Aiken v. Jefferson Cnty.

WILENE P. AIKEN, as Administratrix ofthe Estate of David E. Aiken, Plaintiff, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-81

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

September 13, 2019

District Judge Cathy Bissoon

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. MEMORANDUM

On April 1, 2019, Plaintiff Wilene Aiken, ("Plaintiff"), as the administratrix of the Estate of David E. Aiken, filed an Amended Complaint (hereinafter "Amended Complaint" or "Am. Compl.," Doc. 17) against Jefferson County, Humphrey Charcoal Corporation, and John Does Nos. 1-5 (collectively, "Defendants"). On April 15^th, Humphrey Charcoal Corporation ("Humphrey") filed an Answer, (hereinafter "Humphrey Answer," Doc. 18), asserting a crossclaim against Jefferson County and the John Doe Defendants. On April 22^th, Jefferson County filed a Motion to Dismiss, (hereinafter, "Motion to Dismiss Am. Compl.," Doc. 19), arguing all counts of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint asserted against it fail to state a claim. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (hereinafter, "Plaintiff's Response," Doc. 22) and Jefferson County filed a Reply, (Doc. 25).

On May 6^th, Jefferson County filed a Motion to Dismiss Humphrey's crossclaim (hereinafter, "Motion to Dismiss Crossclaim," Doc. 23). Humphrey opposed the Motion on May 23^rd, (hereinafter "Humphrey's Response," Doc. 26.)

After consideration of all briefing by the parties, Jefferson County's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Doc. 19, will be DENIED and Jefferson County's Motion to Dismiss Humphrey's Crossclaim, Doc. 23, will be GRANTED.

A. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's son, David E. Aiken ("Mr. Aiken"), passed away on July 21, 2017, from heat exhaustion. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 5.) At that time, Mr. Aiken was a participant in a work release program, working at Humphrey while residing at Jefferson County Jail (hereinafter "Jail"). (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8-9.) Mr. Aiken was not provided with transportation from the Jail to his placement at Humphrey. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.)

On the date of his death, Mr. Aiken began to suffer from heat stroke while working at Humphrey, and was permitted to sit in a room with an air conditioner to try to alleviate his symptoms. (Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.) At the close of the workday, Plaintiff states a Humphrey employee contacted the Jail to inquire about whether transportation was available to assist Mr. Aiken. (Id. at ¶ 16.) The Humphrey employee allegedly was told that he should "'Make him walk'" and no transportation would be provided to Mr. Aiken. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Mr. Aiken began to walk back to the Jail with two other adults, and when he arrived at the bottom of the hill on which the Jail sat, he passed out. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) The two adults with Mr. Aiken ran ahead to alert the Jail of Mr. Aiken's condition. (Id. at ¶ 22.)

Plaintiff alleges that a "protocol" in place at the Jail required Mr. Aiken's probation officer be alerted prior to the Jail taking action to assist Mr. Aiken. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-26.) Plaintiff alleges that a message sent to Mr. Aiken's probation officer was not marked urgent, did not indicate that the situation was an emergency, and that the message was "ignored and/ordisregarded" by the probation officer. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.) Mr. Aiken ultimately was life-flighted to the hospital, but died en route. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.)

B. ANALYSIS

Jefferson County has moved to dismiss claims by Plaintiff and the crossclaim of its co-defendant, Humphrey. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When faced with a motion to dismiss, a court "must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).

1. Plaintiff's Claims

Plaintiff brings two claims pursuant to Section 1983 against Jefferson County, the municipality that runs the Jail. (See Am. Compl. at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff avers at Count I that Jefferson County was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Aiken's medical needs, in violation of its duties under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment. (Id. at ¶¶ 37-48.) At Count II, Plaintiff argues that Jefferson County violated Mr. Aiken's Constitutional rights through its failures to adequately train and supervise its employees to respond to medical emergencies, and that Mr. Aiken's death was a foreseeable consequence of these failures. (Id. at ¶¶ 49-59.) Jefferson County argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim at either Count.

a. Denial of Adequate Medical Care

At Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Jefferson County violated both Mr. Aiken's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him access to critical medical care. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 37-48.) Mr. Aiken's status—Plaintiff alleges he was "residing" at the Jail following completingof his prison sentence but "was permitted to be released from jail under a work release program in Jefferson County"—is the critical question that must be resolved to determine his rights at the time of the incident.¹ (Id. at ¶ 6). At a minimum, however, the protections he should have been afforded are determined by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Gamble. 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); see Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr., 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating the level of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is "at least as great" as under the Eighth Amendment); Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 472 (3d. Cir. 1987) (finding it proper to apply Estelle standard to claims under both Amendments).

In Estelle, the Supreme Court concluded that "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983." 429 U.S. at 104. A violation is shown by evidence that there as "(i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need." Natale, 318 F.3d at 582. In this context, deliberate indifference requires a showing of "obduracy and wantonness, which has been likened to conduct that includes recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious risk."Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Plaintiff has adequately pleaded her claim based on denial of adequate medical care. As to the first factor, it is plain that Mr. Aiken's medical need was serious. (E.g., Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 27-28, 43-44.) Next, Plaintiff's allegations as to the acts or omissions of prison officials adequately allege deliberate indifference. Specifically, Plaintiff states that upon being notified that Mr. Aiken had passed out due to heat stroke, Jail officials' only action was to send a message to Mr. Aiken's probation officer regarding his condition. (Id. at 23.) Despite that Mr. Aiken was experiencing a medical emergency, Plaintiff states that Jail officials did not convey any urgency to his probation officer, and the message was ignored. (Id. at 24-25.) Whether this amounted to delay without sufficient reason or to prevention of necessary medical care, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Jefferson County officials acted with deliberate indifference. Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.

Thus, Jefferson County's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint will be denied as to Count I.

b. Failure to Train and/or Supervise

At Count II, Plaintiff brings a claim against Jefferson County for inadequate training or supervision. (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 49-59.) To prevail under a failure-to-train theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the violation of rights, and must show that the municipal action was taken with "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons" the municipality serves. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). A showing of "deliberate indifference" here requires decisionmakers to have "actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes [the county's]employees to violate citizens' constitutional rights." Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011).

Preliminarily, the Court notes that both Plaintiff and Jefferson County appear to misunderstand what is required to plead a "failure-or-inadequacy claim." While Plaintiff's operative pleading briefly references Jail "protocols" and "policies" as a source of Mr. Aiken's injuries, (Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 23, 33), in its Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (hereinafter, "Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Am. Compl.," Doc. 20), Jefferson County focuses in large part on those statements, and argues that her pleading is insufficient because she has not pointed to a specific municipal policy or custom. (E.g., Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 6 ("Counties are only subject to liability 'when execution of a government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.'") (quoting Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).) Without such an allegation, Jefferson County contends there is no way it can be found liable. (Id.) Plaintiff responds in kind and states she clearly has pointed to a Constitutionally defective policy. (Plaintiff's Response at 6-8.) These arguments appear to be wide of the mark.²

A plaintiff may bring a claim under Section 1983 against a municipality in two ways—not one as argued by Jefferson County. First, she could put forth a "policy-and-custom claim," alleging that an unconstitutional policy or custom led to injury. Forrest, 2019 WL 2998601, at *7. Second, she may allege injury through a "failure-or-inadequacy claim" by demonstrating that a deliberate choice by the municipality not to act or to act inadequately deprived her of aConstitutional right. Id. "The pleading requirements are different for failure-to-train claims because a plaintiff need not allege an unconstitutional policy."...