Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jones

1

ALAMO HEIGHTS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, and RYAN ANDERSON, DAVID HORNBERGER, BRIAN HAMILTON, BONNIE GIDDEN, LISA KRENGER, PERRY SHANKLE, STACY SHARP, and DR. DANA BASHARA, in their Official Capacities, Appellants, v. SELINA JONES, ROY HUMMEL, and LESLIE MICHELLE PRUITT, Appellees.

No. 08-23-00124-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Eighth District, El Paso

August 21, 2024

Appeal from 438th Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas (TC# 2020CI23809)

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

OPINION

JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice.

The lawsuit below was brought by Selina Jones, Roy Hummel, and Leslie Michelle Pruitt, tenants of an apartment complex (the Residents), who were displaced when it was purchased by the Alamo Heights Independent School District (the District). The District required the Residents to vacate their apartments in anticipation of its demolition. The Residents filed suit in Bexar County seeking relocation expenses, relocation assistance, and injunctive relief (all premised on two provisions in Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code) against the District and several of its officials (Ryan Anderson, David Hornberger, Brian Hamilton Bonnie Gidden, Lisa Krenger, Perry Shankle, Stacy Sharp, and Dr. Dana Bashara) (collectively, AHISD).^[1]

Before this Court, AHISD seeks interlocutory review of the trial court's order denying their second-filed motion for summary judgment, which expressly raised a jurisdictional plea as to claims brought under Chapter 21. We conclude that the claims asserted do not fall within any waiver of AHISD's governmental immunity, which therefore deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to reach the merits of the suit. But before explaining our reasoning for that holding we tackle a challenge to our own jurisdiction based on the denial of AHISD's first-filed motion for summary judgment (which was not appealed). The Residents urge that if the first filed motion raised the same jurisdictional challenge, and was not appealed, the appeal of the second filed motion would be untimely.

We conclude that the first motion did not expressly raise a jurisdictional challenge-the second motion did-and we thus have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We conclude that the second motion should have been granted, which deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the merits of the suit.

I. Background

A. AHISD buys an apartment complex and evicts its tenants

The Residents lived at the Desert Sands Apartments in San Antonio (the Property), where they paid monthly rent between $515 and $595. By 2020, each Resident was leasing month-to-month.

In March 2020, the District purchased the Property, which sits across the street from a local high school. To avoid revealing the District's identity as the buyer, it engaged another entity to enter into a contract to purchase the Property and subsequently assign its interests in the contract to the District. The District maintains that it took this approach to "negotiate a fair market price for the Property without fear that the seller would realize it was negotiating with a governmental entity and try to drive up the sales price[.]" After acquiring the Property, the District sent letters to the Residents still residing at Desert Sands, stating that it would extend their leases until June 30, 2020 to provide "enough time to find an alternate living accommodation," so long as the they "complied] with all of the other terms and conditions of the Lease."

Each of the Residents faced challenges with the change in ownership. Mr. Hummel reported that soon after he received the District's letter, construction workers entered his home without knocking, claiming that they were part of a demolition team and had been told no one was living there. The District later agreed to extend Mr. Hummel's deadline to vacate until September 30, 2020. In August 2020, through counsel, Mr. Hummel sent the District a demand for relocation assistance under Texas Property Code § 21.046, which the District denied. Mr. Hummel ultimately found a new apartment in October 2020, but his rent increased from what he paid at Desert Sands.

Ms. Pruitt noticed maintenance issues after the District purchased the Property, including lapsed pest control and an unaddressed water leak that she says caused her electric bill to rise several hundred dollars more than normal. When she moved to a new apartment in July 2020, her rent increased more than $300 per month. She also reported that the District towed her car from Desert Sands, and she has been unable to retrieve it from storage due to her financial struggles.

At Ms. Jones's request, the District extended her deadline to vacate until September 30, 2020, though it denied her request for relocation assistance under § 21.046 of the Property Code. Ms. Jones retained counsel and again made a relocation-assistance demand. When Ms. Jones did not pay rent for August, the District sent her a notice of default, requesting that she become current on rent within 15 days or meet with District representatives to determine another payment arrangement. Ms. Jones instead renewed her demand for relocation assistance, which the District again denied. It instead offered to connect Ms. Jones with the owner of another apartment complex who was willing to assist her in renting an apartment at a reduced rate for a six-month lease. Those attempts failed, and the District gave Jones a notice to vacate on October 1 and again on November 5. The District began eviction proceedings but later dismissed its case after Ms. Jones vacated the Property on January 23, 2021.

B. The Residents strike back, suing for relocation expenses

In December 2020, the Residents sued the District as well as its superintendent and trustees in their official capacities. Their suit is premised on duties defined by § 21.046(b) of the Texas Property Code which provides that governmental entities "shall, as a cost of acquiring real property, pay moving expenses and rental supplements, make relocation payments, provide financial assistance to acquire replacement housing, and compensate for expenses incidental to the transfer of the property if an individual, . . . is displaced in connection with the acquisition." Tex. Prop. Code Ann § 21.046(b). The suit asserted an ultra vires claim against several officials of the District claiming they failed (1) to provide "any relocation advisory services or relocation program" or (2) "adopt[ ] rules relating to the administration of the relocation program" or (3) provide several notices the Residents contend as required by § 21.046(b). As a separate claim, the Residents sought recovery of relocation expenses under § 21.043 of the Property Code.^[2]

AHISD answered and aside from its general denial, pleaded six affirmative defenses, two of which claimed: (1) that because AHISD was immune from Appellees' claims, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) that Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code was inapplicable to the subject of the suit because it only applied to eminent domain proceedings.

C. AHISD files for summary judgment on the merits

In March 2021, AHISD filed its first motion for summary judgment, which argued that AHISD had "no duty to pay any relocation fees" to the Residents because "[t]he eminent domain chapter of the Texas Property Code (Chapter 21), and the relocation program section therein (Section 21.046) are inapplicable to an arm's length purchase, such as the one at issue here." They also contended that the Residents "are not 'persons displaced due to an acquisition' as required for applicability of Section 21.046." The motion sought dismissal of the claims with prejudice. After a hearing, the trial court in June 2021 denied the motion.

D. AHISD reloads its summary judgment motion, and adds a governmental immunity claim; the Residents file their own partial motion for summary judgment

In July 2022-over a year after the denial of its first motion for summary judgment- AHISD filed a second motion for summary judgment. In that motion, AHISD made the same arguments noted above but added that because "AHISD did not exercise its eminent domain authority, Chapter 21 itself deprives the Court of jurisdiction to decide any issues of amounts awardable under Chapter 21 Subchapter C[.]" It added that all discovery was complete, so the motion for summary judgment was ripe.

The Residents opposed the motion and filed their own motion for partial summary judgment, which asked the trial court to conclude that AHISD violated § 21.046.

E. The trial court denies AHISD's motion and grants the Residents' motion

After hearing the cross-motions, the trial court denied AHISD's motion and granted the Resident's motion. Its order concluded that:

• AHISD has "ministerial duties under Texas Property Code section 21.046 and those duties apply to negotiated purchases of real property as well as demolition programs, even in the absence of any exercise of eminent domain authority";

• the Residents "are entitled to advisory services and relocation assistance as described in section 21.046 which requires [AHISD] to compensate [the Residents]";

• AHISD "acted ultra vires and violated their ministerial duties to [the Residents] under Texas Property Code section 21.046 by failing to provide relocation advisory services, to pay moving expenses, to pay rental supplements, to make relocation payments, to provide financial assistance to acquire replacement housing, and to compensate for expenses incidental to the transfer of property"; and

• AHISD "acted ultra vires and violated their ministerial duty by failing to adopt rules relating to the administration of a relocation assistance program under Texas Property Code section 21.046."

AHISD filed its

...