Adams v. Annucci

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JERRY ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. ANTHONY ANNUCCI, et al., Defendants.

No. 17-CV-3794 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

March 28, 2023

Jerry Adams Pro Se Plaintiff

David Cheng, Esq. Office of the New York State Attorney General Counsel for Defendants

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pro se Plaintiff Jerry Adams (“Plaintiff”) brings this Action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Acting Commissioner of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) Anthony Annucci (“Annucci,” or “Commissioner”) and Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health (“OMH”) Ann Marie T. Sullivan (“Sullivan”; with Annucci “Defendants”). (Am. Compl. (Dkt. No 36).)^[1]Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by designating him as a sex offender and that Annucci violated his rights under the First Amendment by sanctioning him for his failure to participate in a Sex Offender Counseling and Treatment Program (“SOCTP”). (See generally id.)

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). (See Dec. in Support of Mot. (Dkt. No. 126).) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the Defendants' 56.1 Statement in Support of their Motion (“Defs.' 56.1”) pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1. (See Defs.' 56.1 (Dkt. No. 128).) Additionally, where appropriate, the Court cites directly to the admissible evidence submitted by the Parties. The facts as described below are in dispute to the extent indicated.

Plaintiff entered DOCCS's system in 1989, after being convicted of several crimes including Sodomy in the First Degree. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleged that he was never screened or otherwise examined by OMH to determine whether he was a sex offender or if SOCTP was appropriate. (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.) However, in March 2012, Plaintiff was assessed by OMH's Sex Offender Evaluation Unit using the Computerized Criminal History Based Risk Instrument. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 4.) OMH's assessment deemed Plaintiff as “needing low risk sex offender programming.” (Id. ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Woodbourne Correctional Facility (“Woodbourne”) from October 26, 2015 until July 19, 2016. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was housed in the same cell for the entirety of that timeframe. (Id. ¶ 7.)

In June 2016, Plaintiff was instructed to attend SOCTP but refused to go. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleged in his Amended Complaint that as a result of his refusal to go to the program, Annucci “[invoked] sanctions against [Plaintiff],” including removing him from his assigned program in food services, revoking his single room housing “privilege” and moving him to a “dorm setting,” reducing his pay grade until he agreed to participate in the program, and transferring him to a facility far from his family. (Am. Compl. 3.) However, Plaintiff's inmate program assignment shows that his pay and job title were not changed upon his refusal to attend SOCTP in June 2016. (Cheng Dec. Ex. D, at 1-2 (Dkt. No. 126).)^[2]

Plaintiff subsequently agreed to attend SOCTP and was transferred to Gowanda Correctional facility to participate in the program on July 19, 2016, as there was no residential SOCTP available at Woodbourne. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiff's pay was temporarily increased before his transfer to Gowanda. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff arrived at Gowanda for SOCTP on July 21, 2016. (Id. ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding his attending SOCTP on July 28, 2016. (Id. ¶ 15.) In Plaintiff's original grievance, he raised the issue that he could not participate meaningfully in SOCTP by taking full responsibility for his crime because he maintained his innocence in the underlying crime and was appealing the verdict. (Seguin Dec. Ex. 4, at 6 (Dkt. No. 129).) Plaintiff further wrote that he was being “sanctioned” for maintaining his innocence because he was subject to the loss of his good time credits if he was removed from the program for failure to accept responsibility. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff's grievance was denied in August 2016, because he qualified for required attendance at SOCTP due to his “sentence for a specified offense as a sexually motivated felony under Penal Law [§] 130.91,” and because after investigation, it was determined that Plaintiff had “not provided any compelling reason to substantiate [a] change to the current policy.” (Id. at 4, 8.) When Plaintiff appealed this grievance to the Central Office Review Committee (“CORC”) after the grievance was denied by the superintendent, he argued that he had never been diagnosed or assessed by anyone from OMH pursuant to Correction Law § 622, which he claimed required that inmates be assessed for their need for programs rather than being assigned on the basis of their sex offense conviction. (Id. at 8-10.)^[3]CORC considered both Plaintiff's original claim regarding his inability to participate in SOCTP because he maintained his innocence and his argument about Correction Law § 622, denying the grievance on both grounds. (Id. at 1.) The CORC found that Plaintiff was “appropriately referred to the [SOCTP] based on his instant offense, and that the referral was approved by the Office of Guidance and Counseling.” (Id.) CORC also noted that he was assessed by OMH in accordance with Correction Law § 622 in 2012. (Id.)

At an unknown point in time, Plaintiff sent a letter to Annucci challenging his placement in SOCTP, which was referred to a subordinate commissioner. (Cheng Dec. Ex. A, at 36-38 (Dkt. No. 126).)

Plaintiff was discharged from SOCTP on October 7, 2016, principally for “minimal to no participation” in the program tasks. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 23.) Plaintiff was released to parole supervision on August 2, 2021. (Id. ¶ 24.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced the instant Action on March 27, 2017 in the Western District of New York, naming Annucci as the only Defendant. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).) The case was transferred to this Court on May 19, 2017. (Dkt. No. 4.)

On November 10, 2017, Annucci filed a Motion To Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 23.) Although Plaintiff moved to dismiss the New York Attorney General's Office from the case because of an alleged conflict of interest, (Dkt. No. 24), the Court denied the motion, but considered Plaintiff's accompanying Declaration in opposition to Annucci's Motion To Dismiss, (Dkt. Nos. 25-26). Annucci filed a Reply on January 10, 2018, (Dkt. No. 27), and Plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply on January 22, 2018, (Dkt. No. 28).

On September 25, 2018, the Court issued an Opinion & Order dismissing Plaintiff's claims without prejudice and allowing Plaintiff 30 days to file an Amended Complaint. (Op. & Order (“Op.”) 24-25 (Dkt. No. 33).) After receiving an extension from the Court, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on November 16, 2018, adding Sullivan as a Defendant. (Dkt. Nos. 3435; Am. Compl.)

On April 12, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 53.) Plaintiff filed an Opposition on May 3, 2019. (Dkt. No. 57.) Defendants filed a Reply on May 31, 2019. (Dkt. No. 58).) On March 27, 2020, the Court issued an Opinion & Order, denying Defendants' motion as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim regarding his status as a sex offender and First Amendment claim regarding the imposition of sanctions besides the revocation of good time credits by Annucci, dismissing Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim with prejudice, and dismissing certain of Plaintiff's First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims without prejudice. (Second Op. & Order (“Second Op.”) (Dkt. No. 60).)

Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on April 25, 2022. (See Not. of Mot.; Decl. of David H. Chen in Supp. Of Mot. (Dkt. No. 126); Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. (“Defs.' Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 128).) Plaintiff submitted his Opposition on June 30, 2022. (See Mem. of Law for Reply to Mot. (“Pl.'s Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 135).) Defendants replied on July 27, 2022. (See Reply to Mot. (“Defs.' Reply Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 136).) Plaintiff filed multiple Sur-Replies without leave of the Court on August 19, 2022, October 6, 2022, and November 28, 2022. (Dkt. Nos. 137, 140, 143.)^[4] Defendants replied to each of Plaintiff's Sur-Replies on September 16, 2022, October 17, 2022, and on December 15, 2022. (Dkt. Nos. 138, 142, 144.)

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (same); Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2014) (same). “In deciding whether to award summary judgment, the court must construe the record evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Torcivia v. Suffolk County, 17 F.4th 342, 354 (2d Cir. 2021); see also Horror Inc. v. Miller, 15 F.4th 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2021) (same). “It is the movant's burden to show that no genuine factual dispute exists.” Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Red Pocket, Inc. v. Interactive Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., No. 17-CV-5670, 2020 WL 838279, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2020) (same).

“However when the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the non[-]movant's claim,” in which case “the non[-]moving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial...