Allen v. Macoupin Cnty. Pub. Health Dep't

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NIKA ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. MACOUPIN COUNTY PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT, Defendant.

No. 20-3137

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Springfield Division

September 22, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court is Defendant Macoupin County Public Health Department's (the “Department”) Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 26) and Motion to Strike (d/e 39) and Plaintiff Nika Allen's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (d/e 28). Because genuine disputes of material fact exist as to essential elements of Plaintiff's claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 26) and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (d/e 28) are each DENIED. Further, because the Court reaches this conclusion without considering the affidavit the Department seeks to strike, the Motion to Strike (d/e 39) is DENIED AS MOOT.

I. FACTS

The Court draws the following facts from the parties' statements of material facts, taking into account each party's objections thereto. The Court discusses material factual disputes in its analysis. Any fact submitted by any party that was not supported by a citation to evidence will not be considered by the Court. See Civ. LR 7.1(D)(2)(b)(2). Any response to an allegedly disputed fact unsupported by evidentiary documentation is deemed admitted. Id.

Plaintiff Nika Allen began working for the Macoupin County Public Health Department at the Maple Street Clinic (the “Clinic”) in early 2017. Def.'s Mem. (d/e 27) p. 7. Plaintiff reported directly to Kimberly Stinnett, who was employed by the Department as a lead office assistant with immediate supervisory authority over Plaintiff. Pl.'s Mem. p. 6; Def.'s Mem. p. 7. Angela Weidner, the director of nursing and chief operating officer for the Department, also had supervisory authority over Plaintiff, though Weidner was not Plaintiff's immediate supervisor. Pl.'s Mem. (d/e 30) p. 5; Def.'s Mem. p. 7. Weidner also had supervisory authority over Christy Blank, clinical director at the Department, and Donna Rassmussen, a physician assistant and assistant director of behavioral health at the Department, though Weidner's supervision of Rassmussen was administrative only. Pl.'s Mem. p. 5, 6; Def.'s Mem. p. 4, 8. Kent Tarro was the director of the Department and was the person to whom Weidner reported. Pl.'s Mem. p. 5; Def.'s Mem. p. 7.

Plaintiff began her employment with the Department and Clinic as a “faxer,” but eventually assumed the role of a “Medical Office Assistant.” Pl.'s Mem. p. 7; Def.'s Mem. p. 7. Plaintiff's responsibilities as Medical Office Assistant included scheduling appointments for patients of the medical clinic and the behavioral health and recovery center. Pl.'s Mem. p. 7; Def.'s Mem. p. 9. Plaintiff's performance in her role was mixed. At Plaintiff's sixmonth evaluation in September 2017, Stinnett evaluated Plaintiff as being “very proficient” and “do[ing] what [was] asked of her.” J.A. 1599. Stinnett also noted that Plaintiff “would benefit from avoiding conversations with other certain coworkers and focus on her duties” but that Plaintiff was “capable of being a top performer” and was “always polite and willing to do extra tasks asked of her.” J.A. 1600.

However, Plaintiff was also a part of an “Informal Counselling Session” on February 9, 2018. Def.'s Mem. p. 12; J.A. 0748. She was reportedly cited for not getting along with coworkers and failing to perform some of her job duties. Id. According to Stinnett, the other office assistants also complained that Plaintiff's behavior had changed during her time at the Clinic. Def.'s Mem p. 13. Weidner testified at her deposition that, in February or March of 2018, she thought the other office assistants at the Clinic were “being mean and picking on Plaintiff” which resulted in Plaintiff and the other assistants “constantly fighting.” J.A. 1712. The informal counseling session was, itself, the listed discipline for Plaintiff's alleged behavioral issues. J.A. 0748.

Plaintiff also suffered from anxiety and depression while employed at the Clinic. Pl.'s Mem. p. 8; Def.'s Mem. p. 11. Plaintiff received treatment for these mental health conditions from Rassmussen at the Clinic beginning in October 2017. Id. Plaintiff was treated with Xanax, a sedative. Id. Plaintiff discussed her conditions and her treatment with Weidner around the same time she began treatment, though Plaintiff did not tell Weidner about the specific medication she was taking. Pl.'s Mem. p. 8; Def.'s Mem. p. 11.

Plaintiff was then hospitalized on March 1, 2018. Pl.'s Mem. p. 8; Def.'s Mem. p. 11. Hospital records from Alton Memorial Hospital showed that, after a 9-1-1 call was made to Alton Hospital EMS, Plaintiff was found on the floor of her home and that her family reported Plaintiff experiencing seizures. J.A. 0200. Plaintiff was eventually transferred to Passavant Hospital in Jacksonville, Illinois, where she remained hospitalized for three days. Pl.'s Mem. p. 10; Def.'s Mem. p. 14. Toxicology reports from Passavant showed Plaintiff's blood tested positive for Xanax, alcohol, and cocaine. J.A. 2148. Plaintiff was also diagnosed with bipolar and borderline personality disorder when admitted to Passavant. Def. Mem. p. 18.

At some point while Plaintiff was hospitalized, Weidner and Blank spoke about the situation. Pl.'s Mem. p. 10; Def.'s Mem. p. 15. Weidner testified in a deposition that Blank told Weidner about Plaintiff's hospitalization. Id. Weidner stated that Blank said, “[Allen is] fucking crazy and she's in the hospital.” J.A. 1662.

Plaintiff was then discharged from Passavant on March 5, 2018. Pl.'s Mem. p. 12. The same day, Dr. Kamna Handa at Passavant sent a letter to Stinnett stating that Plaintiff had been hospitalized, should be excused from work, and would be “able to return to work on 03/09/18 with no restrictions.” Pl.'s Mem. p. 12. Plaintiff did so on March 12, 2018. Pl.'s Mem. p. 13; Def.'s Mem. p. 19. The same day, Plaintiff had an appointment with Dr. Yae Rim Lee, a psychiatrist at the Clinic, for evaluation of Plaintiff's mental health matters after Rassmussen referred Plaintiff to Dr. Lee. Pl.'s Mem. p. 8-9; Def.'s Mem. p. 19. Dr. Lee noted that Plaintiff stated she was referred because “I [Plaintiff] overdosed and I [Plaintiff] almost died.” J.A. 0441. Dr. Lee also noted Plaintiff saying that she had been using illegal substances on a weekly basis for about a year. J.A. 0441-0442. Plaintiff immediately returned to work following her appointment with Dr. Lee. Pl.'s Mem. p. 9.

The next day on March 13, 2018, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with Stinnett, Weidner, and Blank. Pl.'s Mem. p. 14; Def.'s Mem. p. 20; Def.'s Resp (d/e 33) p. 24. According to Plaintiff, Weidner stated that both she and Blank believed Plaintiff was mentally unstable and should take a leave of absence. Pl.'s Mem. p. 14-15; J.A. 0137-0138. Both Weidner and Blank deny commenting on Plaintiff's mental health. Def.'s Resp. p. 25-26. The parties dispute most of what transpired at the meeting, including what was said, who said it, and whether Plaintiff was forced to take involuntary FMLA leave or whether the leave was “offered” to Plaintiff. Pl.'s Mem. p. 14-16; Def.'s Mem. p. 20-23; Def.'s Resp. p. 25-28; Pl.'s Resp. (d/e 34) p. 13-19. Undisputed, though, is the fact that Plaintiff was placed on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act effective March 13, 2018 despite Plaintiff not believing she needed to take any leave. Def.'s Mem. p. 23; Pl.'s Resp. p. 19.

Also undisputed is an email Blank sent to Tarro, Weidner, and Stinnett on March 13, 2018 recommending Plaintiff's employment be immediately terminated. Pl.'s mem p. 13; Def.'s Resp. p. 22. Blank's recommendation was, in part, due to her concern that the Clinic “[had] someone first line with patients” who was “very unstable but yet” the Clinic was “asking her to represent” the Clinic. J.A. 2137. Blank's concern stemmed from “the amount of patients [the Clinic] deal[t] with . . . on a daily basis” who were “not stable.” Id. While Plaintiff's employment was not terminated in accordance with Blank's recommendation, Plaintiff's employment with the Department eventually ended when Plaintiff contacted Tarro sometime mid-June 2018 to say that Plaintiff quit. Def.'s Mem. p. 31; Pl.'s Resp. p. 34.

Plaintiff then filed suit against Defendant the Macoupin County Public Health Department on June 4, 2020 alleging the Department's employees' actions in placing Plaintiff on leave violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (hereinafter “ADA”). See Compl. (d/e 1). Both Plaintiff and the Department have now moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper under Rule 56 if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant shows she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant believes demonstrates the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment is not warranted if there are factual disputes as to an essential element of the case which would determine whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012). In short, “summary judgment is the ‘put up or shut up' moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show...