) seizure of the plaintiff in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The Court grants the defendants' motions to dismiss. This case arises from the plaintiff's dismissal from medical school. The Court dismisses the two counts against MCV because MCV is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and because the complaint does not allege a breach of contract. Alternatively, the Eleventh Amendment immunity protects MCV. The Court dismisses Count II against Woleben, Wood, and Chen because no constitutional violations occurred and, even if they had, qualified immunity protects the individual defendants.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

In keeping with the appropriate motion to dismiss standard, the following facts come from the plaintiff's complaint and the Court has construed them in the manner most favorable to Abbas. MCV admitted Abbas to medical school in August 2006. After Abbas completed two years of medical school, MCV granted Abbas five leaves of absence over a two and a half year period from June 2008, to January 2011, for various personal and health reasons. In August 2009, MCV's promotions committee recommended Abbas's dismissal from medical school for failure to take the required licensing examination prior to the start of his third year. In October 2009, the Dean of MCV overturned the dismissal.

On January 4, 2011, Wood wrote to Abbas alerting him of an upcoming review by the promotions committee. On January 6, 2011, Abbas met with Woleben and Wood,² who asked the plaintiff to accompany them to the emergency room for an examination. Abbas reluctantly agreed and Chen³ examined him. Chen informed the plaintiff that he needed institutionalization against his will and signed an order beginning the commitment process. A Richmond Behavioral Authority employee subsequently examined the plaintiff and determined that Abbas did not need institutionalization. As a result, the hospital discharged Abbas after several hours.

On January 12, 2011, MCV's promotions committee met and recommended the school dismiss Abbas "due to not satisfying academic process." (Compl. ¶ 13.) The letter did not inform him of his appeal right and Woleben and Wood subsequently informed the plaintiff that he could not protest the decision.

The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond in January 2013, naming Woleben, Wood, Chen, and Virginia Commonwealth University Health Systems Authority ("VCU Health Systems") as defendants. Woleben and Wood removed the claim to federal court on March 8, 2013, with the consent of the other defendants. On March 15, 2013, VCU Health Systems filed a motion to dismiss noting that VCU Health Systems and MCV "are separate and distinct legal entities." (Dk. No. 9, at 5.) In response to VCU Health Systems's motion, Abbas filed a motion asking the Court to substitute MCV for VCU Health Systems. (Dk. No. 15.) The Court granted this motion on March 27,2013.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint; it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts of the case, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of any defense. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). In considering the motion, a court must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999); Warner v. Buck Creek Nursery, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254-55 (W.D. Va. 2001). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter which, accepted as true, "state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to demonstrate more than "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. It requires the plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, "show" that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling him to relief, in other words, the "plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Although the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court need not accept legal conclusions. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as "matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint." Moore v. Flagstar Bank, 6 F. Supp. 2d 496, 500 (E.D. Va. 1997) (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (1990)). The Court may also look to documents incorporated into the complaint by reference without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 353 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against MCV

Abbas alleges Counts I and III against MCV. Count I alleges "Violation and Deprivation of Constitutional Rights" (Compl. at 4.), and discusses "the school," MCV. Since MCV is not a "person" under § 1983, the Court must dismiss Count I. In Count III, Abbas alleges a breach of contract. Abbas does not identify which defendant Count III lies against, but the Court infersthat the only possible defendant to breach an alleged contract is MCV. The Court will discuss these counts in turn.

1. Constitutional Claims

Congress created 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a procedural remedy to allow suits to enforce constitutional rights. "Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a remedy for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state law." Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358 (1990).

It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (overruled on other grounds). Thus, the Court assumes that Abbas brings Count I, "Violation and Deprivation of Constitutional Rights," pursuant to § 1983.

Section 1983 only allows suit against

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has held that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). MCV is part of Virginia Commonwealth University, a state government entity. Va. Code § 23-50.5. Accordingly, since § 1983 is the remedy for constitutional violations by state actors and a state is not a person under § 1983, MCV cannot besued under § 1983. Consequently, the Court dismisses Abbas's claims against MCV for alleged constitutional violations.

2. Breach of Contract Claim

"The elements of a breach of contract action are (1) a legally enforceable obligation of a defendant to a plaintiff; (2) the defendant's violation or breach of that obligation; and (3) injury or damage to the plaintiff caused by the breach of obligation." Filak v. George, 267 Va. 612, 619, 594 S.E.2d 610, 614 (2004). Additionally, well-settled contract law in Virginia states that "there must be absolute mutuality of engagement, so that each party has the right to hold the other to a positive agreement." Smokeless Fuel Co. v. W.E. Seaton & Sons, 105 Va. 170, 52 S.E. 829, 830 (1906).

The complaint does not show the existence of a contract. In his complaint, Abbas attempts to allege a contract because "Plaintiff offered to attend school and pay tuition and the school accepted Plaintiff's offer, admitted him and received tuition payment therefore." (Compl. ¶ 31.) Further, Abbas states that MCV breached its contract by dismissing him "not in accordance with the student handbook." (Compl. ¶ 33.) The Court ordered Abbas "to file with the Court the document on which he relies as creating a contract between the plaintiff and [MCV]." (Dk. No. 22.) In response to the Court's Order, Abbas submitted only his application to MCV as well as his application for in-state tuition. (Dk. No. 22.) Despite this submission, in his opposition memorandum to MCV's motion to dismiss, Abbas only argues that a contract exists because of MCV's student handbook. (Dk. No. 25.)...