Alexis v. Sessions

RICHARD LAWRENCE ALEXIS Petitioner, v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, et al., Respondents.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-18-1923

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

November 13, 2018

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Richard Lawrence Alexis is in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, at the Contract Detention Facility in Houston, Texas. (Docket Entry No. 1 at ¶ 17). He seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering his release. (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 25). Alexis alternatively requests a hearing on whether his continued detention is justified. (Id. at ¶ 15).

The respondents, Jefferson B. Sessions, Attorney General of the United States; Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Thomas Homan, the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Patrick Contreras, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director in Houston; Robert Lacy, Jr., Warden of the Houston Contract Detention Center; and Sarah Hartnett, Chief Counsel of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Houston, have moved to dismiss improper defendants. They have also moved to dismiss the petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. (Docket Entry No. 21). Alexis responded, and the court heard argument. (Docket Entry Nos. 22, 23).

Based on a review of the petition, motion, response, the record, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, the court grants and denies Alexis's petition in part. The reasons are set out in detail below.

I. Background

Richard Lawrence Alexis is a 38-year-old native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago. (Docket Entry No. 1 at ¶¶ 17, 33). He first entered the United States in 1991 as a lawful permanent resident. (Id. at ¶ 33). Alexis alleges that his biological father severely abused him during his childhood in Trinidad and Tobago, and that he began using drugs as a result. (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35).

In 2007, the government initiated removal proceedings against Alexis based on his two misdemeanor convictions for marijuana possession.¹ (Id. at ¶ 36). The immigration judge ordered Alexis removed, reasoning that the second conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101. (Id.). Alexis appealed. (Id. at ¶ 37). The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Alexis v. Holder, 354 F. App'x 62 (5th Cir. 2009), but the Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded the case. Alexis v. Holder, 561 U.S. 1001 (2010).

The government removed Alexis to Trinidad and Tobago after the Board of Immigration Appeals denied his appeal. (Docket Entry No. 1 at ¶ 38). Alexis alleges that he experienced significant trauma there, including undiagnosed mental illness, homelessness, domestic abuse, police brutality, threats, torture, and imprisonment. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-48).

On remand, the immigration judge revoked Alexis's removal order, and he reentered the United States in 2011. (Id. at ¶ 41). Alexis alleges that he continued to suffer from mental illness, and that he attempted suicide after returning to the United States. (Id. at ¶ 49). He also abuseddrugs and in 2016 was again convicted for possessing a controlled substance, a felony under Texas law.² (Id. at ¶¶ 49-50). The government detained Alexis in June 2017 and initiated proceedings to remove him from the United States. (Id. at ¶ 50).

Alexis moved to terminate the removal proceedings. (Id. at ¶ 51). After denying the motion in September 2017, the court terminated the proceedings in January 2018, holding that the Department of Homeland Security had failed to establish removability. (Id. at ¶ 52). Later that month, the government renewed the removal charge against Alexis on the same basis, that he had committed a crime involving a controlled substance, warranting deportation. (Id. at ¶ 53). Alexis again disputed removability, arguing that the statute under which he was convicted in 2016 was not a categorical match to the federal controlled-substance statute, and that the state criminal statute was indivisible. (Id. at ¶ 54). The immigration judge disagreed, finding that the state statute matched the controlled-substance list and that the statute was divisible. (Id. at ¶ 55). In May 2018, the immigration judge found that Alexis was competent, denied his requests for relief, and ordered him removed. (Id. at ¶ 56). Alexis appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals in May 2018, and the Board dismissed his appeal in October 2018. (Id. at ¶ 57; Docket Entry No. 22 at 4). Alex petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review in November 2018. (Docket Entry No. 22 at 4).

Alexis petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus in June 2018, alleging that he has been in detention since June 2017. (Docket Entry No. 1 at ¶ 58). Alexis claims that he has asked the government to treat him for mental health illness and alleges that the failure to provide it results from deliberate indifference to his medical needs. (Id. at ¶ 58; Docket Entry No. 22 at 6). He contends that even though a board-certified professional counselor reported that he suffers frompost-traumatic stress disorder and recurrent severe major depression with psychotic features, the government has yet to provide him with medical care. (Docket Entry No. 1 at ¶¶ 65, 68).

Alexis makes the following claims for relief: (1) he is not "deportable" under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B), (id. at ¶¶ 83-84); (2) his 16-month detention is "demonstrably unreasonable" under Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003), (id. at ¶¶ 7, 86-87); (3) his continued detention violates his substantive and procedural due-process rights under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), (id. at ¶¶ 90, 93, 97); (4) his continued detention violates the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause, (id. at ¶¶ 102-04; 118-20); (5) his continued detention violates his substantive and procedural due-process rights under the Fifth Amendment, (id. at ¶¶ 107-09, 111-15); and (6) the government's refusal to treat his medical conditions violates the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at ¶¶ 122-24). Alexis asks the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, a writ of habeas corpus releasing him from detention, and an order requiring the government to hold a bond hearing. (Id. at 30).

The government has moved to strike certain respondents, and to dismiss the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Alexis responded, and the court heard argument from counsel.³ (Docket Entry Nos. 21, 22, 23).

The issues raised by Alexis's petition, the government's motion, and Alexis's response are analyzed below.

II. The Legal Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) governs challenges to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction. "Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the claim." In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig. (Miss. Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). "Courts may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three different bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Clark v. Tarrant Cty., 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).

The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). When examining a factual challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), which does not implicate the merits of the plaintiff's cause of action, the district court has substantial authority to "weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413 (quotation omitted). "[A] motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle [the] plaintiff to relief." Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (citing Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausibleon its face." Bell Atl. Corp.v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Rule 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550, U.S. at 556).

To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a "complaint must allege 'more than labels and conclusions,'" and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Norris v. Hearst Tr., 500 F.3d 454, 464 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual...