Aiello v. Wainewright

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DANIEL AIELLO, Plaintiff, v. DALE WAINEWRIGHT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:22-CV-00018

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Corpus Christi Division

December 7, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Julie K. Hampton United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Daniel Aiello, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court are: (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by Patrick O'Daniel, Bryan Collier, Miguel Martinez, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) (D.E. 13); and (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 27). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and that Plaintiff's summary judgment motion be DENIED without prejudice.

I. JURISDICTION

The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1331. This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Criminal Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID), and is currently residing at the Hightower Unit in Dayton, Texas. At the time he filed this lawsuit, Plaintiff was housed at the McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas.

Plaintiff named the following defendants in his Original Complaint: (1) TDCJ; (2) TDCJ Executive Director Bryan Collier (Collier); (3) TDCJ-CID Director Miguel Martinez (Martinez); and (4) Dale Wainwright, Chairman of the TDCJ. (D.E. 1). Plaintiff sues the individual defendants in their official capacities only. (Id. at 8).

Plaintiff asserts violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. Sections 200cc-200cc-5. (D.E. 1). Plaintiff claims that TDCJ's policies requiring him to work at his assigned prison job without compensation restricts his right to exercise his religious obligation as a Christian to tithe one-tenth of his labor. (Id. at 8-14). Plaintiff further claims that TDCJ's policies of allowing only certain inmates to be paid for their prison jobs violate his equal protection rights. (Id. at 8). In addition to declaratory relief, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of “awarding Plaintiff compensation or a value for labor performed, thereby endorsing Plaintiff['s] rights to exer[c]i[s]e the religious belief of tithing.” (Id. at 16-17).

On February 1, 2022, the undersigned ordered service of Plaintiff's complaint on Wainwright, Collier, Martinez, and TDCJ. (D.E. 8). In a Notice of Substitution of Party, Patrick O'Daniel (O'Daniel) informed the Court that Wainwright no longer serves as TDCJ Chairman and that O'Daniel should automatically be substituted as a party to this lawsuit. (D.E. 12). Plaintiff, in turn, moved the Court to amend by substituting O'Daniel for Wainwright. (D.E. 17). The undersigned granted Plaintiff's motion to amend, and O'Daniel was substituted for Wainwright as a party to this lawsuit. (D.E. 18).

On September 30, 2021, O'Daniel, Collier, Martinez, and TDCJ filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (D.E. 13). Plaintiff subsequently filed a response. (D.E. 16). On August 11, 2022, the undersigned granted Plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss Martinez from this case without prejudice. (D.E. 33).

On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E. 27). The undersigned granted Defendants' motion to stay their deadline to respond to the summary judgment motion pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss. (D.E. 29). Upon reexamining this matter, however, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has submitted his summary judgment motion prematurely.

“Federal courts are permitted to dismiss a summary judgment motion without prejudice if it is filed before any party answers.” Watkins v. Monroe, No. 6:18cv347, 2019 WL 1869864, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2019), adopting report and recommendation 2019 WL 1858100 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2019). Here, Defendants have not filed an answer in this case. Additionally, no discovery has taken place, and no scheduling order regarding the deadline for discovery or the filing of dispositive motions has been issued. See Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co., Inc. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that summary judgment motions should not “ordinarily be granted before discovery has been completed”). Plaintiff further has not attached any evidence to his summary judgment motion in order to establish the absence of any genuine issues of fact with respect to his claims.

Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 27) be DENIED without prejudice to renew at a later time after a scheduling order has been issued and after Plaintiff has been able to conduct sufficient discovery and can provide evidentiary support for his motion.

III. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts in his Original Complaint. (D.E. 1). Plaintiff has practiced a non-denomination Christian faith for thirty years. (Id. at 9). The act of tithing is part of his religious beliefs. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that “his religious belief requires him to tithe one-tenth of his labor,” which is typically accomplished by tithing one-tenth of his income. (Id. at 10).

Per TDCJ policy, Plaintiff is assigned to a mandatory job for which he receives no compensation. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff is therefore forced to choose an activity that does not provide income for tithing or else face disciplinary consequences. (Id. at 9). According to Plaintiff, Defendants have restricted his ability to exercise his religious belief in the form of tithing “by requiring Plaintiff to work while depriving him of compensation for his labor.” (Id. at 10). Thus, Plaintiff alleges that TDCJ's prison policies have imposed a substantial burden on his ability to practice his faith. (Id. at 12).

In contrast to the majority of offenders who were not paid for their physical labor, offenders working in the Prison Industries Enforcement Certification Program (PIECP) receive compensation for their labor. (Id. at 14). According to Plaintiff, offenders in fortyseven state prisons and in federal prisons are paid for their labor. (Id.).

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Section 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Defendants O'Daniel, Collier, and TDCJ (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (D.E. 16). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1887 (2d Cir. 1996)). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). Once the subject matter jurisdiction has been challenged, the party asserting jurisdiction retains the burden of proof that jurisdiction truly does exist. Id.

Rule12(b)(6), in turn, provides for dismissal of an action for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A claim is said to be plausible if the complaint contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[A] plaintiff's obligation to prove the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-55.

V. DISCUSSION

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

(1) Applicable Legal Principles

“The Eleventh Amendment bars an individual from suing a state in federal court unless the state consents to suit or Congress has clearly and validly abrogated the state's sovereign immunity.” Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2002). “The state need not be the named party in a federal lawsuit, for a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to any state agency or entity deemed an ‘alter ego' or ‘arm' of the state.” Id. The Eleventh Amendment bar, when it applies, implicates the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Warnock v. Pecos County, 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996).

The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons...