Aboah v. Fairfield Healthcare Servs., Inc.

662 F.Supp.3d 192

Gwendoline ABOAH and Tania Stewart, Plaintiffs, v. FAIRFIELD HEALTHCARE SERVICES,INC. d/b/a BrightStar Care of Fairfield & Southbury and Peter R. Moore, Defendants.

3:20-CV-00763 (SVN)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

Signed March 16, 2023

Nitor V. Egbarin, Law Office of Nitor V. Egbarin, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiffs.

Angelo Spinola, Anne Mellen, Polsinelli PC, Atlanta, GA, Donald L. Samuels, Polsinelli PC, Denver, CO, Sandra R. Stanfield, Stanfield Bechtel Law, LLC, Middletown, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION OF FLSA COLLECTIVE AND MOTION FOR RULE 23 CLASS CERTIFICATION

Sarala V. Nagala, United States District Judge.

Plaintiffs Gwendoline Aboah and Tania Stewart, who were employed as live-in home health aides by Defendant Fairfield Healthcare Services, Inc., d/b/a BrightStar Care of Fairfield & Southbury ("BrightStar") (together with Defendant Peter R. Moore, "Defendants"), have brought this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act ("CMWA"), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-58 et seq. Plaintiffs allege, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, that Defendants required caregivers to work long shifts without bona fide meal and sleep breaks, improperly excluded sleep and meal breaks from shifts caregivers worked when calculating the caregivers' wages, failed to account for food and lodging provided to caregivers when calculating their overtime rates of pay, and failed to accurately record caregivers' hours. Plaintiffs have now moved for conditional certification of an FLSA collective with respect to their federal claims and for class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 with respect to their state law claims. Defendants oppose both motions.

For the reasons below, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they have satisfied the requirements for conditional certification of an FLSA collective as to their claim that Defendants failed to account for food and lodging provided to live-in caregivers when calculating the caregivers' overtime rates of pay. The Court agrees with Defendants, however, that Plaintiffs have not met the requirements for conditional certification as to their claims that Defendants improperly excluded sleep and meal breaks from caregivers' shifts when calculating their wages and failed to accurately record hours caregivers worked. Plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification is therefore GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court further agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have not met the requirements for class certification under Rule 23. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 23 class certification is DENIED.

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In their Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), ECF No. 69, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have violated the FLSA and the CMWA in various ways. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants require live-in caregivers, who are referred to as home health aides ("HHAs"), to work long shifts without bona fide meal and sleeping periods in violation of the CMWA. SAC ¶ 4. Second, Plaintiffs allege that, because Defendants did not provide HHAs with bona fide meal and sleeping periods, federal regulations did not permit Defendants to exclude such periods from the hours HHAs worked during each 24-hour period. Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 58. Third, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated federal regulations by failing to include the value of food and lodging provided to HHAs in the HHAs' regular rates of pay when calculating the HHAs' overtime rates. Id. ¶¶ 14-16.

At the time Plaintiffs filed their SAC, the present certification motions were already pending. ECF Nos. 50, 52. Defendants then responded to the SAC by filing a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 70. Before ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court entered an order directing the parties to address whether they should have the opportunity to re-brief Plaintiffs' certification motions in light of the new allegations in the SAC and with the benefit of the Court's then-anticipated ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss. ECF No. 75. In response, Plaintiffs represented that they did not wish to re-brief the certification motions, but Defendants requested the opportunity to at least supplement their previous briefing. ECF No. 76. In September of 2022, the Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss, ECF No. 77, and permitted the parties to submit supplemental briefing on Plaintiffs' certification motions if they wished to do so, ECF No. 78. Both parties subsequently submitted supplemental briefing. ECF Nos. 81, 82.

In relevant part, the parties' pleadings in this action, as well as their exhibits and briefing regarding Plaintiffs' certification motions, reflect the following. Defendant BrightStar employs HHAs who perform household services in private homes. SAC ¶¶ 3, 48; ECF No. 54 at 10, 12. BrightStar assigns these HHAs to live with clients, SAC ¶ 3; ECF No. 54 at 9, 10, 46, so that the HHAs can provide safety services such as fall risk prevention and assist clients with tasks such as cooking, cleaning, bathing, dressing, feeding, and toileting, Gilday Dep. Tr., ECF No. 50-16, at 33:1-33:16; ECF No. 50-3. It is undisputed that Plaintiff Aboah worked for BrightStar as a live-in HHA from July of 2018 until December of 2019, and Plaintiff Stewart worked for BrightStar as a live-in HHA from June of 2018 until July of 2020. It is further undisputed that Defendant Moore owns BrightStar and either currently serves as, or formerly served as, President of the company.

When they begin working for BrightStar, HHAs typically attend an orientation. ECF No. 54 at 10; Ward Dep. Tr., ECF No. 50-2, at 40:13-41:12. Defendants contend that, at orientation, new HHA hires are told that "unless an aide is reporting otherwise, they are paid for - in a 24-hour period . . . 13 hours of work which is defined as actively providing items on the care plan." ECF No. 54 at 10 (citing Ward Dep. Tr. at 78:4-78:23). According to Defendants, unless an HHA reports that they worked more than 13 hours, the HHA is typically paid 13 hours for each 24-hour shift because "8 hours of sleep" and "three other rest/meal/break time[s]" are subtracted from each shift. Id. (citing Ward Dep. Tr. at 78:4-78:23). In addition, Defendants submitted a PowerPoint presentation from BrightStar's new hire orientation, which states that the "Live in rate is $10.10/hour for 'full' 13 hour days." ECF No. 54-6 at 19. They further contend that "[e]ight hours of sleep time" was "communicated to BrightStar's clients and formed part of each clients' [sic] contract with BrightStar, to which Plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries." ECF No. 54 at 11 (citing ECF No. 54-7).

During their initial orientation sessions,¹ BrightStar caregivers are also trained on a timekeeping software called "Mobile ABS" (or "MABS") through which HHAs electronically record the time they work. Ward Dep. Tr. at 41:3-41:24, 43:12-43:23, 51:5-51:6; Zapata Dep. Tr., ECF No. 50-13, at 13:20-16:11. The MABS software prepopulates a daily 13-hour schedule of 7:00 am to 8:00 pm, which BrightStar employee Stephanie Ward characterized as a "placeholder" schedule. Ward Dep. Tr. at 103:4-103:13. Ward and BrightStar's payroll assistant, Priscilla Zapata, testified that HHAs could "start" and "stop" their shifts in MABS during each 24-hour period and record extra hours worked in addition to the 13-hour placeholder schedule. Ward Dep. Tr. at 102:6-102:10; 122:3-122:5; Zapata Dep. Tr. at 12:8-12:19. Ward further testified that BrightStar has paid live-in caregivers for more than 13 hours in a day. Ward Dep. Tr. at 97:22-98:20.²

In addition, the parties have submitted a version of BrightStar's Employee Handbook that includes the following policy for "Employees Working Twenty-Four Hour Shifts":

Unless applicable state law requires otherwise, if a non-exempt employee works a shift of twenty-four (24) hours or longer, up to eight (8) hours of sleeping time can be excluded from compensable working time if all of the following apply:

a. A voluntary agreement excluding sleeping time exists between the Company and the employee;

b. Adequate sleeping facilities for an uninterrupted night's sleep are provided;

c. At least five (5) hours of uninterrupted sleep is possible during a scheduled sleeping period; and

d. Interruptions to perform duties are considered hours worked.

ECF No. 50-12 at 15. The policy further provides that the following items will "be adhered to":

a. Even if the sleeping period is longer than eight hours, only eight hours will be credited.

b. The five (5) hours of sleep time do not have to be consecutive; however, if the sleep period is interrupted to such an extent that the employee cannot get a reasonable night's sleep, the entire period must be counted as working time.

c. Sleep time does not necessarily have to be at night.

d. The deduction of sleep time is prohibited where the demands of the job have seriously interfered with the employee's ability to sleep, or the sleeping facilities have been minimal.

e. Any agreement for the treatment of compensable time for live-in employees must meet the requirements of federal and applicable state law and be an employer-employee agreement, not a unilateral decision by the employer. This agreement will be in writing.

Id. at 15-16. Defendants have submitted an agreement between BrightStar and Plaintiff Stewart dated July 23, 2020, that addresses sleep and meal breaks and provides, in part, that Stewart is "entitled to up to eight (8) hours of sleep time," that she "will be provided with adequate sleeping facilities," and that she "will be compensated" if her sleep is interrupted. ECF No. 54-19. The agreement further states, that "[t]o recap/clarify: during one 24 hour period you will be working 13 hours, taking a meal break 3 hours, and sleeping 8 hours." Id. Defendants have provided no...