Abraham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

342 Mich.App. 475

995 N.W.2d 849

Amber Marie ABRAHAM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Enterprise Leasing Company of Detroit, LLC, Defendant-Appellee, and Enterprise Leasing Company of Detroit, EAN Holdings, LLC, EAN Holdings Group LLC, Kirka Holdings Group, Ltd, and Nexen Corporation, Defendants.

No. 356748

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 13, 2022, at Detroit.

Decided July 28, 2022, 9:15 a.m.

Ward, Anderson, Porritt, Bryant, Lord & Zachary (by Nicolette S. Zachary ) for Enterprise Leasing Company of Detroit, LLC.

Grover Lewis Johnson, Grandville (by John P. Lewis ) for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.

Before: Jansen, P.J., and O'Brien and Hood, JJ.

Hood, J. Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) appeals by leave granted ¹ the trial court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Detroit, LLC (Enterprise) and denying State Farm's countermotion for summary disposition. On appeal, State Farm argues that the trial court erred when it granted Enterprise summary disposition and denied State Farm summary disposition, because Enterprise and defendant Nexen Corporation (Nexen) were both "owners" of the vehicle involved in the accident, under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. State Farm also argues Enterprise is first in priority for payment of personal-protection-insurance (PIP) benefits for plaintiff, Amber Marie Abraham, because she was driving a vehicle "owned" by Nexen, and Enterprise was the insurer of the vehicle. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a December 2018 motor vehicle accident in which Abraham was injured. Nexen is a business that provides delivery services for household goods, and Abraham worked for Nexen as a driver delivering Amazon packages. At the time of the accident, Abraham was driving a 2018 Ford Transit (Transit) that Nexen provided to her. While Abraham drove through a green light at an intersection in Detroit, another vehicle turned left in front of the Transit. Abraham was unable to stop, and the vehicles collided. Abraham's personal vehicle was insured through a policy with State Farm at the time of the accident. Enterprise held legal title to the Transit and was self-insured, but it denied issuing an insurance policy for the Transit. Nexen rented the Transit from Enterprise through a continuing series of 28-day rental agreements. At the end of each rental period, the rental agreement was "closed out and rewritten." Nexen remained in possession of the Transit for nearly six months, and did not return the vehicle to Enterprise between lease periods.

Abraham sought payment of PIP benefits, relating to injuries from the motor vehicle accident, from State Farm, Enterprise, Nexen, and defendants Enterprise Leasing Company of Detroit, EAN Holdings, LLC, EAN Holdings Group, LLC, and Kirka Holdings Group, Ltd. When she was unsuccessful, she sued defendants for those benefits. Only State Farm and Enterprise are involved in this appeal.

Enterprise moved for summary disposition, arguing MCL 500.3114(3) was inapplicable to this case, and therefore, State Farm, not Enterprise, was first in priority for payment of Abraham's PIP benefits. State Farm filed a countermotion for summary disposition and argued that Nexen and Enterprise were both "owners" of the Transit under the no-fault act, and that Enterprise was the insurer of the Transit. Thus, State Farm contended, Enterprise was first in priority for payment of Abraham's PIP benefits. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Enterprise after determining that Abraham "was not occupying a vehicle owned or registered by her employer [Nexen] at the time of the accident ...." State Farm moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied relief. State Farm now appeals.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

"We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition." El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc. , 504 Mich. 152, 159, 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). Enterprise moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) "tests the factual sufficiency of a claim." Id. at 160, 934 N.W.2d 665 (emphasis omitted). In considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court "must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id. Such a motion "may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact." Id. State Farm's countermotion for summary disposition was filed under MCR 2.116(I)(2). "[A] trial court properly grants summary disposition to the opposing party under MCR 2.116(I)(2) if it determines that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment." Ingham Co. v. Mich. Co. Rd. Comm. Self-Ins. Pool , 321 Mich. App. 574, 580, 909 N.W.2d 533 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Mich. Ass'n of Home Builders v. Troy , 504 Mich. 204, 212, 934 N.W.2d 713 (2019). When interpreting statutory language, this Court must "ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). "[W]here the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be applied as written." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

State Farm argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to Enterprise and denying State Farm's countermotion for summary disposition because, under the no-fault act, Enterprise and Nexen were both "owners" of the Transit, and Enterprise is first in priority for payment of Abraham's PIP benefits. We agree.

MCL 500.3114² governs priority of responsibility regarding PIP benefits. As a general proposition, an injured party should look to their own personal no-fault policy when seeking PIP benefits after an accident. See MCL 500.3114(1). If the individual was occupying a vehicle "owned or registered" by their employer, however, they must look to the insurer of the furnished vehicle:

An employee, his or her spouse, or a relative of either domiciled in the same household, who suffers accidental bodily injury while an occupant of a motor vehicle owned or registered by the employer, shall receive personal protection insurance benefits to which the employee is entitled from the insurer of the furnished vehicle. [ MCL 500.3114(3).]

Under MCL 500.3101(1), as amended by 2017 PA 140, owners of motor vehicles must maintain security for the payment of PIP benefits. The questions here, therefore, are whether Nexen and Enterprise constitute "owners" of the Transit, and whether Enterprise is higher in priority than State Farm for the payment of Abraham's PIP benefits.

A. OWNERSHIP OF THE TRANSIT

1. NEXEN AS AN "OWNER"

State Farm first argues that, under MCL 500.3101(3)(l )(i ), Nexen is an "owner" of the Transit because it had use of the Transit for more than 30 days before the accident. We agree.

MCL 500.3101(3)(l ) defined "owner," in part, as:

( i ) A person renting a motor vehicle or having the use of a motor vehicle, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days.

* * *

( iii ) A person that holds the legal title to a motor vehicle or motorcycle, other than a person engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles or motorcycles that is the lessor of a motor vehicle or motorcycle under a lease that provides for the use of the motor vehicle or motorcycle by the lessee for a period that is greater than 30 days. [ MCL 500.3101(3)(l )(i ) and (iii ).]

MCL 500.3101(3)(n) defined a "registrant":

(n) "Registrant" does not include a person engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles or motorcycles that is the lessor of a motor vehicle or motorcycle under a lease that provides for the use of the motor vehicle or motorcycle by the lessee for a period that is longer than 30 days.

With respect to MCL 500.3101(3)(l ), this Court has determined that an individual need not possess legal title of a vehicle to be considered an "owner" under the no-fault act. See Chop v. Zielinski , 244 Mich.App. 677, 681, 624 N.W.2d 539 (2001) (determining that "[t]he fact that [the] plaintiff was not awarded legal title of the car pursuant to the divorce judgment is not dispositive of whether she may be considered an ‘owner’ under the no-fault act"). This Court has also held that "[t]here may be multiple owners of a vehicle for purposes of the no-fault act." Id.

Under MCL 500.3101(3)(l )(i ), to be an "owner" of a vehicle for purposes of the no-fault act, an individual must rent or have use of a motor vehicle, under a lease or otherwise, for more than 30 days. Enterprise argues that Nexen was not an "owner" of the Transit because each rental agreement was for a period of 28 days, not 30 days. Enterprise is mistaken. MCL 500.3101(3)(l )(i ) does not require an individual to have use of the vehicle explicitly through a lease or rental agreement. Rather, MCL 500.3101(3)(l )(i ) expressly states that the individual must have use of the vehicle "under a lease or otherwise " for more than 30 days. (Emphasis added.) This Court must discern the Legislature's intent, as may reasonably be inferred from the plain language of the statute. Mich. Ass'n of Home Builders , 504 Mich. at 212, 934 N.W.2d 713. The statute's use of the phrase "or otherwise" indicates the Legislature intended the statute to apply to individuals who have use of a vehicle for more than 30 days in situations other than leases or rentals. See Chop , 244 Mich.App. at 682, 624 N.W.2d 539 (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that she could not be an "owner" under MCL 500.3101(2)(g)(i ) because the subsection only applies to lease agreements, rental agreements, or other such transactions, and concluding that use of the...