Akinsinde v. Not-for-Profit Hosp. Corp.

216 F.Supp.3d 33

Irene AKINSINDE, Plaintiff,

v.NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITAL CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil No. 16-cv-00437 (APM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed November 3, 2016

John Felix Pressley, Jr., Law Office of John F. Pressley, Jr., Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Charles Frederick Walters, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Amit P. Mehta, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Irene Akinsinde is a nurse who worked in the psychiatric ward of Defendant Not-For-Profit Hospital Corporation for eleven years. She brings this lawsuit seeking redress for two general categories of alleged misconduct. First, Plaintiff claims that Defendant failed to pay her overtime, as required by federal and District of Columbia law, during her entire tenure as Defendant's employee. As to those acts of non-payment, Plaintiff advances three separate claims under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (Count I), the D.C. Minimum Wage Revision Act (Count II), and the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law (Count III). Second, Plaintiff alleges that her immediate supervisor—motivated by personal animosity—falsely accused her of discarding a patient's medications, which ultimately resulted in Plaintiff's termination. As to that conduct, Plaintiff raises a single common law tort claim for negligent supervision (Count IV).¹

Defendant has moved to dismiss all claims. Specifically, it contends that each of Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed for two main reasons: (1) Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant with timely notice of her claims under D.C. Code § 44–951.14(d) ; and (2) Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to give rise to a plausible claim for relief as to each of her claims.

For the reasons explained below, Defendant's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Irene Akinsinde is a licensed practical nurse. First Am. Compl., ECF No. 6 [hereinafter Am. Compl.], ¶ 8. Since 2004, she has worked in the psychiatric ward of Defendant Not-For-Profit Hospital Corporation's hospital, now known as United Medical Center. Id. When Plaintiff began her work at the hospital, it was privately owned and operated. However, in 2011, the District of Columbia government created Defendant as "an instrumentality of the District government" for the purpose of acquiring the hospital's assets and continuing its operations. See D.C. Code § 44–951.02. Thus, Defendant is an arm of the District government, albeit one with "a separate legal existence." Id. § 44–951.02(a).

According to Plaintiff, Defendant's policies allowed hospital staff members who worked an eight-hour shift to take two unpaid 15-minute breaks and one unpaid 30-minute meal break. Am. Compl. ¶ 9. Due to chronic understaffing in the psychiatric ward, however, Plaintiff "routinely worked the entire day ... without taking a break" and she was not paid for these additional hours of work. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. Moreover, Plaintiff avers that she did not receive an overtime rate of pay for the work she did in excess of 40 hours. Id. ¶¶ 18, 33. Plaintiff claims that such nonpayment and underpayment occurred "during the entire time that she was employed by [D]efendant." Id. ¶ 16.

At some unspecified time, Grea Neverson-Daniels became Plaintiff's supervisor. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff knew Neverson-Daniels's husband before he married Neverson-Daniels, causing friction between Plaintiff and her supervisor. Id. Plaintiff complained to a Human Resources officer, Jennifer Dupree, about her mistreatment by Neverson-Daniels, but no one took corrective action. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. Tensions continued to escalate between Plaintiff and Neverson-Daniels, culminating in Neverson-Daniels falsely accusing Plaintiff of discarding a patient's medications. Id. ¶ 24. According to Plaintiff, "neither the Director of Human Resources or any other ... supervisors took it upon themselves to investigate and intervene," despite evidence of Plaintiff's innocence—she was not at work on the day in question. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. Although "preposterous and false," Neverson-Daniels's accusation caused Plaintiff to be fired on March 9, 2015. Id. ¶ 25.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff originally brought this case in D.C. Superior Court on February 17, 2016, after which Defendant removed it to this court. See Notice and Pet. for Removal, ECF No. 1, at 1. Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is now before the court and ripe for consideration. See Def.'s Second Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 8 [hereinafter Def.'s Mot.].²

III. LEGAL STANDARD

In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept a plaintiff's factual allegations as true and "construe the complaint ‘in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’ " Hettinga v. United States , 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Schuler v. United States , 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ). The court need not accept as true either "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986), or "inferences ... unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint," Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp. , 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is facially plausible when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The factual allegations in the complaint need not be "detailed"; however, the Federal Rules demand more than "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. If the facts as alleged fail to establish that a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, then a court must grant the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Am. Chemistry Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , 922 F.Supp.2d 56, 61 (D.D.C. 2013).

IV. DISCUSSION

The court first considers Defendant's contention that each of Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because she has failed to provide notice of her claims in advance of filing suit, as required by D.C. Code § 44–951.14(d). Having concluded that Plaintiff did provide proper notice, the court then turns to Defendant's arguments concerning the sufficiency of Plaintiff's pleading.

A. Whether Plaintiff Has Satisfied the Notice Requirement of D.C. Code § 44–951.14(d).

Section 44–951.14(d) of the D.C. Code provides:

An action other than an action for medical negligence or malpractice may not be maintained against the [Not-For-Profit Hospital] Corporation for unliquidated damages to persons or property unless, within 6 months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the CEO of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage.

Neither side has cited any case—either within this Circuit or from the D.C. Court of Appeals—interpreting Section 44–951.14(d), and this court likewise has found none. Thus, the scope and meaning of Section 44–951.14 are issues of first impression.

The plain language of Section 44–951.14 sets out a rule and its exceptions: a plaintiff cannot sue Defendant for unliquidated damages unless (1) the suit is one for medical negligence or malpractice or (2) the plaintiff provided written notice to Defendant within six months of her injury. To fall under the second exception, a plaintiff's notice must contain the time, place, cause, and circumstances of her injury. See D.C. Code § 44–951.14(d). Defendant characterizes this rule as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Thus, Defendant argues, Plaintiff's failure to satisfy the waiver conditions deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. See Def.'s Mot., Def.'s Mem. of Law, ECF No. 8-1 [hereinafter Def.'s Mem.], at 3–5. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's argument misses the mark.

The Supreme Court has held that when two statutes contain the same language, it is a strong indication that they "should be interpreted pari passu ," that is, on equal footing.³ Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schs. , 412 U.S. 427, 428, 93 S.Ct. 2201, 37 L.Ed.2d 48 (1973) (per curiam); cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 164 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006) ("[W]hen judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its ... judicial interpretations as well." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Section 44–951.14(d) parallels another, more familiar notice-of-claim requirement under District of Columbia law—that contained in D.C. Code § 12–309. Section 12–309 provides that:

[A]n action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated damages ... unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant ... has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage.

The textual parallels between Sections 44–951.14(d) and 12–309 are evident. Both require potential plaintiffs, as a precondition to filing suit, to provide written notice of claims for unliquidated damages within six months of injury or damage,...