Aguilera v. Wright Cnty.

50 F.Supp.3d 1057

Jose Angel AGUILERA, Plaintiff,

v.WRIGHT COUNTY, IOWA; Lee E. Poppen; Jeffrey TeKippe; Victor Murillo; William Basler; Jack Seward; Eric Simonson; and Scott D. Brown, Defendants.

No. C 13–3034–MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Central Division.

Signed Oct. 6, 2014

Motion granted. Martyn S. Elberg, Sigmeth Roberts Law, PLC, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey C. Peterzalek, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant, Scott D. Brown.

Robert M. Livingston, Kristopher K. Madsen, Stuart Tinley Peters Thorn Hughes Faust & Madsen, Council Bluffs, IA, for Defendants Wright County, Iowa, Eric Simonson, Jeffrey TeKippe, and Lee R. Poppen.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

1060

A.

Factual Background

1060

B.

Procedural Background

1061

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

1063

A.

Standards For Summary Judgment

1063

B.

Absolute Judicial Immunity

1064

1.

Arguments of the parties

1064

2.

Analysis

1065

C.

Other Grounds For Summary Judgment

1067

1.

Arguments of the parties.

1067

2.

Analysis

1068

III.

CONCLUSION

1069

As I explained, in somewhat more detail, in my January 6, 2014, Memorandum Opinion And Order Regarding State Defendants' Motion To Dismiss (docket no. 19), published at Aguilera v. Wright Cnty., Iowa, 990 F.Supp.2d 926 (N.D.Iowa 2014), this unhappy case has been brought by a state prisoner, plaintiff Jose Angel Aguilera, after the Iowa Supreme Court set aside Aguilera's 1996 conviction for the second-degree murder of Jesus “Jesse” Garcia, on the basis of a Brady violation,¹ but not until Aguilera had already served 14 years in prison. The state opted to retry Aguilera for second-degree murder, but, on March 12, 2012, Aguilera entered into a plea agreement to plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter and to be sentenced to time served. Aguilera continues in custody facing deportation. Aguilera asserts federal constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law tort claims against state investigators and county prosecutors involved in his initial prosecution in 1996 and against a state investigator and county and state prosecutors involved in his re-prosecution in 2012. ² This action is now before me on the County Defendants' August 4, 2014, Joint Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 24), asserting absolute prosecutorial immunity and other bars to Aguilera's claims against them.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Factual Background

I set out an extensive statement of the factual and procedural background to this case in my prior ruling, including a description of the circumstances of the underlying shooting of Jesse Garcia. Aguilera, 990 F.Supp.2d at 930–37. Here, I find that a rather more circumscribed statement of facts—disputed and undisputed—than the parties have offered is sufficient to put in context the parties' arguments concerning the County Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. In the present context, the focus is on what the County Defendants did in the course of prosecuting and re-prosecuting Aguilera.

Agents with the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), who are identified as State Defendants, investigated Garcia's death. As a result of their investigation, Aguilera was prosecuted on a charge of first-degree murder for the death of Garcia in the Iowa District Court for Wright County by Wright County Attorney Lee E. Poppen and Assistant Wright County Attorney Jeffrey TeKippe, both identified as County Defendants. TeKippe filed the Complaint charging Aguilera with first-degree murder, and Poppen later filed a Trial Information charging Aguilera with first-degree murder.

By letter dated September 30, 1996, Poppen informed Aguilera's trial counsel that the Wright County Attorney's Office would “voluntarily provide [trial counsel] with the reports of local law enforcement agencies, any lab testing results and the written statements provided by any witnesses,” but that Poppen “w[ould] not provide the DCI investigative report without a specific court order directing [him] to do so.” Aguilera contends that Poppen implemented the policy reflected in this letter in his “administrative” role, but the County Defendants contend that nothing in the portions of the record that Aguilera cites indicates that Poppen was acting in an “administrative” role. On November 6, 1996, Aguilera's trial counsel moved the district court for “production of evidence as requested within a time to be fixed by the Court.” The district court orally granted that request, then, later, at Aguilera's trial counsel's request, entered a written ruling on December 17, 1996, memorializing that the request was granted.

In its opinion granting Aguilera's second petition for post-conviction relief, the Iowa Supreme Court found that the State never turned over the DCI file, which that court held violated Brady, but that court nowhere determined who, specifically, was responsible for failure to turn over the file. See Aguilera v. State, 807 N.W.2d 249, 251–59 (Iowa 2011). The Iowa Supreme Court also determined that the file was not turned over until October 2, 2006. Id. at 251. While admitting that the Iowa Supreme Court found otherwise, Poppen contends that he disclosed the DCI reports to Aguilera's trial counsel after the district court orally stated that it would require production of the file, which Aguilera denies. Aguilera contends that his trial counsel did not receive the DCI file and that the DCI file is not in the state Public Defender's case file for his 1996 prosecution. Poppen and TeKippe prosecuted Aguilera at his 1996 trial. Aguilera admits that Poppen's and TeKippe's continued involvement in the case during post-trial, appellate, and post-conviction stages of the case were in performance of their prosecutorial functions as advocates for the State.

After the Iowa Supreme Court granted Aguilera's second petition for post-conviction relief, Eric Simonson, who was an Assistant Wright County Attorney and then the Wright County Attorney, referred the case to the Iowa Attorney General's Office for possible re-prosecution. Another DCI agent re-investigated the matter by gathering the files from the prior investigation. The County Defendants assert, and Aguilera admits, that Simonson filed the March 7, 2012, Substitute Trial Information and Supplemental Minutes of Testimony initiating Aguilera's re-prosecution on a charge of second-degree murder. Aguilera contends that Simonson acted as a “complaining witness” by signing the Minutes of Testimony in 2012–and, indeed, that he did so knowing that there was no probable cause for a second-degree murder charge, because there was no determination of the whereabouts of several witnesses in the 1996 trial or if those witnesses would testify as they did in 1996. The County Defendants deny that the record supports Aguilera's assertion that Simonson acted as a “complaining witness,” because Simonson simply signed the document, but did not attest to the truth of its contents. Aguilera admits that Simonson engaged in traditional prosecutorial functions throughout Aguilera's re-prosecution. Aguilera eventually chose to plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter to avoid a retrial.

B. Procedural Background

In his Amended Complaint, Aguilera asserts the following claims against the County Defendants: ³

In a Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 24), filed August 4, 2014, the County Defendants seek summary judgment on all of the claims against them, primarily on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity, but also on other grounds. Aguilera filed his Resistance (docket no. 27), on September 5, 2014, and the County Defendants filed their Reply To Plaintiff's Statement Of Additional Facts (docket no. 29), on September 12, 2014.

I find that the issues raised in the County Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment are appropriate for disposition without oral arguments. Furthermore, my crowded schedule has not permitted the timely scheduling of oral arguments. Therefore, I will deem the County Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment fully submitted on the parties' written submissions.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standards For Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (emphasis added); see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.2005) (“Summary judgment is appropriate if viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, “[t]he movant ‘bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,’ and must identify ‘those portions of [the record] ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’ ” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir.2011) (en banc) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). In response, “[t]he nonmovant ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ and must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

When the parties have met their burden, the district judge's task is as follows:

“On a motion for summary judgment, ‘facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.’ ” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 129 S.Ct. 2658,...