Abira Med. Labs. v. Karim

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ABIRA MEDICAL LABORATORIES, LLC, d/b/a GENESIS DIAGNOSTICS, Plaintiff, v. MARIA J. KARIM, et al., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-4317-KSM

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

January 5, 2022

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J.

Plaintiff Abira Medical Laboratories, LLC (doing business as Genesis Diagnostics) (“Genesis”) filed this suit against Defendants Maria J. Karim, Medcurative, LLC, and Interlab Billing, LLC (collectively, the “Defendants”) alleging that they used Genesis's employees and misappropriated confidential information stored on Genesis's computer servers to steal Genesis's clients. (Doc. No. 25.) Genesis brings four claims against Defendants: tortious interference, unfair competition conversion, and civil conspiracy. (Id.)

Defendant Karim has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's first amended complaint on four grounds.^[1] (Doc. No. 29.) First, she argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case because Genesis has failed to allege that the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. (Id. at 5-6.) Second, Karim argues that this case should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction because she is a citizen of and conducted all relevant activities in Missouri and thus lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Pennsylvania. (Id. at 2-5.) Third, she argues that venue is improper because a substantial portion of the alleged acts and omissions giving rise to the claims did not occur in Pennsylvania. (Id. at 5.) Finally, Karim argues that this case should be dismissed because Genesis has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Id. at 6 7.) Genesis opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 30.)

For the reasons below, Karim's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Taking the allegations plead in the amended complaint or averred in the affidavit of Abraham Miller, Genesis's Vice President for Research & Development, ^[2] as true, the relevant facts are as follows:

Genesis is a medical testing laboratory limited liability company registered under the laws of New Jersey with its principal place of business in Langhorne, Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 25 ¶ 4.) Specifically, Genesis provides clinical laboratory testing services to medical service providers throughout the country out of its Langhorne, Pennsylvania headquarters. (Id. ¶¶ 1112.) Genesis stores records, including referral contracts with third-party providers, billing records, and invoices, on a centralized computer database at its headquarters. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Certain employees in Genesis's billing department have unfettered access to Genesis's entire catalog of records: Harry Myles, Tessler Brown, and Kevin Rox. (Id. ¶ 15.) All of these employees executed employment agreements that include non-compete and non-solicitation clauses, as well as clauses that require them to “maintain and preserve confidential information proprietary to [Genesis's] business.” (Id. ¶ 16.)

Karim is an individual residing in Missouri. (Id. ¶ 5.) Karim's husband, Malik Karim, ^[3]previously owned Interlab, LLC, a medical testing company based out of Missouri that was a direct competitor of Genesis's. (Id. ¶ 17.) Karim was employed as Interlab's billing and accounts manager. Then, in 2018, when Interlab was on the brink of bankruptcy, ^[4] Karim founded Interlab Billing and Medcurative (both of whom are also defendants in this case). (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) Interlab Billing and Medcurative solicited business from medical service providers on behalf of third-party laboratory testing facilities. (Id. ¶ 19.) The third-party laboratories would use Interlab Billing and Medcurative to bill insurers for testing services rendered and would pay Interlab Billing and Medcurative a share of the fees earned on testing business that Interlab Billing and Medcurative had originated. (Id.)

In 2019, Karim, who had previously worked with Myles, Brown, and Rox in her position at Interlab, reached out to Myles, Brown, and Rox, who she knew to work for Genesis, asking them to join her new ventures, to share confidential customer information with Karim, and to redirect business away from Genesis to Interlab Billing and Medcurative. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) Myles, Brown, and Rox have full access to Genesis's computer servers, located in Genesis's Pennsylvania headquarters. (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.) After Karim induced Myles, Brow, and Rox to share confidential customer information, one of Genesis's customers, Redwood Lab Services LLC (“Redwood”), terminated its agreement with Genesis and entered into an agreement with Interlab Billing and Medcurative. (Id. ¶ 23.) The loss of the Redwood contract cost Genesis over $150, 000 in testing revenue. (Id.)

II. ANALYSIS

Karim has moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim. (See Doc. No. 29.) The Court considers each of Karim's arguments in turn.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether we have subject matter jurisdiction. Genesis asserts that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case. (Doc. No. 25 ¶ 8.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, this Court has jurisdiction over actions where the amount in controversy is greater than $75, 000 and the plaintiff and defendants are citizens of different states. Karim tacitly admits that there is complete diversity between Genesis and Defendants but argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because there is not “a single iota of evidence” that the amount in controversy exceeds $75, 000. (See Doc. No. 29 at 5.)

The amount in controversy is determined from the complaint itself. Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1993). “The sum claimed . . . controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 87 F.3d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938)). An amount in controversy is considered to have been claimed in “good faith” unless it can be shown “to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” Id.; see also Brady v. Middle E. Forum, No. CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-2252, 2021 WL 5003335, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2021) (holding that the plaintiff satisfied the amount in controversy requirement where the “damages plead[ed] in her complaint in the aggregate exceed[ed] the jurisdictional threshold” and there was no legal certainty that she would be unable to recover those amounts); Krauss v. Steelmaster Bldgs., LLC, No. CIVA 06-796, 2006 WL 3097767, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2006) (holding that the plaintiffs satisfied the amount in controversy requirement where they asserted $128, 000 in potential damages and there was no legal certainty that they would be unable to recover that amount).

Genesis's amended complaint alleges that the amount in controversy is greater than $150, 000 (well in excess of the $75, 000 threshold), and there is no legal certainty that they would be unable to recover that amount. Accordingly, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Next, Karim argues that the case should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. “The burden of demonstrating the facts that establish personal jurisdiction falls on the plaintiff, ” Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (cleaned up), and the plaintiff must do so with “reasonable particularity, ” Mellon Bank PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.3d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, “a court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002).

A district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the extent permitted by the law of the state in which the court sits. O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1221. Pennsylvania's long-arm statute authorizes courts to assert personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed under the United States Constitution. 42 Pa. Stat. & Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322(b); see also D'Jamoos ex rel. Est. of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 2009); O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 316. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the defendant must “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'” Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted).

There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 317. “General jurisdiction is all-purpose” in that it “allow[s] a court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant for any claim lodged against that party.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Jiangsu Tie Mao Glass Co., 2:15-cv-00965, 2020 WL 1526940, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2020). Because Karim is a citizen of Missouri and is not at home in Pennsylvania, she is not subject to the general jurisdiction of this Court.

Specific jurisdiction exists where the claims arise from or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum state. IMO Indus. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1998). “Because this analysis depends on the relationship between the claims and contacts, we generally evaluate specific jurisdiction on a claim-by-claim basis.”...