Albahary v. City of Bristol

886 A.2d 802

276 Conn. 426

Mary L. ALBAHARY et al. v. CITY OF BRISTOL

No. 17265, 17266.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 23, 2005.

Decided December 20, 2005.

Michael A. Zizka, Hartford, for the appellants in Docket No. SC 17265, appellees in Docket No. SC 17266 (plaintiffs).

Ben M. Krowicki, with whom were Susan Kim, Hartford, and Brian R. Hole, for the appellee in Docket No. SC 17265, appellant in Docket No. SC 17266 (defendant).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

SULLIVAN, C.J.

These certified appeals arise out of an action brought by the plaintiffs,¹ the owners of a certain property located in the town of Southington, against the defendant, the city of Bristol, challenging the statement of compensation filed by the defendant in connection with its taking by condemnation of certain interests in the plaintiffs' property. Before they brought this action, the plaintiffs had brought an action against the defendant in the United Stated District Court for the District of Connecticut (federal court) raising numerous statutory claims, common-law claims and a claim of inverse condemnation, all pertaining to the defendant's maintenance of a landfill abutting their property which, the plaintiffs alleged, had contaminated the groundwater under their property. The federal court found for the plaintiffs on most of their statutory and common-law claims but denied the plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim. Subsequently, the trial court in the present case rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the valuation of the property interests taken by the defendant should be measured by comparing the value of the land in its uncontaminated state to the value of the land in its contaminated state on the ground that the federal court previously had decided that issue in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that although the plaintiffs had a right, in principle, to be compensated in this condemnation proceeding for the pretaking contamination of their property, the trial court properly had concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs were barred by principles of collateral estoppel from making such a claim. Albahary v. Bristol, 84 Conn.App. 329, 337-41, 853 A.2d 577 (2004). We subsequently granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that in the measurement of the plaintiffs' just compensation, the plaintiffs had a right to be compensated for the totality of the damage caused to their property by the defendant's contamination of the plaintiffs' groundwater?" Albahary v. Bristol, 271 Conn. 924, 859 A.2d 576 (2004). We also granted the plaintiffs' petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precluded the plaintiffs from obtaining compensation from the defendant for damages arising out of the defendant's pretaking contamination of the plaintiffs' groundwater?" Albahary v. Bristol, 271 Conn. 925, 859 A.2d 576 (2004). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts and procedural history. "The plaintiffs are joint owners of 87.6 acres of unimproved property in Southington. The property, which is almost entirely in a residential zone, is taxed as open space land. Its northerly part, which abuts [a landfill operated by the defendant], consists of approximately forty-six acres that, since 1992, have been used for the mining of good quality sand and gravel. Its southerly part, approximately forty-two acres, consists of unimproved land.

"The defendant's abutting landfill was operational from 1946 to 1997, when it was closed down by the state department of environmental protection (department) because of contaminating leachate generated at the site. The leachate polluted the groundwater on the plaintiffs' property so that it is not potable.

"On October 24, 1995, the department and the defendant entered into a consent order in which the defendant conceded that `[t]he operation of a solid waste disposal area at the [landfill resulted] in a discharge of water, substance or materials, including but not limited to leachate, into the waters of the State.' The consent order required the defendant to undertake certain investigations and studies with regard to the landfill and to propose plans in order to remediate the leachate contamination that the landfill had caused. The consent order did not require the defendant to clean up the contamination. Instead, it gave the defendant the option to acquire control over all of the polluted groundwater rights or interests therein that were located within a certain `zone of influence' that included the property of the plaintiffs.

"In 1996, the legislature enacted No. 96-12 of the 1996 Special Acts, to permit the defendant to acquire or to condemn property outside of its borders. This special act was intended to enable the defendant to comply with the consent order.

"On July 30, 1997, relying on the special act, the defendant began condemnation proceedings to take an easement over twenty-five acres of the plaintiffs' property. For a thirty-one year period, the easement permits the defendant to access the property to withdraw groundwater, to collect environmental data and to pump and treat groundwater so as to remediate the existing contamination.² The defendant filed a certificate of taking with the clerk of the Superior Court and recorded the certificate in the Southington land records on September 17, 1997. In accordance with a statement of compensation, the defendant made a deposit of $50,000.

"On January 26, 1998, the plaintiffs filed an appeal in the trial court to challenge the adequacy of the proffered compensation award. They made two claims. Their first claim was that, as a matter of law, their damages should be measured by a valuation formula compensating them for the pollution of their groundwater both before and after the taking of their property rights through eminent domain. Their second claim was that, as a matter of fact, the valuation of their property should take into account possible future uses of their property for purposes other than its present use for mining. The defendant disputed both of these claims.

"The trial court rendered a judgment deciding the plaintiffs' claim of law in favor of the defendant.³ It agreed with the defendant that the damages suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of the condemnation of their property were to be measured by comparing the value of their property at the time of the taking, in its polluted condition, with its value after the condemnation. It also agreed with the defendant that monetary compensation awarded to the plaintiffs for the easement that the defendant has taken should be based on the likelihood that the plaintiffs would continue to use their property for mining." Albahary v. Bristol, supra, 84 Conn.App. at 332-34, 853 A.2d 577.

"Before the present state court condemnation proceedings had begun, the plaintiffs filed an action against the defendant in [federal court]. They sought damages and injunctive relief for the injury that they had suffered as a result of the landfill's contamination of the groundwater on their property prior to the condemnation.

"The federal case was decided after the filing of the complaint in this present condemnation case. The federal court held that the plaintiffs had proven most of their statutory and common-law claims, but not their claim of inverse condemnation.⁴ With respect to that claim, the court found that the plaintiffs' receipt of $2.65 million from their mineral extraction contracts demonstrated that the contamination caused by the defendant had not deprived the plaintiffs of the reasonable use of their property. The court denied the plaintiffs any damages even for the claims that they had proven because `the legal remedy of money damages to compensate the current landowners for diminished value of their property is inadequate and highly speculative....' Instead, the court ordered the defendant to provide the plaintiffs with an alternate potable water source and to indemnify the plaintiffs against claims of environmental liability that might be raised by third persons. No appeal was taken from this judgment." Id., at 337-38, 853 A.2d 577.

In the present case, the trial court determined that the damages suffered by the plaintiffs from the condemnation of their property were to be measured by comparing the value of their property at the time of the taking, in its polluted condition, with its value after the condemnation. The trial court stated, in support of its conclusion, that "[t]he record before this court demonstrates that the plaintiffs [in their federal court action] have sought and obtained damages for the [past] contamination to their property caused by the city's landfill. They are therefore barred from litigating the same issues in this proceeding."

The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court claiming, inter alia, that the trial court "improperly [had] confined its analysis of the damages they had suffered to a comparison between the value of their property in its polluted condition and its value after the taking of the easement." Albahary v. Bristol, supra, 84 Conn.App. at 334, 853 A.2d 577. The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's argument that the valuation in the present case was governed by this court's holding in Northeast Ct. Economic Alliance, Inc. v. ATC Partnership, 256 Conn. 813, 832-34, 776 A.2d 1068 (2001) (ATC), that the market value of a condemned property must be determined on the basis of the condition of the property on the date of the taking. Albahary v. Bristol, supra, at 336, 853 A.2d 577. The Appellate Court reasoned that "[e]xtension of the valuation...