Albrecht v. Albrecht

ROBERT ALBRECHT et. al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. JEFFREY ALBRECHT, as Trustee, etc., et. al., Defendants and Respondents.

B306601

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR

June 7, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 17STPB00908

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Deborah L. Christian, Judge. Affirmed.

Robert Albrecht for Appellants.

Pearson Law Corporation and Stephen W. Holohan for Respondents.

INTRODUCTION

Robert Albrecht, Jonathan Albrecht, and James Albrecht¹ appeal from the trial court's orders regarding three petitions filed under Probate Code section 17200,² which pertained to the Albrecht 2004 Family Trust (the "Trust"). Those petitions are: (1) appellants' petition for attorneys' fees and costs associated with their demurrer to a prior petition filed by Joyce Pearson seeking Robert's removal as trustee; (2) Robert's petition for approval of his accounting of the Trust's assets and affairs; and (3) Jeffrey's petition for an accounting and distribution. All three petitions were heard at an evidentiary hearing held in February 2020.

Appellants contend that in ruling on these petitions, the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) denying them the opportunity to present evidence at the hearing; (2) removing Robert as trustee; (3) finding Jeffrey did not violate the Trust's no contest clause when he joined Pearson's petition seeking Robert's removal as trustee; (4) denying Robert's accounting without prejudice and appointing a Probate Referee to appraise Ruth's condominium; (5) denying or failing to rule on various requests for attorneys' fees and costs; and (6) repeatedly disregarding the intent of the trustor, Ruth Albrecht. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ruth had two adult children, Robert and Jeffrey. She also had two adult grandchildren, Jonathan and James, who are Robert's sons.

In March 2004, Ruth executed a declaration of trust (the "Trust Document") creating the Trust. The Trust Document granted Ruth "full and unrestricted power" to amend, alter, or revoke it throughout her lifetime. The assets comprising the Trust Estate included: (1) Ruth's condominium in Chatsworth; (2) her furniture, furnishings, and personal belongings; (3) a bank account with Citibank; (4) an investment account with Edward Jones; and (5) a 1999 Lexus.

Per the Trust Document, Ruth was the trustor and the trustee. Upon her "death, incapability, resignation, or inability" to serve as trustee, Robert was designated to act as successor trustee. His wife was designated to serve as successor trustee in the event of his "death, incapability, resignation, or inability" to serve as successor trustee.

Among other things, the Trust Document set forth the distribution of the Trust Estate upon Ruth's death, and enumerated the trustee's and successor trustee's powers relating to the Trust's administration. The Trust Document also contained a no contest clause, which stated in pertinent part: "A contestant shall be considered to have predeceased the trustor without surviving issue and not to be in existence at the time of the trustor's death."

In July 2009, Ruth executed an amendment to the Trust Document (the "First Trust Amendment"). The First Trust Amendment clarified the circumstances in which Ruth may be deemed "incapacitated," and authorized the release of her healthinformation and medical records to successor trustees. It also revoked and replaced the Trust Document's provisions setting forth the distribution of the Trust Estate upon Ruth's death. Per the revised distribution provisions: (1) Jonathan was to receive Ruth's "approximately one carat diamond ring"; (2) James was to receive "the diamond ring consisting of multiple smaller diamonds"; (3) Jeffrey was to receive her Lexus; (4) Barbara Rainville was to receive her other jewelry, a cabinet containing her "angel collection," and "all furniture, furnishings, and personal belongings which the residual beneficiaries do not want"; (5) Jonathan and James would each receive $5,000; and (6) all remaining assets would be divided equally among her children.

Ruth amended the Trust Document again in September 2016 (the "Second Trust Amendment"). The Second Trust Amendment revoked the Trust Document's provisions governing the appointment of successor trustee. It replaced those provisions with the following language: "RUTH B. ALBRECHT is the initial Trustee of the Trust. Upon the death, incapability, resignation or inability to act, RUTH ALBRECHT nominate [sic] JOYCE J. PEARSON to act as Successor Trustee. Upon the death, incapability, resignation or inability to act of JOYCE J. PEARSON, then ROBERT J. ALBRECHT shall act as Successor Trustee. Upon the death, incapability, resignation or inability to act of ROBJERT J. ALBRECHT, then JEFFREY H. ALBRECHT shall act as Successor Trustee[.]" In all other respects, Ruth "confirm[ed] and readopt[ed] the remaining provisions of [the Trust Document.]"

On the same date she signed the Second Trust Amendment, Ruth executed several other documents. Of relevance to thisappeal, she signed a document nominating Pearson as co-trustee of the Trust. She also executed a durable power of attorney granting Pearson the authority to make financial decisions and handle other affairs on her behalf.

In October 2016, Ruth executed a document entitled "Revocation and Declaration of Nullity." By this document, Ruth "revoke[d] and declare[d] to be null and void" all the documents she signed and executed in September 2016, including, among others, the Second Trust Amendment, the document nominating Pearson as co-trustee, and the durable power of attorney appointing Pearson as her agent.

Two months later, in December 2016, Ruth executed a document entitled "Revocation of 'Revocation of Declaration of Nullity.'" Pursuant to this document, she "revoke[d] and declare[d] to be null and void the 'Revocation and Declaration of Nullity'" executed in October 2016, and reinstated all of the documents she executed in September 2016.

In January 2017, Robert filed a petition under section 17200.³ He alleged Ruth "has been incapacitated since 2015" and, for the past year, has been "incapable of taking care of herself, . . . attending to her financial or business affairs[,] [or] . . . making competent decisions for herself." Robert therefore alleged the documents Ruth executed in September 2016 were "invalid and void," as they were the product of Pearson's undueinfluence. Thus, Robert requested a judicial declaration that under the operative Trust documents, he—not Pearson—was "the sole true and lawful Trustee of [the] Trust." In the alternative, he sought Pearson's removal as trustee pursuant to section 15642.

Ruth passed away in March 2017.

In May 2017, Pearson filed a petition under section 17200. She alleged the Trust's terms were governed by the Trust Document as amended by the First and Second Trust Amendments. Thus, she requested, among other things, an order confirming the Trust was valid as amended, and that she was the successor trustee.

The same day Pearson filed her section 17200 petition, Robert filed an ex parte application seeking the same relief sought in his section 17200 petition, based largely on the same grounds alleged in the petition.

After attending mediation per court order, on December 22, 2017, Robert and Pearson executed a settlement agreement resolving their claims for relief asserted in their respective petitions and Robert's ex parte application (the "Settlement Agreement"). In exchange for mutually releasing their claims, Robert and Pearson agreed to the following terms: (1) Robert "is and shall be the sole and true lawful trustee of the [Trust]" and Pearson "waive[d] and relinquishe[d] any and all claims she ha[d] or may . . . ha[ve] to act as . . . trustee of [the] Trust"; (2) Pearson and Robert would each receive $55,000 in attorneys' fees, which were to be paid from the net proceeds from the sale of Ruth's condominium; and (3) Pearson would deliver to Robert all keys to the condominium, and provide him with all information and documents necessary to facilitate the Trust's administration. The Settlement Agreement's validity was contingent upon the trialcourt's approval of a separate Stipulation and Order. They further agreed to present the Settlement Agreement itself to the court for approval and entry of judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

The Stipulation and Order acknowledged Robert and Pearson "entered into and executed [the Settlement Agreement,]" which would be "presented to the court for approval and entry of [j]udgment pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 664.6." It also reiterated Robert and Pearson agreed that Robert was the Trust's "sole true and lawful trustee of the [Trust,]" and that Pearson would provide Robert with the condominium keys and all Trust records and assets in her possession. They further stipulated Robert would be authorized to immediately list Ruth's condominium for sale for the Trust's benefit, and to take all actions reasonably necessary to administer the Trust. The Stipulation and Order did not mention the Settlement Agreement's terms regarding their entitlement to $55,000 each in attorneys' fees.

At a hearing held on December 29, 2017, Robert informed the trial court⁴ that he and Pearson had "arrived at a settlement of [their claims] in a stipulation and order." While Robert mentioned they "ha[d] a written settlement agreement," the record does not reflect he provided the court with a copy of the Settlement Agreement; instead, it indicates he only asked ...