Allah v. O'conner

MEMORANDUM

GENE E. K. PRATTER, J.

Introduction

Michael Allah brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his parole agent, Wayne Hudson, and various employees of Gaudenzia DRC, a privately company that provides outpatient and inpatient substance abuse treatment and mental health services. Mr. Allah alleges that while he was paroled and participating in Gaudenzia DRC's inpatient program, Gaudenzia DRC employees falsely accused him of cocaine use, refused to let him attend medical appointments, denied him access to his prescription pain medication, retaliated against him for filing grievances, and took his personal property without a hearing. Mr. Allah alleges that Mr. Hudson was, at least in part, personally involved in these same deprivations. The Court granted the Gaudenzia defendants' motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 44. However, Mr. Allah's parole agent, Mr. Wayne Hudson, also filed a motion to dismiss, Doc. No. 33, which remained pending awaiting a response from Mr. Allah.

Mr. Hudson moves to dismiss the claims against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. After almost two years,

Mr. Allah filed a response in opposition to Mr. Hudson's Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 62. Mr, Hudson filed his reply shortly thereafter. Doc. No. 66.

For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Mr. Hudson's Motion.

Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcrofl v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The question is not whether the claimant "will ultimately prevail. . . but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court's threshold." Skinner v. Swi†zer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court adheres to certain well-recognized parameters. For one, the Court may consider "only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record." Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). In addition, the Court must accept as true all reasonable inferences emanating from the allegations and view those facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Revell v. PortAuth. of N. Y, N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that a court need not accept a plaintiffs "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions").

The Court notes that Mr. Allah's pro se pleading should be "liberally construed." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). That admonition does not demand that the Court ignore or discount reality, however, even given the indulgent nature of the Court's review of pro se pleadings. The Court "need not accept as true unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences." Doug Grant, Inc. v. Create Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Discussion

In his Motion, Mr. Hudson argues that Mr. Allah has not met the Rule 12(b)(6) standard because he failed to allege that Mr. Hudson had any personal involvement with any alleged deprivation of Mr. Allah's protected rights. In other words, Mr. Hudson asserts that Mr. Allah's complaint does not sufficiently allege that Mr. Hudson ever deprived Mr. Allah of any constitutional right so as to move his complaint from the theoretically possible across the threshold to the factually plausible, as required by Rule 12(b)(6).

Mr. Allah does not directly address Mr. Hudson's arguments. Instead, Mr, Allah's response reiterates the claims about his conditions of confinement at the Gaudenzia facility and against the Gaudenzia employees. As to Mr. Hudson, Mr. Allah notes that "he was detained at his Chester parole Agent[']s office fo[r] a hot urine" and that "he informed his parole agent Mr. Hudson that he go[es] to physical therapy 3 days a week." Doc. No. 62, at 1. In fact, Mr. Allah mentions Mr. Hudson only two additional times in his response, First, Mr. Allah contends that when he received pain and anxiety medication from outside doctors "he was threaten[ed] with being sen[t] back to state prison by Director Pat O'Conner, Supervisor Jane Doe #1 and his parole agent Wayne Hudson." Id. at 2. Second, Mr. Allah argues that the Gaudenzia defendants "were in agreement

with state parole agent [Hudson], . . by way of contract."^[1] Id. at 3. In other words, Mr. Allah seems to be relitigating his claims against the Gaudenzia employees, claims that the Court already dismissed.

Nevertheless, construing Mr. Allah's response liberally, the Court will take up Mr. Hudson's Motion and Mr. Allah's responses. Because the Court agrees with Mr. Hudson that Mr. Allah's complaint fails to allege that Mr. Hudson had any personal involvement in any alleged constitutional deprivations, Mr. Allah has failed to state a claim sufficient to survive Mr. Hudson's Motion to Dismiss.

"To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 'a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law."' Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 287 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). For purposes of the second requirement, parole agents are state actors. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. and Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008).

In addition, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the state official had "personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing." Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Id. Instead, a plaintiff must show personal involvement "through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, there is no question that Mr, Hudson, as a parole agent, was an agent of the Commonwealth. Thus, the questions remaining are whether Mr. Allah's complaint sufficiently

alleges (1) a violation of Mr. Allah's protected rights and (2) Mr. Hudson's personal involvement with that violation.

Construing Mr. Hudson's complaint liberally, it alleges constitutional violations including denial of medical care, retaliation, unlawful confiscation of property without due process, conspiracy, and a denial of access to the courts.^[2] As to Mr. Hudson's personal involvement, Mr. Allah's complaint only twice alleges Mr. Hudson's participation in anything at all, let alone a constitutional deprivation. First, Mr. Allah claims that "[o]n August 1, 2016, my parole agent took me to Gaudenzia inpatient drug treatment program." Doc. No. 2, at 3. Second, Mr. Allah states, "[o]n 10/7/2016, Defendant Agent Wayne Hudson attended a conference with me at the Gaudenzia facility concerning the write up I received for the positive urine where I was told by" Gaudenzia employees "and Agent Hudson that 1 am not to take my pain or anxiety medication. If so I would be unsuccessfully discharged and taken back to state prison." Id.

The Court will take up each episode of Mr. Hudson's alleged involvement in turn. But neither of Mr. Allah's allegations as to Mr. Hudson's personal involvement, even construed under the very liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants, alleges any violation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured under the Constitution or federal law that would plausibly state a claim under § 1983.

I. Mr. Hudson's Alleged Transport of Mr. Allah to Gaudenzia Does Not Plausibly State Any Constitutional Violation

Mr. Allah first alleges that Mr. Hudson took him to the Gaudenzia drug treatment center. Even construed liberally, Mr. Allah does not suggest any theory under which Mr. Hudson's transport of Mr. Allah to the Gaudenzia drug treatment center violated any rights, privileges, or immunities secured under the Constitution or federal law. For example, Mr. Allah does not allege any facts suggesting that anything untoward took place during that ride. As a point of contrast, this Court found that an incarcerated plaintiff had stated a plausible deliberate indifference claim after a prison official allegedly declined to take the plaintiff to a hospital in order to cover up the fact that the prison official had been in a vehicle accident while transporting the plaintiff and in which the plaintiff was injured. See Brown v. Lewis, 865 F.Supp.2d 642, 647-48 (E.D. Pa. 2011). Mr. Allah has not alleged anything of the sort here. As a result, his first allegation against Mr. Hudson fails to plausibly state any cognizable claim under § 1983.

II. Mr. Hudson's Alleged Participation in the October 17, 2016 Meeting Does Not Plausibly State Any Constitutional Violation

Next, Mr. Allah alleges that Mr. Hudson, along with other Gaudenzia employees, informed Mr. Allah that his parole would be revoked and he would be returned to state prison if he continued to take outside pain and anxiety medications while in drug...