Alcocer v. Bulloch Cnty. Sheriff's Office

JUDITH ALCOCER, Plaintiff, v. BULLOCH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE et al., Defendants.

CV 615-94

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION

January 18, 2017

ORDER

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for Damages, in Part. (Doc. 30.) Plaintiff, Judith Alcocer, alleges that Defendants violated multiple federal laws and constitutional provisions. Defendants move to dismiss only a limited portion of Plaintiff's complaint: the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against Sheriff Anderson in his official capacity. The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion.

BACKGROUND

On January 30, 2014, Deputy Sheriff Randall Norman observed Plaintiff driving east on U.S. Highway 80 in Bulloch County, Georgia. After running the license plate of the vehicle Plaintiff was driving through the Georgia Crime Information Center ("GCIC"), he discovered that the owner of the vehicle had a suspended license. Suspecting that she was the vehicle's owner, he stopped Plaintiff and asked for her identification. After confirming that she was the vehicle's owner, Deputy Norman issued Plaintiff a citation for driving with a suspended license. He then arrested Plaintiff for the misdemeanor offense and transported her to the county jail for processing.

Plaintiff remained in the county jail for the next twenty-seven hours. She alleges that Defendants refused to release her despite the fact that she posted bond. In fact, Plaintiff claims that Defendants ignored her bond because they were awaiting notification from Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") on whether Plaintiff was here illegally, even though she provided Defendants with a copy of her birth certificate. Defendant does not deny these accounts.

Following this incident, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court. Relevant to the current motion, Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Anderson (1) failed to formulate and implement a policy or custom that protects against violations of the civil rights of citizens, (2) established a custom, policy, or practice of making illegal traffic stops if someone looks Latino, and (3) established a custom and protocol of automatically detaining arrested Latinos in anticipation of an ICE hold. Plaintiff asks this Court to: (1) "[E]njoin Defendant's from assuming that all Latinos, like the Plaintiff are illegal aliens"; (2) "[E]njoin the Defendants from utilizing the policy, practice or custom ofroutinely running license plates through GCIC, of drivers who appear Latina, like the Plaintiff, with no other legal reason for doing so."; (3) "[E]njoin the Defendants from refusing bond to Latinas, like the Plaintiff, because of an assumption on the part of the Defendants that all Latinas are illegal in this country."; (4) "[E]njoin the Defendants from referring Latinos to I.C.E. without legal grounds for doing so because the Plaintiff, an American-borne woman, was referred to I.C.E. as if she was an illegal alien."; (5) "[E]njoin the Defendant Sheriff from violating the Fourteenth, Fifth, and Fourth Amendments by illegally stopping, intimidating, detaining, searching and seizing Latinos for 'driving while brown'"; and 6) "[E]njoin the Sheriff from illegally detaining Latinos in anticipation of a Federal I.C.E. hold." (Doc. 26 ¶¶ 132-138.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to request injunctive or declaratory relief.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 556 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Applying this standard requires a two-part test. See id. at 679. First, the Court asks whether the plaintiff has stated specific facts supporting a claim rather than mere legal conclusions. Id. Second, it askswhether those facts might plausibly give rise to a right to relief. Id. at 680.

The first prong of the inquiry requires that the plaintiff plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While the Court must accept as "true all of the allegations contained in a complaint," it must not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. Generalized conclusions and "bare allegations" will not allow the plaintiff to "unlock the doors of discovery." See id. The plaintiff must assert specific facts that "show" the defendant's misconduct. Id. at 679.

Once the Court separates the specific factual allegations from mere legal conclusions, it must accept those facts as true and "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. Well-pleaded facts cannot be merely consistent with the alleged misconduct; they must allow the Court to infer that such misconduct was plausible. Id. at 678. Thus, facts which show only the possibility of misconduct are not enough. Id. Thecomplaint must allege facts that push the claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Id. at 683.

Finally, while a plaintiff does not have to "allege a 'specific fact' to cover every element or allege 'with precision' each element of a claim, it is still necessary that a complaint 'contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'" Fin. Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2007)(quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)).

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the substance of Defendants' current motion to dismiss, the Court needs to clarify some confusion about the status of Defendants' previous motion to dismiss. (Doc. 13.) Plaintiff argues in her response to the current motion to dismiss that "Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint states mostly that of Plaintiff's prior pleadings which the Court found plausible on its face, denying Defendant's (sic) first 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Sheriff Lynn Anderson, in his official capacity." (Doc. 33 at 2.) The Court, however, made no such finding. The Court declared Defendants' first motion to dismiss moot, because Plaintiff amended the complaint to which it objected. The Court did not deny Defendants' motion on the merits or find Plaintiff's prior pleading "plausible on itsface." Having cleared up that misconception, the Court must now decide whether Plaintiff (1) has standing to request injunctive relief or (2) has standing to request declaratory relief.

A. Request for Injunctive Relief

Before a court reviews the merits of a case, it must first ensure the plaintiff has standing. Eland v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006). To establish standing, "the plaintiff must demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressability." Id. at 1205. If a plaintiff fails to meet any one of these requirements, the Court is without jurisdiction to decide the dispute. Id. at 1206.

Defendants claim that Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief fails to satisfy the injury-in-fact element because Plaintiff's claim of injury is too speculative. A plaintiff suffers an injury in fact when he suffers a harm that is "(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Eland, 471 F.3d at 1207. Usually, a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact element by alleging a past harm. When a plaintiff seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, however, he seeks to regulate ongoing or future conduct by alleging a future injury. McCullum v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135, 1145 (11th Cir. 2014). Thus, determining whether a plaintiff has an injury in fact requires a special analysis. A court must determine whether the plaintiff has proven that "the threatened harm isreal and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 1145. In the Eleventh Circuit, the future injury must be "imminent." Eland, 471 F.3d at 1207.

Because "each element of standing must be supported 'with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation,'" the reviewing court must conduct its analysis in light of where the litigation sits procedurally. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Thus, the burden of proof for standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage differs from that at the summary-judgment stage which differs from that at the trial stage. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. When standing is challenged on a motion to dismiss, "general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we 'presume[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.'" Id. These factual allegations, however, must be viewed in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. Therefore, the allegations supporting standing, while taken as true, must be specific factual allegations and not merely conclusory statements.

1. Plaintiff has not alleged an "imminent" injury in fact

Plaintiff has failed to prove that her future injury is "imminent," first and foremost, because the future injuryalleged is too speculative. To obtain an injunction, a plaintiff must be at a real risk of suffering the future injury she seeks to avoid. Church, 30 F.3d at 1337. When determining whether a prospective injury is "real" or "immediate" federal courts assume that the plaintiff will abide by the law and not repeat the misconduct that led to her original injury. Id. at 1337-38. Thus, if a plaintiff's future injury depends on...