Alhidir v. L. A. Cmty. Coll. Dist.

WAIL ALHIDIR, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

B284635

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR

January 29, 2019

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC614663)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, William F. Fahey, Judge. Affirmed.

Barbosa Group and Patricia Barbosa for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Jesse D. Marr, Kayla Birns and Stuart W. Rudnick for Defendant and Respondent.

Plaintiff and appellant Wail Alhidir, a blind student enrolled at Los Angeles City College (LACC), a community college within the Los Angeles Community College District (respondent), filed a complaint against respondent alleging disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.), and the Unruh Act (Civ. Code, § 51). His claims involved LACC's alleged failure to accommodate his disability in three areas: auxiliary classroom aids, emergency plans, and physical barriers. The trial court bifurcated appellant's equitable claim for injunctive relief from his request for damages. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that appellant's evidence failed to prove a failure of accommodation under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Unruh Act, and entered judgment in favor of LACC. On appeal, appellant contends that the court erred in trying the equitable claim for injunctive relief first, and that the evidence does not support the court's verdict in favor of LACC. We disagree. Under settled law, it was within the trial court's discretion to try the equitable claims first. Further, under the applicable standard of review, the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that appellant failed to meet his burden of proof. Therefore, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We save our summary of the evidence for that part of our Discussion section, below, in which we consider appellant's contentionthat the evidence does not support the trial court's decision. We begin with a procedural summary.

On March 22, 2016, appellant filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages for disability discrimination under the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.), and Unruh Act (Civ. Code, § 51). Appellant alleged that respondent failed to accommodate his impairment and failed to make reasonable modifications for him. His prayer for injunctive relief asked the court to order respondent to provide accommodations that included the following: a "qualified reader and note taker who consistently provide[s] competent accommodations for each of his classes"; "[a]lternative media resources and up-graded [sic] technology . . . equal to the resources offered to non-disabled students, including books, reference materials, and computer access on campus"; "[t]est taking accommodations . . . useable to and accessible by Plaintiff"'; and "[w]ritten materials in an alternative format that include Braille formatted and/or computer accessible materials that are provided in a timely manner that is equal to that available to other students."

On March 27, 2017, at the final status conference, the trial court bifurcated the trial, ordering that it would hear the injunctive relief issues on April 10, 2017. Following appellant's presentation of evidence, respondent moved for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The trial court took the motion under submission. Later, the court heard closing argument (without presentation of any evidence by respondent). The court then issued a Final Statement of Decision inwhich the court concluded that appellant had failed to meet his burden of proof on his claims. The court stated that appellant's claims were based on three theories: denial of academic accommodations, lack of a sufficient emergency plan, and "architectural barriers." The trial court found that appellant provided "very minimal evidence of difficulties he had in his previously taken classes. In fact, when he requested accommodations, he admitted OSS was usually prompt in responding. Further, most of his now reported difficulties stem from plaintiff's own inaction and/or failure to notify the college that accommodations were not meeting his needs. Plaintiff's primary demand—a paid note taker—is not a legally required accommodation." The court further found that appellant failed to show that the school's emergency plan was unreasonable or "defective." As to physical barriers, the court found that appellant failed to show that he "was denied access to any specific area on the campus because of the presence of some barrier." Finally, the court found that the school is not a business establishment within the meaning of the Unruh Act. The court thus concluded that appellant was not entitled to injunctive relief. Because of its finding that respondent "is not liable for any violation of law," the court found that "no trial on the issue of damages would be proper." Further, based on its conclusions, the court found respondent's motion for judgment to be moot. The court entered judgment in favor of respondent. Appellant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Trial on Equitable Issues First

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in trying his equitable claims first and not allowing him to present his claims to a jury. The law is to the contrary. "'It is well established that, in a case involving both legal and equitable issues, the trial court may proceed to try the equitable issues first, without a jury. . . , and that if the court's determination of those issues is also dispositive of the legal issues, nothing further remains to be tried by a jury.' [Citations.] [¶] Indeed, reviewing courts have emphasized that the better practice for trial courts is to decide equitable issues first for the explicit reason that a jury trial on any legal issues may be avoided. 'Generally, in mixed actions, the equitable issues should be tried first by the court, either with or without an advisory jury. [Citations.] Trial courts are encouraged to apply this "equity first" rule because it promotes judicial economy by potentially obviating the need for a jury trial.' [Citations.]" (Orange County Water Dist. v. Alcoa Global Fasteners, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 252, 355 (Alcoa).) "We would reverse a decision regarding the management of a case for trial and the order in which issues are to be tried only for a manifest abuse of discretion. [Citation.]" (Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 745, 763.) Appellant has failed to show that the court abused its discretion in trying the equitable issues first. The issues regarding whether appellant was entitled to injunctive relief were identical to those regarding LACC's potential liability for damages. In that situation, it was perfectly appropriate for the court to try the right to equitable relieffirst, ultimately obviating the need for a jury trial. (Alcoa, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 355.) We proceed to consider whether appellant produced sufficient evidence to be entitled to relief.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant contends that the trial court's decision was not supported by the evidence. We observe that in terms of his evidentiary presentation, appellant's claims for accommodation can be broken down into three categories: auxiliary academic accommodations for his classes, accommodations for physical barriers on campus, and accommodations for emergency evacuation plans. After discussing the standard of review and the relevant legal principles for appellant's disability claims under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Unruh Act, we discuss the evidence in each of the three categories presented by appellant's evidence, and explain why it was insufficient to meet appellant's burden of presenting a prima facie case of an unreasonable failure to accommodate.

A. Standard of Review

"'In general, in reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, "any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in support of the determination of the trial court decision. [Citations.]" [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'We may not reweigh the evidence and are bound by the trial court's credibility determinations. [Citations.] Moreover, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment.[Citation.]' [Citation.] The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to constitute substantial evidence. [Citation.] On the other hand, '[q]uestions of statutory interpretation, and the applicability of a statutory standard to undisputed facts, present questions of law, which we review de novo. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Lui v. City and County of San Francisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 969 (Lui).)¹

B. Relevant Legal Principles

1. ADA and Rehabilitation Act

Appellant asserted claims under Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. As here relevant, the legal standards and requirements of the two acts are identical.²

Title II of the ADA provides: "[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." (42 U.S.C. § 12132.) In language very similar to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act provides that "'[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of...