Aland v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior

Robert H. Aland, Plaintiff, v. U.S. Department of the Interior, et al., Defendants.

No. 22-cv-5821

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

December 30, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

On October 19, 2022, plaintiff Robert H. Aland (“Aland”), a self-represented lawyer, filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the U.S. Department of the Interior, its secretary, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), and its director, Martha M. Williams (“Williams”). Compl. 1-3, ECF No. 1. Aland seeks a declaratory judgment that Williams does not meet the statutory qualifications to hold her office set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 742(b) because she allegedly lacks the requisite scientific education and experience. See Compl. 1, 15-16, 20-21. The statute states in relevant part, “The Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. No individual may be appointed as the Director unless he is by reason of scientific education and experience knowledgeable in the principles of fisheries and wildlife management.” § 742B(b). Defendants move to dismiss Aland's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.^[1]See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6). Defendants have also filed a motion to delay entry of a scheduling order until the court rules on their motion to dismiss. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b)(2).

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The court begins and ends with subject matter jurisdiction because “the first step in any federal lawsuit is ensuring the district court possesses authority to adjudicate the dispute-in short, that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Boim v. Am. Muslims for Palestine, 9 F.4th 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Steel Co. v Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)).

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction: ‘It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.'” Ware v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 6 F.4th 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2021)(quoting Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 457 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2006)). Where, as here, defendants contend that the complaint's jurisdictional allegations are facially insufficient, the court assumes the truth of the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations and views “all facts in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, 764 F.3d 765, 773 n.19 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Apex Digit., Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009).

Defendants raise four jurisdictional arguments. See Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 1-2, 5-12, ECF No. 22-1. They first argue that Aland has not identified a statutory source of subject matter jurisdiction. See Id. at 5-6. Aland cites two statutes in the jurisdictional portion of his complaint: (1) the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. Compl. ¶¶ 5 and 6.

The federal question statute vests federal district courts with original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. As the Seventh Circuit has explained:

It is “when federal law creates a private right of action and furnishes the substantive rules of decision [that] the claim arises under federal law, and district courts possess federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331.” Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 378-79 (2012). A federal right of action is a separate requirement, and § 1331 does not itself provide a right of action. See Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Loc. 150 v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Thus, when the basis of the action is a federal statute, a federal cause of action must exist as well for a federal court to hear a given claim; the general grant of federal question jurisdiction contained in § 1331, without a federal cause of action, is not enough.”).

E. Cent. Ill. Pipe Trades Health & Welfare Fund v. Prather Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 3 F.4^th 954, 961 (7th Cir. 2021) (alterations in original).

Aland's argument (Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 3) that the Declaratory Judgment Act furnishes the necessary separate private right of action fails under long-standing Supreme Court precedent holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act “is procedural only” and does “not extend [the] jurisdiction” of the federal courts. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (quotation omitted). The Declaratory Judgment Act instead “presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable right” and thus cannot be pursued without a predicate right of action. Alarm Detection Sys., Inc. v. Orland Fire Prot. Dist., 929 F.3d 865, 871 n.2 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960)); see also DeBartolo v. Healthsouth Corp., 569 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus, Aland cannot use the Declaratory Judgment Act to provide the private right of action needed for federal question jurisdiction.

Aland also points to the statute creating the FWS Director position, 16 U.S.C. § 742(b), Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 3. As a matter of statutory interpretation, federal courts “assume that Congress will be explicit if it intends to create a private cause of action” in a statute. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). The statute Aland cites includes no express Congressional language creating a private right of action or authorizing anyone to file a lawsuit. See § 742B. Rather, Aland cites the statute creating the FWS. The subsection he cites creates the office of Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, specifies who supervises the FWS Director, and lists qualifications for the office. Aland does not point to-and the court does not see how he could-any language in § 742B(b) that shows Congress intended to create an implied private right of action. See generally Ziglar, 137 S.Ct. at 18-5655; Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 28789 (2001) (discussing requirements for inferring a private right of action from the language of a federal statute). Accordingly, Aland has not carried his burden to show that § 742B(b) creates a right of action furnishing this court with federal question jurisdiction.

Defendants suggest the final possible source of a private cause of action:^[2]they contend that this is in substance a quo warranto action. See Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss 6-7. Quo warranto is a common law form of action used to determine one's right to an office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726, 735 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit has held, however, that “there is no general quo warranto jurisdiction in the federal courts.” Id. (citing United States ex rel. Wis. v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 248 F.2d 804, 807-09 (7th Cir. 1957)). Aland does not disagree. He responds that he “does not and could not rely on quo warranto.” Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 3. Since Aland bears the burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction and he disclaims reliance on quo warranto, the court need not explore the issue further.^[3]None of the foregoing sources being sufficient, Aland has not identified an independent source of a federal private right of action needed to invoke this court's federal question jurisdiction.

Aland also argues in his response to defendants' motion to dismiss (but not his complaint) that this court has subject matter jurisdiction under the so-called Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). ECF No. 24 at 3. The Little Tucker Act grants federal “district courts jurisdiction - over non-tort civil actions against the United States for damages up to $10,000 by waiving the government's sovereign immunity.” Okere v. United States, 983 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 10 (2012)); other citation omitted. As the title of his complaint plainly states, Aland seeks declaratory and injunctive relief; he does not request money damages. See Compl. 1-2, 20-21 (prayer for relief). The Little Tucker Act therefore furnishes the court with no jurisdiction because “§ 1346(a)(2) does not confer jurisdiction over claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.” Okurre, 920 F.3d at 982 (citing Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464, 464-65 (1973) and United States v. Norwood, 602 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2010)). If he sought money damages, Aland would “need to identify an independent source of federal law that would allow such a remedy to be pursued through a cause of action in federal court.” Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1973); other citation omitted).

For the reasons discussed above, Aland has not identified such an independent source of federal law. This being sufficient to require dismissal of the complaint, the court declines to reach defendants' arguments that Aland lacks Article III standing and that the political question doctrine applies.^[4] See, e.g., Diliberti v. United States, 817 F.2d 1259, 1261 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 646 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012).

Stay of Discovery

Having determined that the complaint fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the court sua sponte stays discovery. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain “no requirement that . . . discovery cease during the pendency of a motion to dismiss [the complaint] unless the court has ordered a stay. SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 852 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted); but see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(staying discovery automatically when a motion to dismiss...