Aery v. State

1

James Paul Aery, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A23-1329

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

May 20, 2024

Beltrami County District Court File No. 04-CR-18-3347

James Paul Aery, Bemidji, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and David L Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Michael V. Mahlen Assistant County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Frisch, Judge.

SYLLABUS

A petitioner is not exonerated for the purpose of seeking exoneration compensation under the Minnesota Imprisonment and Exoneration Remedies Act (MIERA), Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362-.368 (2022), when the petitioner's conviction for actual possession of an unlawful item was reversed on the ground that an unconstitutional search required suppression of the evidence.

OPINION

GAÏTAS, JUDGE

In 2020, this court reversed the drug-possession conviction of appellant James Paul Aery because a search that revealed drugs in his pocket and his subsequent arrest violated his constitutional rights. Following the reversal of his conviction, Aery petitioned the district court for an order declaring him eligible for exoneration compensation under MIERA. The district court denied Aery's petition, determining that Aery was not eligible for exoneration compensation because his conviction was reversed on a legal ground and not based on his factual innocence. Aery now challenges the district court's denial of his petition.

We conclude that a petitioner is not exonerated for the purpose of seeking exoneration compensation under MIERA when the petitioner's conviction for actual possession of an unlawful item was reversed solely on the ground that an unconstitutional search required suppression of the evidence. Because we reversed Aery's conviction based on the unconstitutionality of the search that revealed the drugs in his pocket, he was not exonerated as defined by MIERA. Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of Aery's petition.

FACTS

Aery was a passenger in the backseat of a car that police stopped for a traffic violation. During the stop, police officers saw suspected drugs in plain view near the driver's seat. They asked the driver and the other people in the car, including Aery, to exit the car. While police officers searched the car, one officer reported that Aery put his hand in his pocket. According to that officer, when Aery removed his hand from his pocket, a small bag containing a trace amount of a crystalline substance fell to the ground. Based on this observation, the officer handcuffed Aery and searched him. In Aery's pants, the officer found three glass smoking pipes and another small bag, which contained methamphetamine.

Following this incident, respondent State of Minnesota charged Aery with fifth-degree possession of methamphetamine. Aery moved to suppress the evidence, asserting that it was discovered during an unlawful search. The district court denied Aery's suppression motion, ruling that the officers had probable cause to arrest Aery for constructively possessing the drugs observed near the driver and that the search of Aery's person was a lawful search incident to his arrest. Following a stipulated-evidence court trial, the district court found Aery guilty and sentenced him to prison.

Aery appealed his conviction to this court, challenging the district court's order denying his motion to suppress. We reversed Aery's conviction, determining that the search of his pants violated the federal and state constitutions, which required suppression of the evidence. State v. Aery, No. A19-1845, 2020 WL 7134872, at *1 (Minn.App. Dec. 7, 2020).

Aery then petitioned the district court for an order determining that he was eligible for compensation under MIERA. The district court observed that Aery's conviction was reversed because the evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and not because Aery was "factually innocent" or "on grounds consistent with innocence."

Thus, the district court concluded that Aery "[did] not meet the statutory definition of 'exonerated'" and was not eligible for compensation.

Aery appeals.

ISSUE

Was Aery exonerated for the purpose of seeking exoneration compensation under MIERA when this court reversed his drug-possession conviction on the ground that the police discovered the drugs in his pocket during an unconstitutional search?

ANALYSIS

In this case, we consider whether a petitioner who was convicted for actual possession of an unlawful item is eligible for exoneration compensation under MIERA when the conviction is later reversed on the ground that an unconstitutional search required suppression of the item. MIERA provides that formerly convicted people may obtain compensation after exoneration if they meet specified criteria. Minn. Stat §§ 611.362-.368. It "establishes a multistep process for receiving compensation." Back v. State, 992 N.W.2d 363, 366 (Minn. 2023). Whether an individual has been exonerated is the threshold determination under MIERA. Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633, 641 (Minn. 2022). A petitioner seeking exoneration compensation must first obtain a district court order "under section 590.11 determining that the person is entitled to compensation based on exoneration." Minn. Stat. § 611.362, subd. 1; see also Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (2022).

Section 590.11 defines the term "exonerated." Relevant here, the statute provides that a person is "exonerated" if a court "reverse[s]" the person's conviction "on grounds consistent with innocence." Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(i). "[G]rounds consistent with innocence" means the petitioner was either:

(1) exonerated, through a pardon or sentence commutation, based on factual innocence; or

(2) exonerated because the judgment of conviction was vacated or reversed, or a new trial was ordered, and there is any evidence of factual innocence whether it was available at the time of investigation or trial or is newly discovered evidence.

Id., subd. 1(c)(1), (2).

In his petition for exoneration compensation, Aery alleged that the reversal of his conviction on appeal constituted an exoneration under section 590.11. But the district court determined that the reversal of Aery's conviction did not amount to an exoneration because Aery's conviction was not reversed "on grounds consistent with innocence."

Aery, who is self-represented on appeal, challenges the district court's determination. He argues that he is factually innocent because his arrest and the subsequent search of his person were unlawful. Whether a petitioner meets the definition of an "exonerated" person for the purpose of MIERA presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Buhl v. State, 922 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Minn.App. 2019).

In Kingbird, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the term "factual innocence" as used in section 590.11. 973 N.W.2d at 641-42. Kingbird, who was convicted for unlawfully possessing a firearm based on his possession of a BB gun, sought exoneration compensation after the supreme court held that a BB gun is not a firearm, and his conviction was reversed on this ground. Id. at 642 (relying on State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 2016)).

In considering whether Kingbird was exonerated for the purpose of section 590.11, the supreme court observed that "'factual innocence' is the state of being not guilty of a...