Adams v. U.S. Dep't of Navy

DONNA ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-1618 (RDM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

May 8, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Donna Adams, proceeding pro se, brings this action against the United States Department of the Navy ("the Navy"), where she worked as an Electronics Engineer with the Strategic Systems Program. Dkt. 1 at 4. Her complaint, which is comprised of a single handwritten page and a copy of a Final Agency Decision on an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, appears to assert claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. See Dkt. 1 at 1. The Final Agency Decision from the Navy regarding her Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") claim details two actions allegedly taken based on Adams's race, sex, age, and protected EEO activity that formed the basis for Adams's administrative complaint: (1) a denial of time off to attend a professional development conference and issuance of a Letter of Caution for attending that conference and (2) the fact that other members of her team received a "Special Act Award"—which came with a $2,500 cash prize—and she, the only African-American woman on the team, did not. Id. at 3, 5-6. The Navy now moves for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment and partial dismissal of Adams's claims. Dkt. 11. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the Navy's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Adams is an African-American woman who was in her mid-fifties and employed as an Electronics Engineer with the Navy's Strategic Systems Program at the time of the two incidents detailed in the Final Agency decision. Dkt. 1 at 1, 3. Her complaint is a single handwritten page that reads, in relevant part:

On January 16, 2015, I did not receive a Special Act Award for my work on the D5 Life Extension Acceleration to Demonstration and Shakedown Operations (DASO-25) efforts. I was subject to a hostile work environment and ongoing harassment base[d] on my race (African-American), sex (female), age (DOB: 02/26/1960), and reprised/reprisal (prior EEO activity, Docket Number 11-00030-01695. My business travel was scrutinized, blackballed for promotions to GS-14 and higher.

Id. at 1. In evaluating the Navy's motion to dismiss, however, the Court may also consider the allegations contained in the Final Agency Decision that is attached to Adams's complaint. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) ("[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety[.]"); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, [the Court] may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [it] may take judicial notice."). Because the complaint is so threadbare, the bulk of the factual background is derived from that Final Agency Decision. For purposes of evaluating the Navy's motion to dismiss, the following facts taken from those two documents are accepted as true. See Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

The Final Agency Decision addressing Adams's claims focuses on two instances of alleged disparate treatment. The first incident occurred on January 16, 2015, when Adams did not receive a Special Act Award along with the other members of her team. Dkt. 1 at 3, 5. Despite being "very involved in the success of [D5 Life Extension Acceleration to Demonstrate and Shakedown Operations ("DASO-25")]," id., and having her name submitted for the award by one of her supervisors, id. at 5, Adams did not receive an award, id. at 3. In describing the criteria for the award selection to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), another supervisor stated that each potential recipient was considered under a numerical rankings system, which included criteria such as "the impact value" and how "broad[ly]" that "impact value" "affected the command, country, etc." Id. at 16. A supervisor in the Human Resources department further stated that supervisors submitted the names of those employees who had a "significant role [in] or [who made a significant] contribution" to the project's efforts to him, and he forwarded those nominations to the Special Systems Project Board of Directors for final approval. Id. When the EEOC conducted interviews with three of Adams's coworkers, all indicated that she played a significant role in the project, asserting: Adams was a "lead in their unit for Electrical Support Equipment and the Missile Test and Readiness Equipment," "had a significant role with the support test equipment," id. at 5-6, and was the "Missile Test and Readiness Manager," id. Each award recipient received $2,500. Id. at 5. Out of Adams's three coworkers that were interviewed during the investigation, all three received the award in question. Id. at 5-6. One of those coworkers is an African-American male born in 1962, one is a Caucasian male born in 1975, id. at 5, and the third is a Native-American and Caucasian male born in 1980, id. at 6.

The second incident occurred on April 13, 2015, when Adams sought to attend the Navy Sea, Air and Space Symposium that day in Washington, D.C. Id. Adams had received approval to attend and had attended the symposium "for the last four or five years." Id. The morning of the symposium, Adams sent her supervisor an email stating that she would be out for the day because she would be attending the symposium. Id. In his reply, that supervisor stated that he did not approve her request to attend the event and, upon consulting with the former Human Resources Specialist, told Adams that she would be considered absent without leave ("AWOL"). Id. at 6, 11. On May 4, 2015, Adams received a Letter of Caution, citing her failure to obtain approval to attend the symposium. Id. at 3, 11.

On June 18, 2015, Adams filed a formal EEO complaint with the Navy's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity pursuant to Title VII and the ADEA. Id. at 4. On January 21, 2016, she sent an email requesting a hearing before the EEOC, but she withdrew her request on February 27, 2017. Id. As a result, on May 2, 2017, the Navy's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity issued a final decision on the merits of Adams's formal complaint. Id. at 3. That decision examined Adams's claims of retaliation, disparate treatment, and harassment/hostile work environment and determined that the Navy did not discriminate against Adams on the basis of her race, sex or age, nor did it retaliate against her for filing a prior EEO complaint in 2011. Id. at 9, 18.

B. Procedural Background

On August 2, 2017, Adams brought this action, id. at 1, and, on that same day, she filed a motion to leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"), Dkt. 2. On August 22, 2017, Adams's motion for leave to proceed IFP was denied, and her suit was (mistakenly) terminated. Dkt. 3. Two weeks later, Adams refiled the same suit with the required filing fee. See 1:17-cv-01845,Dkt. 1. Because Adams's original action was incorrectly terminated without first providing her with the opportunity to pay the filing fee, the Court terminated her second suit, reinstated her first suit, and transferred the filing fee submitted with Adams's second suit to that of the first suit, Minute Order (Sept. 4, 2018); Dkt. 4 at 1.

The Navy then moved for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment and partial dismissal. Dkt. 11 at 1. On April 2, 2019, the Court issued a Fox/Neal order cautioning Adams about the need to respond to the Navy's motion. Dkt. 13 at 3. When Adams did not do so, the Court sua sponte extended her time to respond. Minute Order (Oct. 7, 2019). Finally, on March 9, 2020—months after both of the deadlines imposed by the Court had expired—the Court received a copy of Adams's response to the Navy's motion. Dkt. 20. Oddly, that document is stamped "Received" by the Clerk of Court on "August 16, 2019"—the date that Adams's response was originally due. Id. at 1. The Court will, accordingly, treat Adams's response as timely filed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain "'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). Although "detailed factual allegations" are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must furnish "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all theallegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. (citations omitted). Although "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely,'" id. at 556 (citation omitted), the plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged," Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice." Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2...