Adria MM Prods., Ltd. v. Worldwide Entm't Grp., Inc.

ADRIA MM PRODUCTIONS, LTD., Plaintiff, v. WORLDWIDE ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC., Defendant.

Case Number: 17-21603-CIV-MORENO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA Miami Division

February 20, 2019

ORDER DENYING WORLDWIDE ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Adria MM Productions, Ltd., a Croatian company, and Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Worldwide Entertainment Group, Inc., a Miami-based company, entered into a five-year Promotional Agreement for the production of "Ultra Europe" musical festivals in Croatia. Pursuant to the Agreement, Worldwide Entertainment granted Adria Productions the right to use certain "Ultra" trademarks in Croatia and Europe to promote the events, in exchange for licensing and promotional fees. After Worldwide Entertainment revoked the Agreement for alleged material breaches, Adria Productions filed suit, claiming that the Agreement was void for fraud or, in the alternative, had been breached. Specifically, Adria Productions alleged ten counts: I-Fraud in the inducement; II-Fraudulent misrepresentation; III-Breach of contract; IV-Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; V-Equitable (promissory) estoppel; VI-Rescission (fraud); VII-Unjust enrichment; VIII-Declaratory relief; IX-Injunctive relief; and X-Tortious interference with business relationships.

In response, Worldwide Entertainment countersued claiming that, among other things, Adria Productions breached the contract entitling Worldwide Entertainment to damages. More specifically, Worldwide Entertainment alleged nine counts in its Counterclaim: I-Breach of contract (damages); II-Breach of contract (injunction); Ill-Misappropriation of trade secrets; IV-Unjust enrichment; V-Violation of Florida's Computer Abuse and Data Recovery Act; VI-Violation of the Stored Wire and Electronic Communication and Transactional Records Access; VII-Common law trademark infringement; VIII-Unfair competition; and IX-Federal trademark infringement.

The Court held a four-day jury trial on the parties' legal claims. After the close of evidence, the parties argued Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) motions for judgment as a matter of law. After granting Worldwide Entertainment's motion as to Adria Productions's Count IV, the Court allowed Adria Productions's breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, and tortious interference with business relationships claims to be submitted to the jury. Likewise, after granting Adria Productions's Rule 50(a) motion as to Worldwide Entertainment's Counts III, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX, Worldwide Entertainment submitted only its breach of contract claim to the jury.

The jury rendered its verdict, finding that both parties had breached the contract and that Worldwide Entertainment had tortiously interfered with Adria Productions's business relationships. The jury awarded Adria Productions $0 for its breach of contract claim and $866,000 for its tortious interference with business relationships claim. Worldwide Entertainment was awarded $366,211 for its breach of contract claim. The Court then heard argument on the parties' remaining equitable claims, all of which were denied.

Following the entry of judgment, Worldwide Entertainment filed a joint Rule 50(b)motion for judgment as a matter of law and Rule 59 motion for new trial (D.E. 203). The Court has reviewed the motion, the response, the reply, the relevant portions of the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons stated below, Worldwide Entertainment's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial is DENIED.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 50(b) Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Worldwide Entertainment's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). Rule 50(b) allows a party whose motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) was denied at trial, to renew the motion before the Court after judgment has been entered, along with an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). Rule 50(a) "is the mechanism for defendants to challenge the sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence at and after the close of the evidence." Peer v. Lewis, No. 06-60146-CIV-EGT, 2008 WL 2047978, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2008). "[A]ny renewal of a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) must be based on the same grounds as the original request for judgment as a matter of law prior to the case being submitted to the jury." Id. (citing Chaney v. City of Orlando, 483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2006)) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) are reviewed under the exact same standard as Rule 50(a). Id. Under this standard, "[a] district court should grant judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff presents no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for him on a material element of his cause of action." Alphamed Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Arriva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (citing Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 420 F.3d 1272,1279 (11th Cir. 2005)). On the other hand, "the Court should deny the motion if the plaintiff presents enough evidence to create a substantial conflict in the evidence on an essential element of the plaintiff's case." Id. (internal quotations omitted).

The court must uphold the jury's verdict "unless there is no legal basis upon which the jury could have found for the plaintiff." Peer, 2008 WL 2047978, at *3 (quoting Telecom Techn. Servs., Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F. 3d 820, 830 (11th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Delpit v. Nocuba Shipping Co., 302 F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1962) (explaining that the court may not "second-guess jurors or substitute [its] judgment for theirs"). The court may not engage in "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts"—those are the functions of the jury. Alphamed, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1332 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). "[A]lthough the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe." Id. "If there are conflicting inferences that can be drawn from [the] evidence, it is not the court's role to pick the better one. Instead, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in [the non-movant's] favor." Peer, 2008 WL 2047978, at *4 (citing Jackson v. State of Alabama State Tenure Comm'n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. 2005)).

Likewise, even if the Court disagrees with the jury's assessment of damages, it has "no general authority to reduce the amount of a jury's verdict." Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, No. 09-22607-CIV-EGT, 2011 WL 39130, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2011) (citing Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 29 (1889)). "The Seventh Amendment prohibits re-examination of a jury's determination of the facts, which includes its assessment of the extent of the [party's] injuries." Id. (citations omitted). To allow such re-examination "would deprive the parties of their SeventhAmendment right to a jury trial." Id. (citing Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999)).

That said, "[w]hile the court must afford due deference to the jury's findings, it is axiomatic that such findings are not automatically insulated from review by virtue of the jury's careful and conscientious deliberation. Peer, 2008 WL 2047978, at *4 (citing Johnson v. Clark, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1245-46 (M.D. Fla. 2007)). Rule 50 allows the trial court to remove issues from the jury's consideration "when the facts are sufficiently clear that the law requires a particular result." Id. The jury's verdict "is not entitled to the benefit of unreasonable inferences, or those at war with the undisputed facts." Alphamed, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1333 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

B. Rule 59 Motion for New Trial

"If alternative motions for judgment as a matter of law and for new trial are presented, the Court should rule on the motion for judgment, and whatever his or her ruling thereon he or she should also rule on the motion for a new trial, indicating the grounds of his or her decision." Id. (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 253 (1940)) (internal quotations omitted). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues . . . in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States . . ." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. "Resolution of a motion for new trial is committed to the discretion of the trial court." Peer, 2008 WL 2047978 at *17 (citing Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 1999)). When deciding whether to grant a motion for new trial, "the judge must determine if in his opinion, the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence . . . or will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may besubstantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict." Id. (quoting Insurance Co. of N. America v. Valente, 933 F.2d 921, 922-23 (11th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotations omitted). "The judge must protect against manifest injustice in the jury's verdict, but it is not his role to assess credibility where conflicting testimony has been presented during the trial. Instead, the judge must defer to the jury on the weight to be given to each witness's testimony." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Although there is not an exhaustive list of reasons, a new trial...