Adams v. Huntingdon

ANDRE M. ADAMS, Petitioner v. SUPERINTENDENT SCI HUNTINGDON, et al., Respondents

No. 1:19-cv-01455

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

October 21, 2020

(Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM

On August 22, 2019, pro se Petitioner Andre M. Adams ("Petitioner"), who is presently confined at the State Correctional Institution in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania ("SCI Huntingdon"), initiated the above-captioned action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Following an Order to show cause (Doc. No. 6), and after receiving an extension of time to do so (Doc. Nos. 8, 9), on November 22, 2019, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 10) Petitioner's § 2254 petition as untimely. In a Memorandum and Order dated April 27, 2020, the Court concluded that Petitioner's § 2254 petition was timely filed, denied Respondents' motion to dismiss, and directed Respondents to file a response regarding the merits of the petition within twenty-one (21) days. (Doc. Nos. 17, 18.) After receiving an extension of time (Doc. Nos. 19, 20), Respondents filed their response on June 29, 2020 (Doc. No. 21). After receiving an extension of time (Doc. No. 23), Petitioner filed a traverse on August 7, 2020 (Doc. No. 25). Accordingly, Petitioner's § 2254 petition (Doc. No. 1) is ripe for disposition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Petitioner's State Proceedings

In February and July of 2012, Petitioner was charged with numerous drug trafficking offenses. See Commonwealth v. Adams, Docket Nos. CP-14-CR-0000355-2012 & CP-14-CR-0001228-2012 (Centre C.C.P.).¹ Petitioner was represented by numerous attorneys during his criminal proceedings, as set forth by the trial court:

In the instant case, [Petitioner] was assigned three separate court-appointed attorneys in the capacity of either standby counsel or full representation, and met with a fourth attorney who refused to accept the court appointment after speaking with [Petitioner]. [Petitioner] further sought out at least two additional private attorneys throughout the course of his case. Initially, [Petitioner] appeared at the preliminary hearing on docket number 2012-0355 represented by Philip Masorti, Esquire, a privately retained attorney. However, Attorney Masorti did not enter his appearance and on February 22, 2012, the Court appointed Edward Blanarik, Esquire, to represent [Petitioner]. Approximately two months later, Stephen T. O'Hanlon, Esquire, another privately retained attorney, entered his appearance. On July 9, 2012, Attorney O'Hanlon filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, citing lack of payment and irreconcilable conflicts. On July 12, 2012, this Court permitted Attorney Blanarik's withdrawal and Daniel Nelson, Esquire, was subsequently appointed to represent [Petitioner].

[Petitioner] was arrested on eighteen additional offenses on July 3, 2012, which were docketed at 2012-1228. On July 9, 2012, Attorney Blanarik was appointed to represent [Petitioner] on these charges as well. On August 28, 2012, Attorney Blanarik filed a Motion to Withdraw from this case and was permitted to do so on August 29, 2012.

On August 6, 2012, [Petitioner's] cases (2012-0355 and 2012-1228) were joined. On August 28, 2012, Attorney Nelson also filed a Motion to Withdraw, citing irreconcilable differences of opinions. A hearing was held on September 13, 2012 on an omnibus pretrial motion filed by [Petitioner] and the motions of both Attorney O'Hanlon and Attorney Nelson. At that hearing, regarding his then-current counsel, [Petitioner] indicated he believed both Attorney O'Hanlon and Attorney Nelson refused to consider his input and legal research and would not honor his requests to file certain pleadings with the court. [Petitioner] further indicated he believed Attorney Nelson to be inexperienced and incompetent. Regarding his previously appointed and privately retained counsel, [Petitioner] testified he and Attorney Blanarik had "an issue" and he had been unable to pay Attorney Masorti to represent him beyond the preliminary hearing. [Petitioner] also noted although an attempt had been made to appoint Charles J. Kroboth, Jr., Esquire to represent him, after a brief meeting, Attorney Kroboth ultimately declined the appointment. [Petitioner] requested that he be appointed yet another attorney.

(Doc. No. 21-38 at 4-5.) On September 19, 2012, the trial court issued an opinion and order concluding that Petitioner had forfeited his right to court-appointed counsel and appointing Attorney Nelson as standby counsel. (Id. at 5.)

On October 1, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding Petitioner's request for a continuance of jury selection. (Doc. No. 21-22 at 4.) Attorney Nelson could not be present at the hearing; accordingly, the trial court appointed Karen Muir, Esquire ("Attorney Muir") to represent Petitioner for the purposes of the hearing. (Id.) During the hearing, Petitioner argued that the trial court had forced him to ask for a continuance. (Id. at 4-16.) On October 12, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding multiple pretrial motions filed by Petitioner. (Doc. No. 21-23.) During the hearing, Petitioner asserted speedy trial violations pursuant to Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id.) The Commonwealth argued, however, that Petitioner was responsible for delays in his proceedings because of the motions he had filed. (Id.) Subsequently, Petitioner again asked for the appointment of counsel, and the trial court appointed Attorney Nelson to represent Petitioner. (Doc. No. 21-24.)

On December 3, 2012, the parties appeared for jury selection. During jury selection, Petitioner indicated on several occasions that Attorney Nelson was not his attorney and that he was representing himself. (Id. at 3, 10, 12-13,17-18, 22-23, 25.) Petitioner refused to engage in two (2) separate colloquies regarding his right to waive his right to counsel. (Id. at 4-8, 10-13,23.) The trial court warned Petitioner that he would be removed from jury selection if he became disruptive. (Id. at 9.) Ultimately, the trial court concluded that Petitioner would not be present when Attorney Nelson and the Commonwealth selected the jury because of Petitioner's conduct and the absence of a lawful waiver of counsel. (Id. at 16.) In response, Petitioner indicated that he could conduct jury selection himself and purported to fire Attorney Nelson. (Id. at 20-21.) The court then informed Petitioner that he could remain if he was silent, except for communication with Attorney Nelson. (Id. at 21.) Petitioner stated that Attorney Nelson was not his attorney. (Id. at 22.) The trial court decided to remove Petitioner from jury selection. (Id. at 23.)

The trial court, however, identified thirty (30) potential jurors, brought them into the courtroom, and allowed Petitioner to remain, warning him that if he had any outbursts he would be removed. (Id. at 24-25.) The trial court denied Petitioner's request to not be present during voir dire because it wanted Petitioner to be present. (Id. at 25-26.) The jury was selected with Petitioner present. (Id. at 26-49.) Petitioner then asked if he could be taken back to jail. (Id. at 49.) The trial court denied Petitioner's request, and Petitioner replied, "I need to go back to jail. I had enough of this." (Id.) The trial court asked the jurors to disregard Petitioner's statement. (Id.) Petitioner disrupted the proceedings again, arguing that the jury was not a jury of his peers because he is black. (Id. at 50.) The trial court then provided a cautionary instruction to the jury at Attorney Nelson's request. (Id. at 50-51.)

Before trial began, the trial court granted Attorney Nelson's motion to withdraw and denied Petitioner's request for another appointed attorney. (Doc. No.2 1-38 at 5-6.) On January 10, 2013, following the jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of thirty (30) counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, one count of criminal conspiracy, and seven (7)counts of criminal use of a communication facility. See Adams, Docket Nos. CP-14-CR-0000355-2012 & CP-14-CR-0001228-2012. Attorney Muir was appointed to represent Petitioner at sentencing. On February 12, 2013, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of a minimum of seventy-nine (79) years and a maximum of 158 years' incarceration. See id. Petitioner filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. See id. On June 15, 2015, the Superior Court vacated Petitioner's judgment of sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing after concluding that the imposed sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).² See Adams v. Miller, No. 767 MDA 2015, 2015 WL 6871185, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 2015). On August 25, 2015, the trial court resentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of a minimum of forty-five (45) years and a maximum of ninety (90) years' incarceration. See Adams, Docket Nos. CP-14-CR-0000355-2012 & CP-14-CR-0001228-2012.

While his appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a "petition for writ of habeas corpus subjiciendum," arguing that "the criminal statutes he was found guilty of violating are unconstitutional due to the lack of an enacting clause." See Adams, 2015 WL 6871185, at *1. The trial court denied the petition by an order dated April 17, 2015. See id. The trial court also noted that if Petitioner's petition were construed as a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), it would have been dismissed as premature in light of Petitioner's direct appeal. See id. On November 6, 2015, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order, noting that Petitioner's claim was cognizable under the PCRA and that his petition, construed as one brought pursuant to the PCRA, was premature. See id. at *3.

After resentencing by the trial court, Petitioner appealed his new judgment of sentence to the Superior Court. See Adams, Docket Nos....