Alibalogun v. First Coast Sec. Solutions, Inc.

67 F.Supp.3d 211

Bukola J. Alibalogun, Plaintiff

v.First Coast Security Solutions, Inc., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 13–cv–1244 KBJ

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 11, 2014

Theodore S. Allison, Karr & Allison, P.C., Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Joel Jacob Borovsky, Jackson Lewis LLP, Reston, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Bukola Alibalogun (“Alibalogun”) is a woman of African descent who worked as a security guard in the District of Columbia for approximately nine years. Alibalogun's employment with First Coast Security Solutions, Inc. (“First Coast” or “Defendant”) began when First Coast took over a security services contract at a location where Alibalogun already worked, and it ended nine days later when First Coast fired her. Plaintiff has brought the instant action against First Coast, alleging breach of contract and wrongful termination in violation of District of Columbia common law, as well as discrimination based on sexual orientation and national origin in violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C.Code §§ 2–1401.01 –2–1411.06. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 19–20, 23–24, 28, 32.)¹

Before this Court at present is First Coast's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's breach of contract and wrongful termination claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because the Court finds that Alibalogun has failed to allege sufficiently any contractual obligation on the part of First Coast and that the allegations of the complaint do not support an exception to First Coast's general right to terminate at-will employees, this Court will GRANT First Coast's motion to dismiss with respect to the breach of contract and wrongful termination claims (Counts 1 and 2). What remains of the complaint is Plaintiff's contention that her termination was discriminatory (Counts 3 and 4), which Defendant has denied and with respect to which discovery will proceed. A separate order consistent with this Opinion will follow.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The complaint contains only sparse factual allegations; however, certain background facts relevant to Alibalogun's breach of contract and wrongful termination claims are clearly stated. Alibalogun had been employed as a security guard for nine years when First Coast acquired the security services contract at the location where Alibalogun worked. (Compl.¶ 5.) This acquisition occurred on October 1, 2012, and nine days later, on October 10, 2012, First Coast terminated Alibalogun's employment, ostensibly for making a false entry in a timekeeping log. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6.) Alibalogun states that she had a strong performance history and no disciplinary record prior to the termination of her employment. (Id. ¶ 5.)

The exact circumstances surrounding Alibalogun's supposedly false log entry are hazy, but based on the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the incident concerned an entry made in the timekeeping log that Alibalogun's supervisor, Stacy Savoy, maintained. (See id. ¶¶ 6, 11–12.) Alibalogun claims that on October 3, 2012, she arrived at work 20 minutes early for her 4:00 p.m. shift, but could not park in her customary space because she was driving a borrowed truck that was too tall for the parking garage. (Id. ¶ 7.) Instead, Alibalogun temporarily parked the truck on the street and informed Savoy that she had arrived but, due to local parking regulations, needed to move the truck before starting work. (Id. ¶ 8.) Alibalogun says she moved the truck and returned in time to start her shift at 4:00 p.m. (Id. ¶ 9.) When she returned, Alibalogun alleges, the prior security guard on duty—Vonetta Moon, with whom Alibalogun shared a “duty belt”—had taken a break, and Alibalogun had to wait for Moon to return before Alibalogun could take her post. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11.)² Moon, apparently, did not return until sometime after 4:00 p.m. (See id. ) According to the complaint, Savoy was aware of these events and instructed Alibalogun to sign the timekeeping log as though Plaintiff had started working exactly at 4:00 p.m. (See id. ) Alibalogun did so, and according to the complaint, she was subsequently fired for making this seemingly false entry, despite her claim that she was following her supervisor's directions. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 11.)

B. Procedural History

On August 14, 2013, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint in federal court. Count 1 of Plaintiff's complaint alleges breach of contract, based on “customs, practices, and policies” in the “security guard industry,” which “taken together, form a set of contractual expectations[,]” including “the expectation that termination will not be for a dishonest or deceitful reason.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Count 2 of the complaint alleges wrongful termination, under essentially the same rationale. (See id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff's complaint also alleges discrimination based on sexual orientation (Count 3) and national origin (Count 4) in violation of the DCHRA. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 32.)³

On October 30, 2013, First Coast filed the instant motion to dismiss the complaint in part, arguing that Counts 1 and 2 must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, at 1.)⁴ Specifically, First Coast argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege adequately the elements of her breach of contract and wrongful termination claims under D.C. law, and thus, that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. With respect to the breach of contract claim (Count 1), First Coast asserts that Alibalogun has failed to allege either the existence of a valid contract or any duty arising out of such contract, as D.C. law requires. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Br.”), ECF No. 5, at 2–7, 3–4.) As for the wrongful termination claim (Count 2), First Coast contends that Alibalogun has failed to “identify a specific law as the source of the public policy allegedly violated[.]” (Def.'s Br. at 5.) In response, Alibalogun maintains that she has alleged sufficient facts to withstand Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts 1 and 2. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.'s Br.”), ECF No. 6, at 1.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may move to dismiss a complaint against it on the grounds that it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must comply with Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This requirement is meant to “ ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]’ ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (alteration in original)).

“Although ‘detailed factual allegations' are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must furnish ‘more than labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’ ” Busby v. Capital One, N.A., 932 F.Supp.2d 114, 133 (D.D.C.2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In other words, the plaintiff must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “[M]ere conclusory statements” of misconduct are not enough to make out a cause of action against a defendant. Id. Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

In considering a motion to dismiss, “[t]he court must view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and must accept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations.” Busby, 932 F.Supp.2d at 134. Although the Court must accept as true the facts in the complaint, it “need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint [,]” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994), nor is the court “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation[,]” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Breach Of Contract (Count 1)

Plaintiff first contends that certain “customs, practices, and policies” in the security guard industry gave rise to a contract for employment between Alibalogun and First Coast that First Coast allegedly breached when it terminated Plaintiff “for a dishonest or deceitful reason.” (Compl. ¶¶ 19–20.)⁵ Contrary to First Coast's argument that Plaintiff has failed to allege the existence of “[any] contract whatsoever” (Def.'s Br. at 4), it is clear from the alleged facts that Plaintiff maintains that her employment was “at will”— meaning that Alibalogun's employment resulted from “a hiring not accompanied by an expression of a specific term of duration” that nonetheless gave rise to an “employment relationship terminable at will by either party at any time.” Strass v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid–Atlantic, 744 A.2d 1000, 1011 (D.C.2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is well settled in this jurisdiction that “[a]t-will employment should not be viewed as the absence of contract, but as a ‘species of contract [.]’ ” Daisley v. Riggs Bank, N.A., 372 F.Supp.2d 61, 67 (D.D.C.2005) (quoting Sheppard v. Dickstein,...