ABD Eng'r v. N.Y. Div. of Hum. Rts.

207 N.Y.S.3d 205

225 A.D.3d 982

In the Matter of ABD ENGINEERS LLP et al., Petitioners,

v.NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents.

(And Two Other Related Proceedings.)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: January 16, 2024

Decided and Entered: March 7, 2024

Slevin & Associates PLLC, Albany (Kathleen McCaffrey Baynes of counsel), for petitioners.

Caroline J. Downey, New York State Division of Human Rights, Bronx (Toni Ann Hollifield of counsel), for New York State Division of Human Rights, respondent.

Luibrand Law Firm, PLLC, Latham (Kevin A. Luibrand of counsel), for Jessica Snickles, respondent.

Before: Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald and McShan, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT

Aarons, J.

Proceedings pursuant to Executive Law § 298 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Schenectady County) to, among other things, review a determination of the Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights finding petitioners guilty of an unlawful discriminatory practice based on familial status, disability and gender.

Petitioners Luigi Palleschi and Joseph Bianchine are partners of petitioner ABD Engineers LLP (hereinafter ABD). In March 2017, ABD hired respondent Jessica Snickles for the position of administrative assistant and receptionist. In May 2018, Snickles advised respondent Gia Nealon, ABD’s office manager, that she was pregnant. Snickles ceased working for ABD in June 2018 and, in August 2019, she filed a complaint with respondent State Division of Human Rights (hereinafter SDHR). Snickles claimed that petitioners and Nealon unlawfully discriminated against her based upon her known disabilities and/or pregnancy-related conditions. Following a public hearing, an Administrative Law Judge dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The Commissioner of Human Rights upheld the dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against Nealon but sustained the complaint insofar as asserted against petitioners. In this regard, SDHR found that petitioners discriminated against Snickles based upon her familial status, gender and disability by failing to provide her reasonable accommodations and concluded that Snickles was constructively discharged from her employment. SDHR imposed a civil fine against petitioners and awarded Snickles monetary damages for mental anguish, humiliation and lost wages. SDHR also awarded Snickles counsel fees. Petitioners thereafter commenced the first of these proceedings pursuant to Executive Law § 298 seeking annulment of SDHR’s determination. SDHR and Snickles separately cross-petitioned for, among other things, enforcement of SDHR’s determination. Supreme Court transferred the proceedings to this Court.

[1, 2] Petitioners challenge SDHR’s finding that they constructively discharged Snickles. They first argue that Snickles never alleged or proceeded with a theory of constructive discharge and, therefore, their due process rights were violated because they could not adequately defend against a claim of which they had no notice. "[I]n the administrative forum, the charges need only be reasonably specific, in light of all the relevant circumstances, to apprise the party whose rights are being determined of the charges against [it] and to allow for the preparation of an adequate defense" (Matter of Black v. Ambach, 73 N.Y.2d 323, 333, 540 N.Y.S.2d 6, 537 N.E.2d 181 [1989] [internal citation omitted]). Although the complaint may not have explicitly alleged that Snickles was constructively discharged, it did apprise petitioners that they took adverse action against her in the form of her termination of employment (see Matter of Langhorne v. Jackson, 213 A.D.2d 909, 910, 623 N.Y.S.2d 962 [3d Dept. 1995]). The complaint likewise noted that ABD denied Snickles an accommodation, and the circumstances leading to her discharge, whether active or constructive, were explored during the hearing. In view of the foregoing, petitioners’ due process rights were not violated.

[3–5] "Constructive discharge occurs when the employer, rather than acting directly, deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation" (Morris v. Schroder Capital Mgt. Intl., 7 N.Y.3d 616, 621, 825 N.Y.S.2d 697, 859 N.E.2d 503 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Long v. Aerotek, Inc., 202 A.D.3d 1216, 1219, 162 N.Y.S.3d 521 [3d Dept. 2022]). Under certain circumstances, the denial of an accommodation can support the finding that working conditions became so intolerable to a reasonable person so as to lead that person to involuntarily resign (see Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1109 [6th Cir. 2008]). That said, "[c]ourts may not weigh the evidence or reject [SDHR’s] determination where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists" (Matter of State Div. of Human Rights [Granelle], 70 N.Y.2d 100, 106, 517 N.Y.S.2d 715, 510 N.E.2d 799 [1987]; see Matter of Gifford v. McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30, 36, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 [3d Dept. 2016]). In view of SDHR’s expertise in assessing discrimination claims, SDHR’s determinations are entitled to deference (see Matter of Harrison v. Chestnut Donuts, Inc., 60 A.D.3d 1130, 1131, 874 N.Y.S.2d 609 [3d Dept. 2009]).

[6] Although the record discloses conflicting evidence as to how Snickles was terminated from her employment, SDHR’s determination is supported by...