Aguilar v. State

162 N.E.3d 537

Derek R. AGUILAR, Appellant-Petitioner,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-PC-949

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED December 31, 2020

Rehearing Denied April 9, 2021

Appellant Pro Se: Derek R. Aguilar, Carlisle, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Samuel J. Dayton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Bailey, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Derek R. Aguilar ("Aguilar") appeals, pro se , the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which was based on a premise that he should have been released to probation, not parole. He raises five issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the court erred by denying his motion for summary disposition and granting the State's cross-motion for summary disposition.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2006, Aguilar entered a plea agreement concerning two criminal causes: 01C01-0511-FB-10 ("FB-10") and 01C01-0512-FB-12 ("FB-12"). In pertinent part, the plea agreement specified that Aguilar would plead guilty to one count of Burglary in FB-10. As a sentence for that count, Aguilar would serve twenty years in the Indiana Department of Correction (the "DOC"). As for FB-12, Aguilar would plead guilty to several offenses and serve an aggregate term of ten years in the DOC with all the time suspended to probation. The aggregate term in FB-12 would run consecutive to the sentence in FB-10. Summarizing the sentencing arrangement, the plea agreement specified that the "combined sentence" across causes was "30 years to the [DOC], 20 served, 10 suspended." App. Vol. 2 at 46. The agreement also stated that the ten years of probation in FB-12 would begin "following release from incarceration" in FB-10. Id.

[4] At a sentencing hearing, Aguilar pleaded guilty and the court sentenced Aguilar in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.¹ In sentencing Aguilar, the court orally noted that there would be "ten years of formal probation following [Aguilar's] release from incarceration" in FB-10. Id. at 70. The court also instructed Aguilar to "report to the probation department following [his] release from the [DOC]." Id. at 71. Thereafter, the court orally recited conditions of Aguilar's probation, including that he obey all laws. The court also issued an abstract of judgment for FB-10 with a box checked indicating that Aguilar should be returned to the court for probation at the completion of his sentence.

[5] Aguilar began serving his twenty-year sentence in FB-10. After accruing credit time in FB-10, Aguilar signed a conditional parole release agreement and was placed on parole in April 2016. Aguilar was also placed on probation in FB-12.

[6] In July and August of 2016, the State filed petitions alleging that Aguilar violated the conditions of probation in FB-12. Aguilar and the State negotiated an agreement whereby Aguilar would serve 2,370 days in the DOC and have no further probationary period in FB-12. At a September 2016 revocation hearing, Aguilar admitted to violating the conditions of probation, including by using marijuana. Aguilar's probation in FB-12 was revoked and he was ordered to serve 2,370 days in the DOC. Aguilar began serving that executed sentence.

[7] Meanwhile, the parole board held a hearing on allegations that Aguilar violated the conditions of his parole by failing to report to his parole agent as instructed. In November 2016, the parole board revoked ten years of Aguilar's credit time in FB-10. The executed time was arranged so that Aguilar would serve the balance of his sentence in FB-10 before the balance of his sentence in FB-12.²

[8] In September 2019, Aguilar filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The petition focused on whether Aguilar was improperly placed on parole in FB-10. According to Aguilar, both his plea agreement and Indiana law required that he instead begin serving his term of probation in FB-12. Aguilar claimed that the parole board exceeded its statutory authority by, inter alia , releasing him to parole rather than probation. Aguilar also claimed that he was deprived of due process because of errors in handling his sentence. Aguilar moved for summary disposition. Following a hearing, the State filed a cross-motion for summary disposition. The court later granted the State's cross-motion for summary disposition, thereby denying Aguilar's petition for post-conviction relief.

[9] Aguilar now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a person may present limited challenges to a criminal conviction or a sentence. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1 ; Gibson v. State , 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied .³ Generally, "[t]he scope of potential relief is limited to issues unknown at trial or unavailable on direct appeal." Gibson , 133 N.E.3d at 681. In a post-conviction action, the petitioner "has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." P-C.R. 1(5). If there are disputed factual issues, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing. P-C.R. 1(4)(g), 1(5). However, pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(g), the court "may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the petition when it appears from the [evidence] submitted ... that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." On appeal, we review "the grant of a motion for summary disposition in post-conviction proceedings ... the same way as a motion for summary judgment." Norris v. State , 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. 2008). Indeed, "summary disposition, like summary judgment, is a matter for appellate de novo determination when the determinative issue is a matter of law, not fact." Id. [11] To the extent our review requires the interpretation of a contract—such as a plea agreement—we construe contracts de novo , applying the plain language of the contract with a goal of "determining the intent of the parties at the time the plea was entered." State v. Smith , 71 N.E.3d 368, 370 (Ind. 2017). Similarly, to the extent our review requires statutory interpretation, we owe no deference to the court below. See State v. Brunner , 947 N.E.2d 411, 416 (Ind. 2011). Rather, we interpret statutes de novo . Id. When interpreting a statute, "our primary goal is to determine the legislature's intent." D.P. v. State , 151 N.E.3d 1210, 1216 (Ind. 2020). "[T]o ascertain that intent, we must first look to the statutes' language." Id. "If the language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning[.]" Id. However, if the statute is ambiguous, we "resort to rules of statutory interpretation so as to give effect to the legislature's intent." Suggs v. State , 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016). Further, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, we interpret the statute "in the defendant's favor as far as the language can reasonably support." Calvin v. State , 87 N.E.3d 474, 479 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Mi.D. v. State , 57 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind. 2016) ); see K.C.G. v. State , 156 N.E.3d 1281, 1284 (Ind. 2020) ("When the legislature is imprecise, the State does not get the benefit of the doubt.").⁴

[12] Here, the material facts are not in dispute. That is, there is no dispute that Aguilar entered a plea agreement regarding FB-10 and FB-12. Thereunder, Aguilar would serve twenty years in the DOC in FB-10. Consecutive thereto, Aguilar would serve an aggregate term of ten years in FB-12 with the time fully suspended to probation. Aguilar began serving his executed sentence in FB-10. After accruing adequate credit time, Aguilar was placed on parole in FB-10.

[13] In petitioning for post-conviction relief, Aguilar argued that he should have bypassed parole in FB-10 and moved straight to his term of probation in FB-12. Aguilar's argument turns on his reading of the following statute:

[W]hen a person imprisoned for a felony completes his fixed term of imprisonment, less the credit time he has earned with respect to that term, he shall be:

(1) released on parole for not more than twenty-four (24) months, as determined by the parole board;

(2) discharged upon a finding by the committing court that the person was assigned to a community transition program and may be discharged without the requirement of parole; or

(3) released to the committing court if his sentence included a period of probation.

Ind. Code § 35-50-6-1(a) (2005) (emphases added).

[14] Aguilar argues that he received a non-divisible thirty-year "sentence" across FB-10 and FB-12 with the first twenty years executed in the DOC and the last ten years suspended to probation. According to Aguilar, because his "sentence" included a period of probation, the parole board exceeded its statutory authority by releasing him on parole under subsection (1) rather than to the committing court under subsection (3) for placement on probation. Aguilar also argues that the handling of his release violated the terms of his plea agreement and ran afoul of principles of due process.⁵ In support of his argument, Aguilar directs us to language in his plea agreement referring to a "combined sentence" across causes. App. Vol. 2 at 46. He also points out that, at sentencing, the trial court stated that Aguilar was "to report to the probation department following [his] release from the [DOC]." Id. at 71. Additionally, Aguilar directs our attention to the abstract of judgment for FB-10, where a "Yes" box is checked next to the following statement: "Is the defendant to be returned to the Court for probation at the completion of his/her sentence?" Id. at 75.

[15] Aguilar's arguments turn on the premise that it is possible to receive a single "sentence" for multiple convictions. Critically, the Indiana Code requires a discrete sentence for each offense. See I.C. § 35-50-1-1 ("The court shall fix the penalty of and sentence a person convicted of an offense."); Serino v....