Aguilar v. David E. Harvey Builders

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ANGELLA AGUILAR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DAVID E. HARVEY BUILDERS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. GLS-18-03953

United States District Court, D. Maryland

September 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THE HONORABLE GINA L. SIMMS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiffs Angella Aguilar, Luis Baires, Carlos Chavarria, Blanca Ferrer, Jacinto Garcia Romero, Fabricio Marroquin, Antonio Martinez, Wilson Panozo, Freddy Verizaga Prado, Jose Feliciano Revelo, Jose Antonio Torres (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against: Defendant David E. Harvey Builders, Inc., d/b/a “Harvey-Cleary Builders” (“Defendant Harvey-Cleary” or “Harvey-Cleary”); Defendant Frank Marceron (“Defendant Marceron” or “Mr Marceron”); The Subcontractors Gateway, Inc. (“TSCG”) and TSCG Drywall and Painting, LLC (collectively “Defendant TSCG”); and Darlene Marceron, alleging violations of: the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.; the Maryland Wage and Hour Law (“MWHL”), Md. Code. Ann., Labor & Empl. §§ 3-401 et seq.; the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-501 et seq.; and for promissory estoppel and quantum meruit. (ECF No 1).^[1]

After a five-day bench trial, the Court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs against Defendants Marceron, TSCG, and Harvey-Cleary, finding them jointly and severally liable to Plaintiffs for unpaid wages and liquidated damages in the amount of $93,450, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. (ECF Nos. 168, 169).

Plaintiffs timely filed their motion for attorneys' fees and costs and memorandum in support thereto (“the Motion”). (ECF Nos. 170, 178).^[2] Defendant Harvey-Cleary filed a response in opposition (“Opposition”), and Plaintiffs filed a Reply. (ECF Nos. 182-183). To date, neither Defendant Marceron nor Defendant TSCG has responded to the Motion, and the time for responding has passed. See ECF No. 169; Local Rule 105.2(a)(D. Md. 2023). No hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023).

For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is granted in part denied in part.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A plaintiff who prevails on an FLSA claim is entitled to the payment of attorney's fees and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).^[3]A plaintiff is a “prevailing party” if he/she succeeds “on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit. . .sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart et al., 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).^[4] Because judgment has been entered in Plaintiffs' favor, they are indisputably “prevailing parties” entitled to attorney's fees.

The amount awarded for fees and costs is discretionary. Burnley v. Short, 730 F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Randolph v. Powercomm Construction, Inc., 715 Fed. App'x 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2017).

A. ATTORNEYS' FEES

To calculate the amount to be awarded in attorneys' fees, a court must determine what is reasonable. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. To do so, courts engage in a three-step process. First, a court must calculate the lodestar, which is “the number of reasonable hours expended [multiplied by] a reasonable [hourly] rate.” McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013). To determine whether the hours and rates are reasonable, the Fourth Circuit has held that a court's discretion should be guided by the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 71719 (5th Cir. 1974). The twelve factors (“Johnson factors”) are:

(1) the time and labor expended;

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised;

(3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered;

(4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation;

(5) the customary fee for like work;

(6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation;

(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances;

(8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained;

(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney;

(10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose;

(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and

(12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases.

McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88, n.5.

Second, a court must subtract fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones. McAfee, 728 F.3d at 88. Third, a court should award “some percentage of the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success enjoyed by the plaintiff.” McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88.

The party seeking attorney's fees bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of those fees. Ledo Pizza Sys., Inc. v. Ledo Rest., Inc., DKC-06-3177, 2012 WL 4324881, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 18, 2012).

An attorney's fees award that is greater than the amount of judgment is not unusual. There is no rule that requires proportionality between the amount of judgment and fee award under civil rights statutes. See Nelson v. A & H Motors, Inc., No. 12-2288, 2013 WL 388991, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 30, 2013) (citing City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 573-81 (1986)). The FLSA is a civil rights statute. See id. at *2, n.3 (citing CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 454 (2008)). The Supreme Court has opined that a rule requiring proportionality would “seriously undermine Congress' purpose” and prevents victims who frequently cannot pay counsel at market rates from effective access to the justice system. Riverside, 477 U.S. at 576; see also id. at *2. The Fourth Circuit has accordingly recognized that “[a]wards of attorney's fees substantially exceeding damages are not unusual in civil rights litigation.” Nelson, 2013 WL 388991, at *2 (citing Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 328 n.20 (4th Cir. 2006)). Proportionality, then, is considered “only to the extent that amount is relevant to the Johnson factor of amount in controversy and results obtained.” Id.

B. COSTS

A prevailing party may also recover costs, but “only for reasonable litigation expenses.” Jones v. Dancel, 792 F.3d 395, 404 (4th Cir. 2015)(quoting Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1084 (4th Cir. 1986)). An award of costs “must adequately compensate counsel without resulting in a windfall.” Daly, 790 F.2d at 1084 n.18. Courts within the Fourth Circuit have the same discretion in awarding costs as they do when awarding attorneys' fees. Roy v. Cnty. of Lexington, S.C., 141 F.3d 533, 549 (4th Cir. 1998).

II. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

A. Plaintiffs' Motion and Reply

The Motion requests attorney's fees in the amount of $403,474.98. (ECF No. 178, p. 4). This number is ultimately predicated on 1,275.3 hours of work after purported deductions for “excessive or potentially duplicative time ($106,000)” and for “an additional five percent ‘across the board' from the total monetary award sought($21,235.52).” (Id.; see also ECF No. 178-2. p. 35). As broken down by category, the Motion requests:

Description of Event

Billed Hours

Initial Fees Requested

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

46.7

$18,586

Case Development

4.8

$2,231

Hearings

6.3

$2,455

Depositions

123.2

$42,798

Discovery Other than Depositions

293.2

$92,102

Fee Petition

70.9

$21,814

Motions Practice

211.4

$67,749

Pleadings

27.5

$12,272.50

Description of Event

Billed Hours

Initial Fees Requested

Trial

78

$22,620

Trial Prep and Post-Trial Motions

480.4

$142,083

TOTAL INCURRED (prior to billing judgment)

1794.7

$531,378.50

TOTAL (after billing judgment)

1342.4

$424,710.50

TOTAL SOUGHT (after billing judgment and further 5 % reduction)

1276.3

$403,474.98

In sum, Plaintiffs contend that they have appropriately incurred $531,3/8.50 in attorneys' fees, from which they have deducted $12/,903.52, which they contend represents “24 percent of the fees incurred in this case.” (Motion, p. 9).^[5]

After Defendant Harvey-Cleary opposed the Motion, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a Reply, in which the total amount sought in attorneys' fees increased:

Fee Petition (Reply Brief)

Billed Hours

Fees Requested

TOTAL INCURRED (prior to billing judgment)

36.2

$11,887

TOTAL (after billing judgment)

21.0

$6,810.50

TOTAL SOUGHT (after billing judgment and further 5 % reduction)

$6,469.98

In sum, then, Plaintiffs seek a total of $409,944.96 in attorneys' fees.

Plaintiffs' counsel argues that all of the Johnson factors applicable to this case support the amount of fees sought. (Motion, pp. 9-22).

B. Defendant Harvey-Cleary's Opposition

Defendant Harvey-Cleary file an Opposition, which it believes supports its ultimate requests: (a) that the Court reduce the fees sought by 50%; and (b) allocate the amount to be paid amongst the Defendants based on the time spent on issues pertaining to each Defendant.

To that end, Harvey-Cleary advances several arguments. First, that the case was not particularly novel or complex. The litigation required Plaintiffs' counsel to follow well-established case law on the joint employer doctrine and all Plaintiffs had similar fact patterns. Thus, a reduction in fees sought is warranted due to the lack of complexity involved. Second, Plaintiffs did not prevail on all claims and the total amount of attorneys' fees sought does not account for this reality. Third, counsel “over-lawyered” their motions practice, by filing motions that were “unnecessary, imprudent, and ultimately unsuccessful” and by claiming too many hours to prepare the fee petition. Fourth, Harvey-Cleary asserts that “many of the hours billed by Plaintiffs' counsel. . .reflect inefficiency that should not be charged to Harvey-Cleary,” which resulted in unnecessary legal fees. In particular, Defendant Harvey-Cleary argues that redundant review and redrafting by several attorneys and paralegals occurred, and complains that the length of trial lasting...