Ali v. Pruitt

GHULAM ALI, Plaintiffs, v. SCOTT PRUITT, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-cv-1899 (TSC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

October 19, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is pro se Plaintiff Ghulam Ali's third lawsuit against his employer, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Ali alleges that the EPA not only retaliated against him for his prior litigation, but also discriminated against him because of his race, national origin, gender, age, and disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., (Rehabilitation Act); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (Age Discrimination in Employment Act).¹ The EPA moves for summary judgment on all claims. (ECF No. 19.) Having reviewed the submissions of the parties and the record herein, and for the reasons set forth below, the court will GRANT the motion in part andDENY the motion in part without prejudice.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The moving party bears the "initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party, in response, must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted).² "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (citations omitted).

B. Pro Se Litigants

"Courts must construe pro se filings liberally." Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (pro se pleadings should be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."). Despite this standard, "a pro se plaintiff's opposition to a motion for summary judgment, like any other, must consist of more than mere unsupported allegations and must be supported by affidavits or other competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Prunte v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 699 F. Supp. 2d 15, 21-22 (D.D.C. 2010), aff'd, 425 Fed. App'x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). As the non-moving party, a pro se plaintiff "is required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in his favor." Prunte, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

C. Discrimination Claims

Title VII prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color . . . sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where, as here, a plaintiff has offered circumstantial evidence of Title VII discrimination, the court applies the familiar burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Under that framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. In order to do so, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he belongs to a protected class under Title VII, (2) he experienced an adverse employment action, and (3) the adverse employment action "gives rise to an inference of discrimination." Royall v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 548 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir.2008) (internal citation omitted). The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking the challenged employment action. Id. If an employer proffers such a reason, the burden reverts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's purported justification for the adverse employment action was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.

The D.C. Circuit has determined that the question of whether a plaintiff in a Title VII case has established a prima facie case is "almost always irrelevant." Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2008). When "an employee has suffered an adverse employment action and an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision, the district court need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas." Id. at 494 (emphasis in original). The summary judgment analysis instead must focus on "one central question":

Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?

Id. (emphasis added). This same paradigm applies to age and disability claims. Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (the ADEA applies to individuals over 40); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Rehabilitation Act).

Even in the absence of a disparate treatment claim, an employee with a disability may still have a claim for failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act, which requires that federal employers make "reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an applicant or employee who is a qualified individual with handicaps, unless the agency can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operations of its program." Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 528-29 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting 29 C.F.R. §1614.203(c)(1)).

II. ALI'S REQUEST FOR AN OFFICE

A. Background

Ali is a male over forty years old, and of Pakistani national origin. Ali v. McCarthy, 179 F. Supp. 3d 54, 67 (D.D.C. 2016), aff'd sub nom. Ali v. Pruitt, 727 F. App'x 692 (D.C. Cir. 2018). He has filed several lawsuits against his employer, the EPA, beginning in the late 1990s, when he sued the agency for discrimination in promotions. The complaint was dismissed as untimely. Ali, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 61.

At all times relevant to this case, Ali was an economist in the EPA's Standards and Health Protection Division (SHPD). (ECF No. 19, Def. SOF # 1.) He suffers from allergies to multiple environmental compounds and claims that his allergies may result in, among other things, bleeding, itchy skin, rashes, face and arm swelling, as well as difficulty breathing, seeing, walking, and sleeping. (Compl. at 10); Ali, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 67. Because of his condition, Ali occupied a private office for many years through arrangements with his supervisor and through an EPA program that was not governed by the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 61-2, 67-68. After a building renovation and space reallocation among various divisions, as well as Ali's transfer from the Engineering and Analysis Division (EAD) to SHPD, the EPA relocated him to a cubicle. Id. at 61-63. In his last lawsuit against the EPA, he claimed that he should have been allowed to remain in a private office as a reasonable accommodation for his condition, but this court granted the EPA's motion for summary judgment, finding that Ali had refused to submit specific medical information the EPA requested and had therefore abandoned the process for seeking relief under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 67-82.

Ali testified that on or around the time he filed the last lawsuit, the EPA "forced" him to telework for approximately six months and the arrangement "became pretty nice," but the EPA laterrescinded the telework arrangement. (See DEX 4, EEOC Tr. 45; DEX 7, Ali Dep. 95-97.) At some point after he returned to the office, Ali occupied a cubicle near Bryan Goodwin, but relocated to a different cubicle because he became ill from Goodwin's strong "perfumes." (Compl. at 8; ECF No. 22, Pl. Resp. at 2.) Around 2007, Ali settled into a cubicle located in a "huge room with lots of cubicles" and experienced no "health issues" until the fall of 2011 when Goodwin moved near Ali's cubicle and he was again confronted with Goodwin's "perfumes." (See EEOC Tr. 25-26, 133, 136; Ali Dep. 55.)

Ali contends that Goodwin's 2011 move was a result of the EPA's decision to convert Goodwin's office into a conference room in order to avoid forfeiting certain funds. (Compl. at 5.) Ali claims the office conversion was unnecessary because the EPA had enough conference rooms, it could have placed Goodwin in a cubicle elsewhere, and its failure to do so constituted retaliation, as well as discrimination based on Ali's disability, national origin, race, gender, and age. (Compl. at 9, 11; ECF No. 22-2, ROI 1.) Ali also claims that the EPA's failure to provide him with a private office was discriminatory for these same reasons.

In November 2011, before Goodwin's move, one of Ali's upper level managers, Evelyn Washington, emailed several managers, indicating that she had spoken to Goodwin about the "cologne issue" in the past and had recently told him to "tone [it] down because it was going to be a problem for the cube neighbors around him in the space" where he was moving. (Def. SOF # 5; ...