Airday v. City of N.Y.

406 F.Supp.3d 313

George AIRDAY, Plaintiff,

v.The CITY OF NEW YORK and Keith Schwam, Defendants.

14-CV-8065 (VEC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed September 13, 2019

Nathaniel B. Smith, Law Office of Nathaniel B. Smith, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Christopher Aaron Seacord, Jeremy Laurence Jorgensen, William Andrew Grey, Paul Frederick Marks, Don Hanh Nguyen, New York City Law Depart. Office of the Corporation Counsel, New York, NY, Garrett Scott Kamen, Fisher & Phillips LLP, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

VALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff George Airday brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York and Keith Schwam, a former assistant commissioner for the New York City Department of Investigations and former director of the Department's Marshal's Bureau, for a variety of alleged constitutional violations relating to the termination of Plaintiff's tenure as a New York City Marshal. See Dkt. 34 (Am. Compl.). Following Judge Sweet's resolution of a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, see Dkts. 31, 92, and after the case's reassignment to the undersigned, only two of Plaintiff's claims remained: one for deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the other for selective enforcement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See Dkt. 92 (Order & Op. on MSJ) at 46-68. The Court assumes familiarity with the facts and history of this case but recounts details pertinent to these motions.

The Court separated Plaintiff's claims for trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), see Dkt. 132, and, beginning on May 6, 2019, Plaintiff's due-process claim was tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict on May 10, 2019, finding (1) that Plaintiff had proven that he had a constitutionally protected property right¹ to continue in his position as a city marshal after his term expired in December 2013, either in holdover status or as a formally reappointed marshal; (2) that Plaintiff had proven that the City of New York deprived Plaintiff of that constitutionally protected property right without due process of law; (3) that Plaintiff had failed to prove that Defendant Schwam deprived him of his constitutionally protected property right without due process of law; and (4) that Plaintiff had failed to prove any entitlement to compensatory damages for the deprivation. See Dkt. 153 (verdict sheet). The jury awarded Plaintiff $1.00 in nominal damages. Id.

Both sides have made post-trial motions. Defendants have renewed their mid-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that, as a matter of law: (a) Plaintiff failed to prove the existence of an implied contract with the City of New York; (b) any such contract would be barred by New York's statute of frauds; (c) Plaintiff failed to prove the City's liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ; and (d) Plaintiff's due-process claim fails because Plaintiff could have brought a proceeding under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. See Dkts. 174-76. Plaintiff has also renewed his own mid-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that, as a matter of law: (a) Defendant Schwam deprived him of his property right; and (b) he is entitled to compensatory damages. See Dkts. 169-70. Plaintiff further requests an order reinstating him to his position as a New York City Marshal and a new trial to determine the amount of his compensatory damages. See Dkt. 170 (Mem. in Supp. of Pl.'s Post-Trial Mots.) at 1-2. In the alternative to judgment as a matter of law, Plaintiff requests a new trial on Defendant Schwam's liability. Id. at 2.

For the following reasons, Defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motions are DENIED.

STANDARD

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) permits a court to set aside a jury verdict and "direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law" in a movant's favor where, "viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, ‘the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable persons could have reached.’ " Lewis v. Am. Sugar Refining, Inc. , 325 F. Supp. 3d 321, 347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (brackets omitted) (quoting Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504 , 992 F.2d 12, 13 (2d Cir. 1993) ). A Rule 50(b) motion can be granted "only when there is ‘such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or ... such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded jurors could not arrive at a verdict against him." Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Mattivi v. S. African Marine Corp. , 618 F.2d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 1980) ). "The court will credit evidence favorable to the moving party ‘that is uncontradicted and unimpeached,’ " but it must " ‘disregard’ evidence that the jury is not required to believe, but which is favorable to the moving party." Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. , 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1) permits a Court to "grant a new trial on all or some of the issues" to any party. Unlike a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, "a new trial may be granted even if there is substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict." Lewis , 325 F. Supp. 3d at 332 (quoting DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park , 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998) ). "Although the trial judge possesses large authority to grant or deny Rule 59(a) motions, ... the ‘court ordinarily should not grant a new trial unless it is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.’ " Id. at 332-33 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc. , 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1988) ).

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

To prevail on a Section 1983 claim for deprivation of property without due process, a plaintiff must prove that he had "a property interest, created by state law, in the employment or the benefit that was removed." Bernheim v. Litt , 79 F.3d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 1996) ; see also, e.g. , White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson , 991 F.2d 1049, 1061-62 (2d Cir. 1993) ("In order to succeed on a claim of deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must establish that state action deprived him of a protected property or liberty interest."). In "determining which interests are afforded ... protection" under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, "a court must look to whether the interest involved would be protected under state law." Ezekwo v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. , 940 F.2d 775, 783 (2d Cir. 1991). If it would not be protected under state law, then the plaintiff's due-process claim fails as a matter of law. Perry v. Sindermann , 408 U.S. 593, 602 n.7, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972).²

In denying summary judgment on Plaintiff's due-process claim, Judge Sweet held—and this Court proceeded to trial on the basis—that "a factual issue exist[ed] as to whether an implied contract" between Plaintiff and the City of New York "was created as a result of the past practices of holding over City Marshals for reappointment following the expiration of their statutory term." Dkt. 92 at 53. It was Plaintiff's burden, therefore, to prove at trial that he had an implied contract with the City of New York and that one of the terms of that contract was that he would remain in his office after his term expired in December 2013, either in holdover status or as a formally reappointed marshal.

If Plaintiff failed to prove that such a contract existed, then his due-process claim fails as a matter of law.

Although the jury found that Plaintiff had proven the existence of such an implied contract, it is apparent that there was no legally sufficient basis for the jury to find for Plaintiff on that issue, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), and that the jury's finding "could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture," Lewis , 325 F. Supp. 3d at 347-48 ; see also id. at 348 ("The standard of review is the same whether the motion for judgment as a matter of law is submitted prior to the verdict being issued [under Rule 50(a)(1) ], or post-trial [under Rule 50(b) ].").

To make a long story short, Plaintiff failed to marshal any evidence that any official with whom he allegedly contracted was authorized by New York State or City law to bind the City to an implied contract. Beyond the ordinary common-law elements of an implied contract, New York law "impose[s] additional requirements on municipal contracting ‘to protect the public from corrupt or ill-considered actions by municipal officials.’ " NRP Holdings LLC v. City of Buffalo , 916 F.3d 177, 200 (2d Cir. 2019) (brackets omitted) (quoting Henry Modell & Co. v. N.Y.C. , 159 A.D.2d 354, 552 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1990) ). "Municipal contracts which violate express statutory provisions are invalid" and unenforceable, "even if the purported contracts bear the hallmarks of mutual assent." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g. , Casa Wales Hous. Dev. Fund Corp. v. N.Y.C., 129 A.D.3d 451, 11 N.Y.S.3d 31, 32 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2015) ("It is well settled that where there is a lack of authority on the part of agents of a municipal corporation to create a liability, except by compliance with well-established regulations, no liability can result unless the prescribed procedure is complied with and followed.... The courts of this state have long held that no implied contract to pay for benefits furnished by a person under an agreement...