Ajisefinni v. CliftonLarsonAllen, LLP

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PAULA AJISEFINNI, Plaintiff v. CLIFTONLARSONALLEN, LLP, Defendant.

Civ. No. DLB-19-3284

United States District Court, D. Maryland

November 18, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH L. BOARDMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Paula Ajisefinni alleges her former employer CliftonLarsonAllen LLP (“CLA”) fired her from her position as Senior Auditor because of her race and age. ECF 1 & 2. She asserts violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), and Maryland anti-discrimination laws, as well as a breach of contract claim.^[1] Before Ajisefinni retained counsel, CLA moved to dismiss and sought other sanctions for discovery delays. ECF 28. The Court denied the motion. ECF 40. Ajisefinni retained counsel and discovery proceeded, though she never pursued written responses to her discovery requests after CLA refused to produce responsive documents without a stipulated confidentiality order. See ECF 51. After the close of discovery, CLA filed the pending motion for summary judgment. ECF 52. The Clerk of Court sent a Rule 12/56 notice to Ajisefinni on June 1, 2022, advising her that the summary judgment motion, if granted, could result in dismissal of the case; that she had the right to file a response within twenty-eight days; and that if she did not respond, the Court would resolve the case based on the defendant's materials. ECF 53. Ajisefinni did not file an opposition. A hearing is not necessary. Loc R. 105.6. For the following reasons, the Court grants CLA's motion for summary judgment.

I. Background

In support of its motion for summary judgment, CLA submits four sworn affidavits; a Performance Improvement Plan; a list of individuals hired into CLA's Federal Practice sector (where Ajisefinni worked) from 2012 to 2018; and emails between Ajisefinni and a supervisor. See ECF 52-2 - 52-11. Ajisefinni did not respond or submit any evidence in opposition to the motion. Failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment “leave[s] uncontroverted those facts established by the motion” for the purposes of deciding the motion. See Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 2013); Wallace v. Koppel, No. JFM-09-2666, 2010 WL 1956821, at *2 (D. Md. May 14, 2010) (accepting evidence presented by defendants as undisputed where plaintiff failed to oppose summary judgment motion). In deciding whether CLA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court will accept the following facts found in the exhibits to CLA's motion as undisputed and construe them in the light most favorable to Ajisefinni.

CLA hired Ajisefinni as a Senior Auditor within its Federal Practice sector on September 21, 2015. Ajisefinni is Black. At the time she was hired, she was approximately 55 years old. Prior to being hired, Denise Wu, then a Principal at CLA, interviewed Ajisefinni in person. CLA charged Wu with making the decision as to whether CLA should hire Ajisefinni. Following the interview, Wu, who was aware of Ajisefinni's race and approximate age, decided and recommended that CLA should hire her.

CLA's Federal Practice performs audits of various clients, including federal agencies such as the United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and the United States Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”). CLA staffs its audit assignments with a Principal, who primarily supervises an Audit Manager, who primarily supervises a Senior Auditor, who primarily supervises lower-level auditors. The lower-level auditors report directly to the Senior Auditor, who reports to the Audit Manager, and so on. Ajisefinni was initially assigned as Senior Auditor to an audit of GAO. Wu was the Principal on that audit, Justice Sakyi (who is also Black) was the Audit Manager overseeing Ajisefinni, and several lower-level CLA auditors were also assigned.

During the GAO audit, Ajisefinni “did not provide guidance to staff or communicate up to management .... This became a risk in the tight deadline environment the audit was under.” ECF 52-2, at 2. Ajisefinni arrived late to the client office multiple times. During meetings with her supervisor, she “would turn a blind eye” and claim she was not responsible for assigned tasks or outstanding items, despite her supervisor having discussed her responsibilities with her on multiple occasions. Id.

Based on Ajisefinni's performance on the GAO audit, Wu reassigned her to an audit of VA in early 2016. Wu was again the Principal on that audit, Janice Codrington (who is also Black) was the Audit Manager overseeing Ajisefinni, and several lower-level CLA auditors were assigned. During the VA audit, Ajisefinni communicated with her supervisor only when she chose to, “without regard for the needs of her team.” Id. at 3. On several occasions, she did not inform Codrington of her location. For her first assignment, she spent over four weeks updating basic documents. Her work product generally “need[ed] a lot of correction and update[s]” by Codrington to meet client needs, and she failed to prioritize client assignments to ensure timely completion of work. Id. at 4. Despite Codrington specifically instructing Ajisefinni to ask clarifying questions, she “refuse[d] to cooperate with that request” or check in more often. Id. at 3. Finally, she did not prepare for or offer to help with a client meeting.

On April 16, CLA placed Ajisefinni on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). The decision to place her on a PIP was made collectively by Wu, Sakyi, and Codrington, as well as Cynthia Blake, a Senior People Solutions Generalist. On April 20, Sakyi and Codrington met with Ajisefinni to discuss performance issues documented in the PIP. Wu attended the meeting. The PIP notes that prior to the meeting, both of Ajisefinni's supervisors on the GAO and VA audits (Sakyi and Codrington) had discussed the performance feedback with her.

During the weeks following the PIP meeting, Ajisefinni's job performance did not improve. On May 9, 2016, with the approval of Doreen Shute (CLA's Federal Practice leader), CLA terminated Ajisefinni's employment.

Ajisefinni filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on May 8, 2017 alleging discrimination based on race and age, which she signed under penalty of perjury. ECF 1-1, at 1. In it, she alleges that during “the course of [her] employment Denise Wu would make derogatory comments regarding [her] age, which took the form of being told, ‘you are too old, you don't fit the group of younger staff.'” Id. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on August 16, 2019. Id. at 2. On November 14, 2019, Ajisefinni, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint alleging race-based employment discrimination under Title VII, age-based employment discrimination under the ADEA, analogous state law claims, and breach of contract.^[2] ECF 2, at 2. She claims that she was terminated because of her race and age. Id. at 1. She seeks, inter alia, reinstatement with back pay and a promotion; $4 million in compensatory and punitive damages; liquidated damages; and costs and fees. ECF 1, at 7.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). To meet its burden, the party must identify “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” in support of its position. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). Then, “[t]o avoid summary judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Perkins v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 205 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The opposing party must identify more than a “scintilla of evidence” in support of its position to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 251. The Court “should not weigh the evidence.” Perkins, 936 F.3d at 205 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). However, if “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then summary judgment is proper. Id. (quoting Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1991)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court “view[s] the facts and inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmoving party.” Perkins, 936 F.3d at 205 (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996)).

III. Discussion

A. Title VII Race Discrimination

Ajisefinni asserts a Title VII discrimination claim alleging that she was terminated because of her race. “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended, prohibits employment discrimination.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). The Act reaches “status-based discrimination” by providing “basic workplace protection such as prohibitions against employer discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, in hiring, firing, salary structure, promotion and the like.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)).

Ajisefinni as the plaintiff, bears the burden of proving the defendant discriminated against her “because of a protected characteristic.” DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293,...