Albarran v. Blessing

ELENA ALBARRAN, Plaintiff, v. KEITH BLESSING, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:17-cv-2157 (SRU)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

March 11, 2020

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a case about a fatal, single-car accident. Just after 4:00 a.m. on September 3, 2016, Putnam County Sheriff's Deputy Keith Blessing ("Blessing") attempted to pull over a car in which the plaintiff, Elena Albarran ("Albarran"), was traveling. At that time, the car was in Brewster, New York, which is in Putnam County. Albarran was one of five occupants in the car, but she was not driving. The driver did not stop, and, instead, accelerated. A brief police pursuit ensued and carried into neighboring Danbury, Connecticut. The driver of the fleeing car lost control of the vehicle and smashed into a utility pole at an intersection. Albarran and one other passenger survived the accident. Three others—two passengers and the driver—died.

Albarran later sued Putnam County (the "County"), the Putnam County Sheriff's Department (the "Department"), and Blessing (collectively, the "Defendants"). See Am. Compl., Doc. No. 36. In her amended complaint, Albarran alleges negligence and reckless disregard for the safety of others against Blessing, and vicarious liability and negligence against the County and the Department.

The Defendants made a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Blessing is entitled to governmental immunity; (2) even if not, Blessing's actions were not reckless and/or negligent; and (3) even if Blessing's actions were reckless and/or negligent, they did not proximately cause Albarran's injuries. See Mot. Summ. J., Doc. No. 38. On August 6, 2019, I held a hearing on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and Albarran's motions to strike¹ and for a more definite statement,² and I took those motions under advisement. See Min. Entry, Doc. No. 54. For the following reasons, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and Albarran's motions to strike and for a more definite statement are denied as moot.³

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment). When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must construe the facts of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970); see also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1992) (court is required to "resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party"). When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documentary and testimonial evidence, however, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings but must present sufficient probative evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).

"Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir. 1992). If the nonmoving party submits evidence that is "merely colorable," or is not "significantly probative," a court may grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Regarding materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. Id. at 247-48. To present a "genuine" issue of material fact, there must be contradictory evidence "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. at 248.

If the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof at trial, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In such a situation, "there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322-23; accord Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (movant's burden satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of nonmoving party's claim). In short, if there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment may enter. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

II. Background

At 4:21:34 a.m. on September 3, 2016, a single-car accident in Danbury killed three people (Raymond Rivera, the car's driver; Nelson Oseguedo, a passenger sitting behind Rivera; and Warner Nunez, a passenger sitting the back middle seat), and seriously injured two others (Albarran, a passenger in the front passenger's seat; and Beatriz Grajales, a passenger sitting behind Albarran). See Pl. Rule 56(a)2 Statement of Facts, Att. to Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. Summ. J. ("56(a)2 Stmnt."), Doc. No. 45-2, at ¶¶ 46, 51, 55-57. Grajales testified that none of the passengers in the backseat was wearing a seatbelt. See Grajales Depo., Ex. B to Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. ("Grajales Depo."), Doc. No. 38-3, at 60:2-8. The five occupants had left Kas's Bar and Restaurant ("Kas's") in Brewster, New York at roughly 4:00 a.m.; they left together in Grajales's Nissan Maxima (the "Maxima"). See 56(a)2 Stmnt., Doc. No. 45-2, at ¶¶ 53-54. Shortly after leaving Kas's, Rivera stopped at a gas station, and he and Oseguedo went inside and purchased at least a case of beer. See Grajales Depo., Doc. No. 38-3 at 57:6-58:18.

Rivera was driving the Maxima eastbound along State Route 6 in Brewster, New York headed towards Danbury, Connecticut. 56(a)2 Stmnt., Doc. No. 45-2, at ¶ 3. Around 4:20 a.m., Blessing was driving westbound on Route 6 in a marked police vehicle⁴ and noticed that one of the Maxima's headlights was out. Id. at ¶¶ 1-2. Blessing performed a U-turn and began following the Maxima. Id. at ¶ 4; see Dashcam Video, Ex. C to Mot. Summ. J. ("Dashcam Video"), Doc. No. 38-4 (when the video begins, at 4:19:07 a.m., Blessing has already performed the U-turn). Blessing testified that he then observed the Maxima swerve multiple times and cross the dividing line roughly three times. 56(a)2 Stmnt., Doc. No. 45-2, at ¶ 5; see Dashcam Video, Doc. No. 38-4, at 4:19:20-4:19:57 a.m. After following the car for a short period of time, Blessing decided to pull over the Maxima, and so Blessing activated his emergency lights. 56(a)2 Stmnt., Doc. No. 45-2, at ¶ 6; see also Dashcam Video, Doc. No. 38-4, at 4:19:57 a.m. Blessing testified that he began following the Maxima because of the broken headlight and that he attempted to pull over the Maxima because he thought the driver might be intoxicated. Blessing Depo., Ex. A to Mot. Summ. J. ("Blessing Depo."), Doc. No. 38-2, at 13:5-14:6, 16:6-15; 48:9-15. Specifically, Blessing believed the driver might be intoxicated both because the Maxima was moving erratically and because it was traveling, at times, almost 20 mph under the speed limit (as low as 36 mph in a 55 mph zone), which Blessing testified is a "telltale sign" of an intoxicated driver. See id. at 51:8; Dashcam Video, Doc. No. 38-4, at 4:19:17-4:19:57 a.m.

Even though Blessing activated his emergency lights, Rivera did not pull over. See 56(a)2 Stmnt., Doc. No. 45-2, at ¶ 10; Dashcam Video, Doc. No. 38-4. At 4:20:11 a.m., Blessing briefly activated his siren. See 56(a)2 Stmnt., Doc. No. 45-2, at ¶ 12; Dashcam Video, Doc. No. 38-4. Instead of pulling over, Rivera began to accelerate. At 4:20:18 a.m., Blessing alerted the Department's dispatcher that he had "a failure to comply." See Dashcam Video, Doc. No. 38-4. By 4:20:19 a.m., Blessing's patrol car was moving 51 mph to keep up with Rivera. See id. From 4:20:21 to 4:20:28 a.m., Blessing relayed the Maxima's license plate number to the Department's dispatcher. See id. At some point, Blessing also communicated his location (approaching the Connecticut State line) and requested that the Department's dispatcher notify the Danbury Police Department (the "DPD") about the Maxima's approach. See 56(a)2 Stmnt., Doc. No. 45-2, at ¶ 19. By 4:20:38 a.m., Blessing's patrol car was moving 60 mph to keep up with Rivera. See Dashcam Video, Doc. No. 38-4. Blessing testified that, in his experience, intoxicated drivers pull over when police indicate that they should. See Blessing Depo., Doc. No. 38-2, at 58:23-25. When a suspected intoxicated driver does not pull over, Blessing testified, Blessing often suspects that the driver has something to hide, such as a parole or probation violation, or some other kind of criminality (such as harm to another passenger). See id. at 24:10-25:7; 58:10-59:5; 77:9-18. Blessing testified that—although unaware when he began to follow the Maxima—he eventually became aware that there were passengers in the Maxima. See id. at 12:22-25, 84:18-24.

By 4:20:57 a.m., Blessing's patrol car was moving 71 mph to keep up with the Maxima. See Dashcam Video, Doc. No. 38-4. Still, Rivera began to pull away. See id. At 4:20:58...