Alberto v. Spectrum Mgmt.

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WENDY JUDITH REYES ALBERTO, Plaintiff, v. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 22-3094 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

April 26, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

The plaintiff, Wendy Judith Reyes Alberto, brings this civil action against the defendant, Spectrum Management LLC (“Spectrum”), asserting violations of (1) the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Revision Act (“DCMWRA”), D.C. Code §§ 32-1001 et seq.; (2) the District of Columbia Payment and Collection of Wages Law (“DCPCWL”), D.C. Code §§ 32-1301, et seq.; and (3) the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C §§ 201, et seq. See Complaint (“Compl.”) at 1, ECF No. 1. Currently pending before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. 7 (“Def.'s Mot.”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions,^[1] the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant in part and deny in part the defendant's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following allegations are derived from the plaintiff's Complaint, unless otherwise specified. The plaintiff, “a[] resident of the District of Columbia[,]” was “employed by [the defendant] from early June 2020 to September 28, 2022, when she was [allegedly] involuntarily terminated.” Compl. ¶ 1. Throughout her employment, she worked “at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility (‘the Central Detention Facility')[.]” Id. She allegedly abided by a “set schedule[,]” each week, working “from 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.” on “Monday through Friday” and “6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.” on “Saturdays,” “with a one-hour lunch break” each day. Id. ¶ 8. Thus, she alleges that she “typically worked [fifty-one] hours per week.” Id.

The defendant, Spectrum, is “a limited liability company organized under the laws of the District of Columbia.” Id. ¶ 2. During the period of the plaintiff's employment, the defendant allegedly “entered into a contract or contracts with the District of Columbia government to perform property management services for the Central Detention Facility.” Id. Because these contracts allegedly “had a value in excess of $2,500.00[,]” id. ¶ 3, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant was subject to the terms and conditions of the McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act of 1965 (“SCA”), see id. Consequently, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant was obligated to pay her an hourly wage “in accordance with the job classifications and rates set forth in [w]age [determinations made by the United States Department of Labor (‘DOL').” Id.

According to the plaintiff, she was “employed as a janitor,” id. ¶ 1, and should therefore have been classified as such within the meaning of the SCA, see id. ¶ 9-10. And, “during the time period relevant to th[e] Complaint,” the SCA hourly wages for janitors “ranged from $18.95 ($14.41(base) + $4.54(fringe)) to $20.44 ($15.64[(base)] + $4.80[(fringe)]).” Id. ¶ 9. However, when the plaintiff was hired “[i]n early June 2020,” “her [wage] was [allegedly only] $14.00 per hour[;]” “[b]etween July 1, 2020 and June 30, 2021, [the defendant allegedly] paid [the p]laintiff [a wage] of [only] $15.00 per hour[;]” “from July 1, 2021 to June 30, 2022, [the defendant allegedly] paid [the p]laintiff [a wage of only] $15.20 per hour[;]” and “[o]n or about July 1, 2022, [the defendant allegedly] began paying [the p]laintiff [a wage] of [only] $19.70 per hour.” Id. ¶ 10. In addition, “[the defendant allegedly] paid [her] these rates for all of [her] time, including her overtime hours.” Id.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated the FLSA, the DCMWRA, and the DCPCWL by “knowingly failing to pay [her] an overtime premium for her overtime hours[,]” and “failing to pay her anything at all for some hours of work[.]” Id. ¶¶ 18, 25. In addition, she alleges that the defendant violated the FLSA by “failing to apply the correct overtime rate (the DOL rate for a ‘janitor'), for all of [her] overtime hours[,]” id. ¶ 18, and that the defendant violated the DCMWRA and the DCPCWL by “failing to pay [her] in accordance with the prevailing wages for a [j]anitor, as required by [the defendant's] contract with the District of Columbia and the SCA[,]” id. ¶ 25. The plaintiff further asserts that she was “employed [ ] within the meaning of the DCMWRA, the DCPCWL[,] and the FLSA because [the defendant allegedly] treated her as an employee, [ ] maintained her employment records, [ ] paid her wages, [ ] set her pay rate, [ ] supervised her, [ ] hired her, [ ] had the authority to hire and fire her[,] and [ ] made the decision to pay her in a manner made unlawful by the DCMWRA, the DCPCWL and the FLSA.” Id. ¶ 2. The plaintiff seeks “back wages, overtime pay, and liquidated damages, from June 2020 to September 28, 2022.” Id.

B. Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed her Complaint in this case on October 12, 2022. See Compl. at 1. On February 6, 2023, the defendant filed its motion to dismiss. See Def.'s Mot. at 1. The plaintiff filed her opposition, or alternatively her motion for leave to file an amended complaint, on March 20, 2023. See Pl.'s Opp'n at 1. The defendant filed its reply in support of its motion to dismiss and its opposition to the plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint on March 27, 2023. See Def.'s Reply at 1. Finally, on April 3, 2023, the plaintiff filed her reply to the defendant's opposition to her motion to file an amended complaint. See Pl.'s Reply at 1.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a complaint “state[s] a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the Court must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the Court must “assume the[] veracity” of any “well-pleaded factual allegations” in a complaint, conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Also, the Court need not “accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations[,]” or “inferences drawn by [the] plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the facts set out in the complaint[.]” Hettinga, 677 F.3d at 476. Finally, the Court “may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

III. ANALYSIS

The defendant argues that the Complaint should be dismissed because “a violation of the SCA does not give rise to a private civil action[,]” Def.'s Mem. at 6, and the plaintiff's claims “can only be decided through the administrative procedures of the DOL, not this Court[,]” Def.'s Reply at 2. In response, the plaintiff contends that “the SCA does not bar claims under the FLSA, the DCMWRA, or the DCPCWL because there is no conflict between them and the SCA.” Pl.'s Opp'n at 2. The plaintiff also states that an additional “flaw in [the d]efendant's reasoning is that it fails to acknowledge that [the p]laintiff is bringing some claims that are completely independent of the SCA-i.e., claims that [the d]efendant failed to pay overtime rates based on the pay [the p]laintiff actually received.” Id. The Court will first discuss whether the claims tied to the plaintiff's classification under the SCA may proceed, before addressing whether the claims made independent of the SCA may proceed.

A. Whether the Claims Tied to the Plaintiff's Classification Under the SCA May Proceed

The plaintiff first alleges that the defendant violated the DCMWRA and the DCPCWL by “failing to pay [her] in accordance with the prevailing wages for a [j]anitor” under the SCA, Compl. ¶ 25, and that the defendant violated the FLSA by “failing to apply the correct overtime rate (the DOL rate for a ‘janitor' [under the SCA]), for all of [her] overtime hours,” id. ¶ 18. In response, the defendant moves to dismiss these claims on the grounds that the SCA “does not give rise to a private civil action[,]” Def.'s Mem. at 6, but instead limits the plaintiff to “the administrative remedies created by Congress and [ ] the Department of Labor under the SCA[,]” Id. at 5-6.

The plaintiff agrees with the defendant that “there is [no] private right of action” under the SCA, but argues that she is not “bring[ing any] claims directly under the SCA.” Pl.'s Opp'n at 1. To this end, she asserts that “while Congress chose to limit the ability of an employee to bring suit under the SCA, it preserved the employee's rights to do so under the FLSA and [local] laws like the DCMWRA and [the] DCPCWL.” Id. at 10. Moreover, the plaintiff insists that she is “not alleging [that] she was...