Ackie v. Phila. Gas Works

DWAYNE ACKIE, Plaintiff, v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS, et al., Defendants.

WAYNE RAUCEO, Plaintiff, v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS, Defendant.

MIGUEL J. CHAVARRIA, JR., Plaintiff, v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS, et al., Defendants.

MAURICE A. GOODWIN, Plaintiff, v. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-4275

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-4279

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-4428

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-4429

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June 10, 2021

PAPPERT, J.

MEMORANDUM

These are four related cases brought by co-workers at the Philadelphia Gas Works plant on Passyunk Avenue. They emanate from an internal complaint Miguel Chavarria filed with PGW's Human Resources Department about what he felt was a racially discriminatory environment at the Passyunk Plant. Wayne Rauceo, Maurice Goodwin and Dwayne Ackie, in addition to having some of their own concerns about the workplace, each participated in PGW's investigation into Chavarria's complaint. They believe they were retaliated against for doing so. They all sued PGW for discrimination, retaliation and fostering a hostile work environment. Chavarria, Goodwin and Ackie are members of the Gas Works Employees' Union Local 686 and they sued the union as well.

PGW and Local 686 move for summary judgment on all claims. After considering the parties' filings, thoroughly reviewing the record evidence in each case and holding oral argument, the Court grants all Motions in full. None of the Plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case for any of their claims because they did not suffer an adverse employment action or intentional discrimination, much less endure any discrimination that was severe or pervasive.

The Plaintiffs are all represented by Karin Gunter, who saw many of her clients' claims implode at oral argument when she had no alternative but to either withdraw them or concede that the Defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor. Not only is there no support in the record for the claims in these lawsuits, some allegations were directly contradicted by her clients' own deposition testimony. Counsel needed to vet her clients' claims more fully or at some point realize that discretion is the better part of valor.

I

Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 2018). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145 (3d Cir. 2004), holding modified by Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party will not suffice for a court to deny summary judgment. Id. at 252. Rather, the nonmovant must "set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 256.

At summary judgment, a court may consider any material in the record that may be admissible at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Memorial Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 387-88 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1999). In doing so, a court "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor." Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, 579 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But it need not credit "[u]nsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions." Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010). Nor may a court make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016).

II

Title VII and the PHRA prohibit employers from discriminating against employees with respect to the terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of their race, color or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 43 P.S. § 955(a). The ADEA precludes employer discrimination against employees in similar respects because of their age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Analyses of Title VII and PHRA violations are "identical, as Pennsylvania courts have construed the protections of the two acts interchangeably." Huston v. P&G Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002). Further, "[b]ecause the prohibition against age discrimination contained in the ADEA is similar in text, tone, and purpose to the prohibition against discrimination contained in Title VII, courts routinely look to law developed under Title VII to guide an inquiry under the ADEA." Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 191, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Barber v. CSX Distribution Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 698 (3d Cir. 1995)).

A

Disparate treatment claims under Title VII, the PHRA and the ADEA are governed by the burden shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); see also Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003); Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. App'x 831, 841 (3d Cir. 2016) (collectingcases). To establish a prima facie case for disparate treatment against an employer under Title VII or the PHRA, a plaintiff must show: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013). To establish a prima facie case under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show he "(1) . . . was over forty; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was ultimately replaced, or the position was filled by, a younger person." Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1998). An adverse employment action is one "that is serious and tangible enough to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Komis v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Labor, 918 F.3d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 2015)). "[G]eneral unpleasantness that can occur in the workplace, even if that unpleasantness may be motivated by racial animus," is insufficient to support a disparate treatment claim. Barnes v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 598 F. App'x 86, 90 (3d Cir. 2015).

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, "the burden of production . . . shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate non-discriminatory [justification] for the adverse employment action." Burton, 707 F.3d at 426 (quoting Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009)). "This burden is 'relatively light' and is satisfied if the employer provides evidence, which, if true, would permit a conclusion that it took the adverse employment action for a non-discriminatory reason." Id. (citing Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006)); see alsoShellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, 318 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 2003) (at the summary judgment stage "the defendant need not prove that the articulated reason actually motivated the action") (quoting Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 1997)). If an employer provides a sufficient justification, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff "to provide evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably infer that the employer's proffered justification is merely a pretext for discrimination." Burton, 707 F.3d at 426. To show pretext, a plaintiff "must point to some evidence . . . from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Id. at 427 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 763, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).

i

Where a plaintiff asserts a disparate treatment claim against a union, to establish a prima facie case "a plaintiff must show (1) a violation of the collective bargaining agreement with respect to the plaintiff; (2) the union permitted the violation to go unaddressed, thereby breaching its duty of fair representation; and (3) some indication that the union's actions were motivated by some discriminatory animus." Jenkins v. Transp. Workers Union, Loc. 234, No. 19-cv-1904, 2019 WL 6219211, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2019) (quoting Danao v. ABM Janitorial Servs., 142 F. Supp. 3d 363, 371 (E.D. Pa. 2015)). A union can breach its duty of fair representation "if its actions are 'arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,'" and its actions are arbitrary "only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational." Danao,142 F. Supp. 3d at 371 (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991)). "The deliberate choice not to process grievances' can, under certain circumstances, violate Title VII." Danao, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 371 (quoting Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 127 (3d Cir. 1985)).

A plaintiff "must adduce substantial evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives" to show a union's...