Abdul-Ahad v. Essex Cnty. Sheriff Dep't

TASKEEN ABDUL-AHAD, ADMINISTRATOR AD PROSEQUENDUM of the ESTATE OF PAUL O. BRASWELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ESSEX COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-15602

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

April 6, 2022

Not for Publication

OPINION

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiffs allege that multiple plainclothes law enforcement officers violated Paul O. Braswell's civil rights when they approached a vehicle in which Braswell was a passenger and fired their guns into the vehicle after the driver attempted to flee. Braswell was killed during this incident. Presently before the Court are partial motions to dismiss filed by the following Defendants: (1) Detective Ozie Ryals, Detective Gino Izzo, Sgt. Christopher Bozios, Jr., Detective Edgar J Silverio, Detective Yusef Ellis, and Detective Erik Udvarhely (collectively, the “County Defendants”), D.E. 29; (2) Det. Jose Yunque and Sgt. Emanuel Pereira, D.E. 30; and (3) the Essex County Sheriff's Department (“ECSD”), D.E. 32. Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to the motions, D.E. 33, to which Defendants replied, D.E. 34, 35, 36.^[1] The Court reviewed the parties' submissions and decided the motions without oral argument pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the ECSD's motion is GRANTED and the County Defendants, Pereira and Yunque's motions are DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On or about September 26, 2018, Braswell was a passenger in a vehicle in Newark, New Jersey.^[2] FAC ¶ 9. Plaintiffs contend that Braswell was not engaged in any criminal activity at the time and did not possess any illegal contraband or weapons. Id. ¶ 13. Unknown individuals approached the vehicle “with what appeared to be firearms” and tried to block its path. Id. ¶ 9. Trying to flee, the driver struck several other vehicles and a tree, rendering the vehicle “inoperable.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 14. The individuals with firearms opened fire on the vehicle. The individuals were plainclothes law enforcement officers and the Officer Defendants^[3] in this matter. The Officer Defendants discharged seventy-two bullets into the vehicle, which struck Braswell. Id. ¶¶ 10, 14. Braswell and the driver of the vehicle did not “discharge any firearms nor take any other action directed at or towards the police.” Id. ¶ 17. After Defendants discharged their weapons into the vehicle, Defendants did not provide or attempt to provide Braswell with medical

6) as “Pereira Br.”; the ECSD's brief in support of its motion (D.E. 32) as “ECSD Br.”; Plaintiffs' opposition brief (D.E. 33) as “Plfs. Opp.”; the ECSD's reply (D.E. 35) as “ECSD Reply”; the County Defendants' reply (D.E. 34) as “Cty. Reply”; and Pereira and Yunque's reply (D.E. 36) as “Pereira Reply.” aid or attention for hours and did not timely call EMS. Braswell died from the gunshot wounds. Id. ¶¶ 16, 32.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in New Jersey state court, which the ECSD removed to this Court on November 6, 2020. D.E. 1. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2. Certain Defendants subsequently filed motions to partially dismiss the Complaint. D.E. 6, 14, 21. On September 7, 2021, this Court granted the motions in part, and dismissed two counts of the Complaint. The Court otherwise denied the motions. D.E. 23, 24. The Court, however, granted Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint. D.E. 24. Plaintiffs filed the FAC on October 5, 2021. In the FAC, Plaintiffs assert the following claims: (1) excessive force (Count I); (2) false arrest and false imprisonment (Count II); (3) unreasonable seizure (Count III); (4) a Monell claim (Count IV); and (5) failure to provide or timely secure medical care (Count V). D.E. 25. On November 2, 2021, Defendants filed the instant motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants seek to dismiss Counts I, II, III, and V of the FAC. D.E. 29, 30, 32.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the factual and legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). Restatements of the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011). The Court, however, “must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.

III. ANALYSIS

As discussed, Plaintiffs assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the NJCRA. Section 1983, in relevant part, provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not provide substantive rights; rather, Section 1983 provides a vehicle for vindicating violations of other federal rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) a person deprived him of a federal right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Burt v. CFG Health Sys., No. 15-2279, 2015 WL 1646849, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2015).

The NJCRA provides a private cause of action to

[a]ny person who has been deprived of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and for injunctive or other appropriate relief.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2. The “NJCRA was modeled after § 1983, [and so] courts in New Jersey have consistently looked at claims under the NJCRA through the lens of § 1983 and have repeatedly construed the NJCRA in terms nearly identical to its federal counterpart.” Velez v. Fuentes, No. 15-6939, 2016 WL 4107689, at *5 (D.N.J. July 29, 2016) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, the Court considers Plaintiffs' Section 1983 and NJCRA claims together.

1. Claims Against the ECSD

The ECSD seeks to dismiss Counts I, II, III, and V of the FAC because it cannot be vicariously liable for its employees' alleged wrongdoing. ECSD Br. at 14-16. A municipality or local governing body^[4] cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior for § 1983 or NJCRA claims. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Harvey v. County of Hudson, No. 14-3670, 2015 WL 9687862, at *11 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2015) (“The NJCRA, like Section 1983, does not impose vicarious liability or respondeat superior liability.”). Instead, a municipality may be liable under Section 1983 only “if the plaintiff identifies a municipal ‘policy' or ‘custom' that was the ‘moving force' behind the injury.”^[5] Jewell v. Ridley Township, 497 Fed.Appx. 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). In Count I, Plaintiffs address the alleged wrongful conduct of the Individual Defendants and do not mention any purportedly inappropriate policies or customs. See FAC ¶¶ 19-22. In Counts II, III, and V, Plaintiffs plead that the Individual Defendants were acting pursuant to the policies and practices of the ECSD. FAC ¶ 34. Plaintiffs state that they are not asserting claims pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior in Counts II, III, and V. Plfs. Opp. at 21. Accordingly, the Court construes the FAC as only asserting claims against the Individual Defendants in Counts I, II, III, and V because Count IV is a Monell claim. The ECSD's motion, therefore, is granted as to Counts I, II, III, and V.

The ECSD also argues that Plaintiffs' prayer for relief for punitive damages must be dismissed as to it because public entities are immune from punitive damages for Section 1983 and NJCRA claims. ECSD Br. at 7-8. The ECSD is correct that a plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages from a public entity for Section 1983 or NJCRA violations. Damiani v. West Deptford Township, No. 07-2884, 2008 WL 656041, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2008). Plaintiffs concede this fact in their opposition. Plfs. Opp. at 21. Thus, the ECSD's motion is granted as to punitive damages.

2. Excessive Force (Count One)

Defendants^[6] maintain that Plaintiffs'...