Adams v. Atl. Richfield Co.

1

DESHEENA ADAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:18-CV-375-PPS-JEM

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division

May 14, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

PHILIP P. SIMON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

This action is one of several related toxic tort lawsuits brought in this district by various groups of East Chicago residents.^[1] In a forty-one page Opinion and Order, I previously granted in part motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint [DE 224 (SAC)] filed by Defendants Atlantic Richfield Company, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company and the Chemours Company (collectively “DuPont”), and Hammond Lead Products, LLC Halstab, LLC, Hammond Group, Inc., and Halox, LLC (collectively, “Hammond Lead”).[DE 251 see DE 228; DE 231; DE 236.] Plaintiffs have filed a motion requesting that I reconsider this ruling. [DE 257.]

The motion presently before me adopts a kitchen-sink approach taking issue with prior rulings in the case and reasserting numerous arguments that I previously considered and rejected in ruling on Defendants' motions to dismiss. The parties submitted briefing and I held a hearing to provide Plaintiffs a final opportunity to be heard on the matter. [DE 264; DE 265; DE 266; DE 279; DE 281; DE 287; DE 290.] For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied.

Procedural Background

As detailed in my prior Opinion and Order, this case has been stalled at the pleadings stage. [See DE 251 at 2-11.] When I received the case following Judge Van Bokkelen's ruling on a round of motions to dismiss, it was already years in the making. [See DE 157; DE 195.] With each successive round of pleadings, Plaintiffs have tried to adequately allege injuries caused by Defendants' polluting activities to conform to the Court's rulings on what is required to plead claims for relief under Indiana tort law. In ruling on the pending motion, I assume the parties' familiarity with both the operative factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and my analysis of Plaintiffs' state law claims sounding in negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, nuisance, and strict liability. [See DE 251 at 6-10.]

To briefly recap, before I received the case, Judge Van Bokkelen ruled on a round of motions to dismiss and permitted Plaintiffs to proceed on some of their tort claims. [DE 157.] Plaintiffs, believing they could correct the deficiencies Judge Van Bokkelen had identified, sought leave to amend their complaint. [DE 162.] In their proposed amended complaint, plaintiffs reasserted claims of nuisance, strict liability, negligence, and NIED under Indiana law. After reviewing Judge Van Bokkelen's order, former Magistrate Judge Kolar (since confirmed to the Seventh Circuit) granted Plaintiffs leave to file the amended complaint; but in doing so, he noted it presented “several difficult or unsettled legal issues.” [DE 180 at 7.]

Initially, Judge Kolar concluded that only 3 of the 84 plaintiffs named in the proposed amended complaint alleged a present physical injury related to “exposure” to toxic substances, as required to state a negligence claim. The 81 other plaintiffs were denied leave to amend to assert negligence claims, and Judge Kolar found that further amendment would be futile. Id. at 9-12. In sum, only Minerva Ramirez, C.R., and Liduvina Espinosa were permitted to proceed on their negligence claims, as they were the only plaintiffs that adequately alleged present physical injuries. Id. at 12.

As to the Plaintiffs' NIED claims, Judge Kolar observed that Judge Van Bokkelen had previously ruled that absent an injury sufficient to sustain a negligence claim, Plaintiffs could not state an NIED claim under Indiana law based on alleged “emotional distress” damages, in the absence of an ordinary, “standalone” negligence claim. [DE 180 at 13 (citing DE 157 at 9).] Following Judge Van Bokkelen's order, the Indiana Supreme Court issued an opinion potentially supporting an alternative interpretation of state law on this issue and which potentially muddied the water. See Community Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368 (Ind. 2022). In light of this new authority, Judge Kolar was not “certain” the proposed NIED claims would fail on a motion to dismiss, so he granted all Plaintiffs leave to amend with respect to the NIED claims. [DE 180 at 15-16.]

Thereafter, defendants moved to dismiss. After reviewing the latest vintage of the complaint, I found that Plaintiffs' factual allegations still failed to make out plausible claims in certain respects. [DE 251.] In sum:

• I dismissed Counts I and II, asserting strict liability claims against Atlantic Richfield, DuPont, and Hammond Lead. Id. at 31-36.

• I dismissed Counts IV and VII, respectively asserting negligence and NIED claims against Atlantic Richfield. Id. at 14-20, 24-30.

• I dismissed Count V, asserting a private nuisance claim against DuPont. Id. at 36-40.

• As to the remaining NIED claim against DuPont and Hammond Lead (Count VI), I found that only Plaintiffs Minerva Ramirez, C.R., and Liduvina Espinosa (collectively, the “Ramirez plaintiffs”) adequately alleged facts establishing direct physical impacts to proceed under Indiana's “modified impact rule.” The balance of Plaintiffs (i.e., those other than the three Ramirez plaintiffs) failed to adequately allege facts establishing such impacts caused by the alleged lead contamination, so I dismissed their NIED claim. Id. at 24-30.

Given that Plaintiffs had twice been granted an opportunity to address similar issues with the aforementioned claims and made no specific arguments for leave to amend in conjunction with opposing the motions to dismiss, I dismissed the claims with prejudice. Id. at 40-41.

Legal Standard

While Plaintiffs' motion says it is brought under Rule 50(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [DE 257 at 1], it seems clear that this is a typo. In reality, Plaintiffs may seek “reconsideration” of a prior judgment or order under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 59(e) provides for reconsideration of final judgments; but it does not apply in this case, as no final judgment has been entered. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. Rule 60(b) provides for relief from “a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for one of the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed R. Civ. P. 60 (emphasis added).

The circuit has explained that, technically speaking, there is no such thing as a ‘motion for reconsideration' under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1142 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Talano v. Nw. Med. Faculty Found., Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 760 n.1 (7th Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, they are allowed under limited circumstances “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Caisse Nationale De Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1996)). See also, e.g., Miller v. City of Plymouth, 2010 WL 2194842, at *1 (N.D. Ind. May 27, 2010).

More specifically, a motion to reconsider is appropriate where: “(1) the court has patently misunderstood a party; (2) the court has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties; (3) the court has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension; (4) there has been a controlling or significant change in law since the submission of the issues to the court; or (5) there has been a controlling or significant change in the facts since the submission of the issue to the court.” Janky v. Batistatos, 2009 WL 10692471, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 24, 2009) (quoting Orange v. Burge, 451 F.Supp.2d 957, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2006)). See also Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990).

In other words, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to rehash arguments previously raised or waived in briefing the underlying motion or a means to relitigate issues with orders entered years earlier in the case. The circuit has said as much:

It is not the purpose of allowing motions for reconsideration to enable a party to complete presenting his case after the court has ruled against him. Were such a procedure to be countenanced, some lawsuits really might never end, rather than just seeming endless.

Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000). The denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 250 (7th Cir. 2004 (noting that “review of the denial of a motion to reconsider is highly deferential”). With that backdrop, let's turn to the substance of Plaintiffs' motion.

Discussion

Plaintiffs do not point me to any change in controlling law or newly discovered evidence that warrants reconsideration. Rather they assert that my decision contains manifest errors in applying Indiana law on negligence and NIED. As prefaced, the circuit has described “manifest error” as a “wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto, 224 F.3d at 606. That is a high standard which,...