Albright v. Sheriffs Dept. Rapides Parish

DAVID ALBRIGHT v. SHERIFFS DEPT. RAPIDES PARISH, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-2117

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

RECEIVED: September 22, 2014

September 20, 2014

JUDGE DRELL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KIRK

RULING

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 60) filed by the following officers of the Rapides Parish Sheriff's Office ("RPSO"): the former Sheriff of RPSO, Sheriff Charles F. Wagner ("Sheriff Wagner"); the current Sheriff of RPSO, Sheriff William Earl Hilton ("Sheriff Hilton"); Deputy Sheriff Herman Walters ("Deputy Walters"); and Deputy Sheriff Matthew R. Davis ("Deputy Davis"). All responses have been submitted, and the matter is ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, the motion will be GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

David Albright alleges the above Defendants violated both federal and state law on August 8, 2011 by condoning a restaurant manager's decision to bar him entry because he was accompanied by a service animal. (Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 25). According to Plaintiff, the Defendants should be held liable for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment under federal law, in addition to state law violations. (Id. at 10-16).

Plaintiff allegedly suffers from cataplexy and narcolepsy, which cause seizures and instantaneous sleep spells. (Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, Doc. 65-1 at 1). Because Mr. Albright's condition can be perilous, he claims he has two trained service dogs who are able to alert and give him a five minute warning of an impending seizure or sleep spell. (Id. at 1). According to his wife, Earlyne Albright, Mr. Albright experiences seizures "all the time" and he can have as many as three to four in one day. (Deposition of Earlyne Albright, Doc. 66 at 15).

Plaintiff contends he arrived at Sieper Junction Cafe, located in Rapides Parish near Sieper, Louisiana, to attend a Neighborhood Watch meeting on August 8, 2011 featuring guest speakers from the Rapides Parish Sheriff's Office. (Doc. 65-1 at 1). Deputies Davis and Walters, both Defendants in this case, were invited on behalf of the RPSO by the local Neighborhood Watch to speak about safety and security. (Id.; Affidavit of Matthew Davis, Doc. 60-8 at 1; Affidavit of Herman Walters, Doc. 60-9 at 1). At that time, Deputy Davis was the Commander of the Uniformed Division and Deputy Walters was the Assistant Chief Deputy of the Rapides Parish Sheriff's Office. (Doc. 65-1 at 1; Doc. 60-8 at 1; Doc. 60-9 at 1).

When Mr. Albright arrived at Sieper Junction Cafe for the Fifth Ward Neighborhood Watch meeting, he was accompanied by one of his service dog, Zoey. (Doc. 65-1 at 1; Defendants' Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, Doc. 60-4 at 1). The parties agree that as Plaintiff approached the entrance to the cafe, the manager stepped in front of him and said he could not enter the cafe with his dog. (Doc. 65-1 at 2; Doc. 60-4 at 1). Mr. Albright alleges he provided Ms, Teresa Cutts₅ the manager of the cafe, with documentation showing Zoey was a service dog, but Ms. Cutts still refused to admit him into the restaurant. (Doc. 65-1 at 2).

The Rapides Parish Sheriff's Office was called to respond to the dispute and Deputy Gunter arrived on the scene to investigate the problem. (Id.; Doc. 60-4 at 2). According to the Defendants, Deputy Gunter spoke with Ms. Cutts and Mr. Albright separately, and showed Ms. Cutts the identification card stating Zoey is a trained service dog. (Doc. 60-4 at 2). Deputy Gunter informed the parties he would need to contact his supervisor, and a second deputy (whose identity is presently unknown) arrived shortly thereafter. (Id.; Deposition of David Albright, Doc. 60-6 at 31). The second deputy discussed the matter with Ms. Cutts and told Mr. Albright: "You can't stay here. She has a right to refuse service to anybody, so you have to leave." (Doc. 65-1 at 2; Doc. 60-4 at 2).

Plaintiff contends RPSO Deputies Davis and Walters were standing nearby during the exchanges between him, Ms. Cutts, and the deputies responding to the call. (Doc. 65-1 at 3). While Deputy Gunter and the second unknown deputy went inside the cafe to speak with Ms. Cutts, Mr. Albright approached Deputies Davis and Walters.¹ (Id.). Mr. Albright allegedly asked the deputies if they were going to "stand there while a federal felony is being committed." (Id.; Doc. 60-6 at 31). According to Plaintiff, Deputy Davis shrugged his shoulders in response and Deputy Walters said: "I'm not here. I'm going inside." (Doc. 65-1 at 3; Doc. 60-6 at 31). Deputy Walters walked into the cafe and Deputy Davis remained outside. (Doc. 65-1 at 3; Doc. 60-6 at 31). Plaintiff claims he again asked Deputy Davis if he was going to do anything. (Doc. 65-1 at 3; Doc. 60-6 at 31). Deputy Davis allegedly replied: "No. We don't investigate or enforce federal law. That's not our job." (Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, Doc. 65-1 at 3;) Doc. 25, at 8). Plaintiff claims Deputy Davis then watched the two deputies come out of the cafeand tell Mr. Albright to leave the premises. (Doc. 65-1 at 3). Plaintiff contends Deputies Walters and Davis spoke as planned during the Neighborhood Watch meeting at the cafe. (Id.).

Plaintiff also avers that several years before August 8, 2011, he had a similar incident with his service dog at the Rapides Parish Courthouse. (Doc. 65-1 at 3; Doc. 25, at 12). Mr. Albright contends a deputy of RPSO temporarily prohibited Plaintiff from entering the courthouse with Zoey. (Doc. 65-1 at 3). According to Plaintiff, a senior deputy intervened and permitted him to enter the courthouse with Zoey. (Id.). Mr. Albright claims he discussed the incident at the courthouse with Defendant Deputy Davis ^uwho affirmed the need for further training of sheriff deputies regarding the ADA and service dogs." (Id.). Both parties agree that RPSO has no courses or training to teach officers about the ADA or the Louisiana state law concerning service animals. (Doc. 65-1 at 3; Doc. 60-4 at 4-5).

II. Law and Analysis

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We consider "all evidence in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion." Seacor Holdings, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 635 F.3d 675, 680 (5th Cir. 2011)(internal quotations omitted). It is important to note that the standard for a summary judgment is two-fold: (1) there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

B. Federal Law Claims

1. Americans with Disabilities Act

The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") is a "federal anti-discrimination statute designed to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, Tex., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002). The ADA is comprised of three titles addressing discrimination in different contexts including employment discrimination in Title I and discrimination by places of public accommodation in Title III. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12182. Pertinent to this motion is Title II of the ADA which states: "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A public entity includes "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government."42 U.S.C. § 12131(b).

The Supreme Court of the United States found state prisons fall "squarely within the statutory definition of public entity" under an unambiguous reading of the ADA. Pennsylvania Dept. Of Correction s v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998). The Fifth Circuit has also articulated that "the broad language of the statute and the absence of any stated exceptions has occasioned courts' application of Title II protections into areas involving law enforcement." Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000). Another district court found that other appellate circuits have consistently construed the expansive language of the ADA. to include "anything apublic entity does."² Salinas v. City of New Braunfels, 557 F.Supp. 2d 777, 781 (W.D. Tex. 2008). The Salinas Court found a municipal police department qualifies as a public entity. Id. at 782. We agree and find that the Rapides Parish Sheriff's Office in this case is a public entity within the meaning of Title II of the ADA.

The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. A prima face case is established by proving: 1) plaintiff is a qualified individual within the meaning of ADA; (2) plaintiff was excluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability.³ Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2004) (additional citations omitted).

Causes of action brought under the ADA have several key distinctions from actions brought under section 1983. Unlike demands brought under section 1983, "neither a policymaker, nor an official policy must be identified for claims asserted under the ADA" against a municipality. Delano-Pyle v. Victoria...