Alexander v. City of Syracuse

573 F.Supp.3d 711

Troy ALEXANDER, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF SYRACUSE; County of Onondaga; and Detective Rory Gilhooley, Defendants.

City of Syracuse and Detective Rory Gilhooley, Cross-Claimants,

v.County of Onondaga, Cross-Defendant.

County of Onondaga, Cross-Claimant,

v.City of Syracuse and Detective Rory Gilhooley, Cross-Defendants.

5:17-CV-1195

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed December 1, 2021

TROY ALEXANDER, Plaintiff Pro Se, 1906 S. State Street, Syracuse, New York 13205.

OF COUNSEL: DANIELLE PIRES, ESQ., PATRICK R. BLOOD, ESQ., SARAH MAE, KNICKERBOCKER, ESQ., CITY OF SYRACUSE OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL, Attorneys for Defendants City of Syracuse and Rory Gilhooley, 233 East Washington Street, Room 300 City Hall, Syracuse, New York 13202.

OF COUNSEL: JOHN E. HEISLER, JR. ESQ., KATHERINE B. FELICE, ESQ., ONONDAGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Attorneys for Defendant County of Onondaga, John H. Mulroy Civic Center, 421 Montgomery Street, 10th Floor, Syracuse, New York 13202.

DAVID N. HURD, United States District Judge

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ...717

II. BACKGROUND ...717

A. Police Arrive at Crouse Hospital...718

B. Police Seize Plaintiff's House and Cars...720

C. Investigators Follow Up on Leads...721

D. Warrants, Searches, and Plaintiff's Arrest...723

E. Wrapping Up the Investigation...724

F. Plaintiff's Formal Criminal Proceedings...726

G. Plaintiff's Civil Procedural History...728

III. LEGAL STANDARD ...728

IV. DISCUSSION ...729

A. Search and Seizure of 1906 S. State...729

B. Search and Seizure of Plaintiff's Vehicles...733

C. False Arrest on October 25, 2016...734

D. False Arrest for Failure to Release Plaintiff on Bail...735

E. Malicious Prosecution...737

F. Plaintiff's Claims Against Onondaga County...741

V. CONCLUSION ...741

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 28, 2017, pro se plaintiff Troy Alexander ("Alexander" or "plaintiff") filed the present complaint. At its core, that complaint alleges that defendants falsely arrested him, improperly searched his home and seized his vehicles, and initiated a malicious prosecution in the course of investigating a gang rape and torture that apparently occurred from the afternoon of October 23, 2016 until the early morning of October 24, 2016.

Alexander lays the blame for that investigation at the feet of detective Rory Gilhooley ("Gilhooley"), his employer the City of Syracuse ("Syracuse" or the "City" and together with Gilhooley the "City defendants"), as well as on the County of Onondaga ("Onondaga" or the "County"). To right those alleged wrongs, plaintiff invokes his rights under the Constitution of the United States through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" § 1983"), as well as the New York Constitution and common law.

On September 28, 2021, the City defendants filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56 for summary judgment against Alexander's Second Amended Complaint—the current operative pleading—in its entirety as to them.¹ That motion, having been fully briefed, will now be decided on the submissions and without oral argument.

II. BACKGROUND

Before delving too deeply into the record, the Court must first clarify what matters for the present motion practice, as well as what does not. In general, the facts are taken from the moving defendants’ statement of material facts where admitted by Alexander or else from other record evidence. In addition, though, certain of plaintiff's denials to the City defendants’ statement of material facts failed to cite to record evidence that supported a factual dispute, contrary to the requirements of the Local Rules of the Northern District of New York. In the usual case, this would enable the Court to construe those improperly supported denials as admitted. Local Rule for the Northern District of New York 56.1(b).

However, in deference to Alexander's pro se status and notwithstanding plaintiff's extensive litigation experience, the Court will review the record for evidentiary support for plaintiff's denials even where he does not specifically point the Court to where that evidence might be. See Parker v. Fantasia , 425 F. Supp. 3d 171, 176 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that special solicitude afforded to pro se litigants suggests that courts should review record when pro se plaintiff fails to appropriately respond to defendants’ properly supported statement of material facts). Accordingly, any facts that plaintiff disputes and for which the Court has found support in the record are flagged as disputed and described from each party's point of view.

But that preamble only establishes what evidence the Court will consider. How—and whether—that evidence is relevant is a separate issue. To that end, in considering claims of false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, and malicious prosecution, the Court notes at the outset that the truth of the underlying charges or the eventual disposition of Alexander's criminal case are, for the most part, irrelevant to plaintiff's civil case.

After all, one of the City defendants’ chief theories on summary judgment is that the police only ever acted when supported by probable cause. And probable cause is not a question of truth: it is one of probability. See, e.g. , Loria v. Gorman , 306 F.3d 1271, 1288-89 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that even false complaint can still provide basis for probable cause because important question is whether probability of criminal culpability existed).

Instead, the Court is concerned with whether the police had enough evidence to justify their every action. As a consequence, many of the objections plaintiff makes to the underlying truth of evidence the City defendants had at their disposal are irrelevant. What matters is not whether the story the police were putting together ultimately proved itself to be true, but whether the police were justified in coming to the conclusions that they did. See Loria , 306 F.3d at 1288-89. Accordingly, where plaintiff denies the truth of evidence police received—but does not deny the fact that the police received it—the Court will deem admitted the fact that the police were aware of that evidence.

Similarly, Alexander's running hearsay objections in his denials miss the mark. Hearsay is "a declarant's out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." United States v. Dupree , 706 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up) (citing FED. R. EVID . 801(c) ). But again, the eventual truth of a complaint of criminal misconduct is irrelevant to the question of whether the police had probable cause to act on it. See Loria , 306 F.3d at 1288-89. Instead, these statements have value precisely because the police heard them, whether they are true or not. Thus, the statements plaintiff objects to are not hearsay and the Court will therefore deem facts subject to plaintiff's hearsay objections to be admitted.

A. Police Arrive at Crouse Hospital

Having cleared up what evidence it will be considering, the Court now turns to the factual background underlying Alexander's claims. In doing so, it will track the reports the police received and the evidence they recovered. It will also point out any exculpatory evidence or reasons for pause the police should have had. Throughout, though, the Court acknowledges up front that plaintiff denies the truth of the underlying charges and will not belabor the point by repeating it every time plaintiff objects.

On Monday, October 24, 2016, at about 3:39 p.m., Syracuse police officers Thomas Lund ("Lund") and Dustin Kiellach ("Kiellach") responded to Crouse Hospital's ("Crouse") Emergency Room. Dkt. 119-1, Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts ("DSMF"), ¶ 8. Lund and Kiellach had been summoned to Crouse because a patient there, L.M., reported a sexual assault. Id. ¶ 9.

On the way to interview L.M., Lund and Kiellach met Erin Culhane ("Culhane"), a friend of L.M.’s who was waiting outside her room. DSMF ¶ 10. Culhane told Lund and Kiellach that she had been with L.M. at a residence at 264 McLennan Avenue ("264 McLennan") on the previous day, Sunday, October 23, 2016. Id. ¶ 11. Apparently, L.M. had left the residence at around 4:00 p.m. with a woman named Samantha. Id.

The next time that Culhane saw L.M. was the next morning, when L.M. returned to 264 McLennan. DSMF ¶ 12. Culhane claimed that L.M. was naked. Id. She apparently also appeared to be "highly intoxicated." Id. And Culhane reported that L.M. was bleeding heavily from her groin area. Id. Alexander points out, though, and there is some record evidence to support, that L.M. was menstruating on that day. Dkt. 125-1, p. 45.² In any case, Culhane believed that L.M. had been sexually assaulted, and gave Lund and Kiellach the bloody underwear that L.M. had worn after she returned to 264 McLennan.³ DSMF ¶ 13.

Lund then entered L.M.’s room. DSMF ¶ 14. She appeared to be drowsy, and the officers detected a number of visible injuries. Id. Even so, L.M. told Lund and Kiellach what she claimed happened after she left 264 McLennan. See id. ¶ 15.

Apparently, L.M. went with Samantha to her house, 1906 South State Street ("1906 S. State") in Syracuse. DSMF ¶¶ 1, 15. 1906 S. State belongs to Alexander. Id. ¶ 17. L.M. told Lund that the house had a reputation as a brothel, and that she had worked there as a prostitute. Id. ¶ 16. L.M. further claimed that she would have to pay plaintiff so that she would be allowed to work from his house. Id. ¶ 17.

According to Lund's report, L.M. told him that when she and Samantha arrived at 1906 S. State, two women, Lauren and Sheena,⁴ and a male blocked her from leaving. DSMF ¶ 19. They then forced her into the basement. Id. In the basement was some kind of wooden bench. Id. L.M. claimed that she was blindfolded soon after being brought down. Id. Then, L.M. told the police that her assailants tied her to the bench. Id. Next, she claimed that they superglued her lips together. Id. Lund observed "a white substance and peeled skin" on L.M.’s lips, which he...