Allen v. PJ Cheese, Inc.

1

BRANDON ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. PJ CHEESE, INC., Defendant.

No. 2:20-CV-1846-RDP

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division

June 7, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

R. DAVID PROCTOR, CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on Brandon Allen's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 78), PJ Cheese, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 80), and Brandon Allen's Motions to Strike (Docs. # 86, 93). The Motions have been fully briefed. (Docs. # 83, 85, 91; 82, 87, 92; 86 93, 94, 95). For the reasons discussed below, the Motions (Docs. # 78; 80; 86; 93) are due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Background

Brandon Allen (“Plaintiff”), an African American male began working as a delivery driver for PJ Cheese Inc.'s (hereinafter “PJ Cheese” or “Defendant”) Irondale, Alabama location in October 2018. (Doc. # 7 at ¶ 18). As a delivery driver, Plaintiff worked both inside the store (that work was denominated on his paystubs as “Driver Instore”) and on the road (that work was denominated as “On the Road”). (Docs. # 7 at ¶¶ 72-75; 81-4).

While clocked in as Driver Instore, Plaintiff received $7.25 an hour. (Doc. # 81-4 at 1). While clocked in as On the Road, Plaintiff was guaranteed to receive $9.12 an hour, at least $4.00 of which was paid by PJ Cheese as a cash wage. (Id.). PJ Cheese took a tip credit for the balance of the guaranteed rate and made up the difference if Plaintiff did not receive $5.12 in tips.^[1] (Id.; Doc. # 7 at ¶ 77).

As a delivery driver, Plaintiff was required to maintain and pay for his own operable, safe, and legally compliant automobile to use while delivering food. (Doc. # 7 at ¶ 78). As a result, Plaintiff paid some job-related vehicle expenses, including depreciation, gas, maintenance, repair, and insurance. (Id. at ¶¶ 79-80). Defendant did not monitor Plaintiff's individual vehicle expenses. (Id. at ¶ 85). However, to offset some of the costs for his use of his personal vehicle for deliveries, Defendant provided Plaintiff with a $.27 per estimated mile driven cash reimbursement in addition to his wages and tips. (Doc. # 81-1 at 18-20).

During Plaintiff's time as an employee for PJ Cheese, Scott Herrin (now known as Emily Herrin) was the General Manager of his store. (Id. at 13). In addition, there were several Assistant Managers at the store, including Joseph Fleming and Aaron Clark. (Docs. # 79-1 at 6; 81-1 at 13). All were white. (Docs. # 81-1 at 13, 18; 87 at 12).

In November 2018, Plaintiff approached Joseph Fleming and accused him of taking a portion of his cash tips. (Doc. # 81-1 at 14). As the conversation progressed, Plaintiff attempted to leave the store to go home. (Id.). Fleming objected, telling Plaintiff “he wasn't going anywhere,” before further stating “[y]ou beneath me” and that he was “going to do what [Fleming] [said].” (Id.). Fleming also called Plaintiff “boy” and “[m]onkey.” (Id.).

At this time, Aaron Clark escorted Fleming outside of the store as other employees walked Plaintiff to the back of the store to calm down. (Id.). One of Plaintiff's coworkers came to the back of the store and warned Plaintiff against trying to leave because Fleming was waiting outside with a gun and stating that he was going to “handle” Plaintiff if he walked outside. (Id.).

Eventually, the situation de-escalated, and Plaintiff complained to Aaron Clark about the encounter with Fleming. (Id. at 13). Plaintiff then made one more delivery run before heading home for the evening. (Id. at 15). After this altercation, Plaintiff alleges that Fleming bragged that he would get Plaintiff fired. (Id. at 25).

At some point after this event, Fleming was transferred to work at another one of Defendant's store locations.^[2] Fleming returned to Plaintiff's store one day and parked near his car in the parking lot. (Id. at 16). As Plaintiff was walking to his car to make a delivery, Fleming approached him and started mumbling under his breath before audibly calling him a “[m]onkey” and a “nigger.” (Id.). Plaintiff reported this behavior to Herrin; Herrin indicated it would be handled. (Id.).

Throughout his employment, Plaintiff also complained to Herrin that he felt as though certain white employees were treated better than black employees because they received higher reimbursement rates on delivery runs. (Id. at 18). Herrin informed him that this was due to seniority. (Id.).

On March 14, 2019, Plaintiff had a meeting with Herrin to discuss that he had not received the sign-on bonus he was promised at the start of his employment. (Id. at 24). During this conversation, Plaintiff brought up the incident in which Fleming threatened him with a gun. (Id.). At this point, Plaintiff alleges that Herrin fired him and stated it was because he earned a low score on his Drivosity driving test.^[3] (Id.). Defendant's record regarding Plaintiff's termination states that he voluntarily resigned. (Docs. # 79-1 at 22; 79-5 at 48).

Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination on May 6, 2019, alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of race in violation of Title VII. He also alleged that he was retaliated against for reporting and complaining about racially hostile comments and threats made by Fleming. (Doc. # 81-2).

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact. See id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324.

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could [find] for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.

“When the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must support its motion with credible evidence . . . that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Upon making this showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who must produce ‘significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact' to avoid summary judgment.” Baker v. Upson Reg'l Med. Ctr., 94 F.4th 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1438). That is, the moving party must demonstrate that, on all the essential elements on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir. 1991). If the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, it is entitled to summary judgment unless the nonmoving party, in response, “come[s] forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issues of fact.” Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1438 (alteration in original) (quoting Chanel, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1477); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

Although there are cross motions for summary judgment, each side must still establish the lack of genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Chambers & Co. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S., 224 F.2d 338, 345 (5th Cir. 1955)^[4]; Matter of Lanting, 198 B.R. 817, 820 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996). The court will consider each motion independently, and in accordance with the Rule 56 standard. Matter of Lanting, 198 B.R. at 820. “The fact that both parties simultaneously are arguing that there is no genuine issue of fact, however, does not establish that a trial is unnecessary thereby empowering the court to enter judgment as it sees fit.” Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720, at 327-28 (3d ed. 1998). Also, these are the facts for summary judgment purposes only; they may not be the actual facts. See Cox v. Admin. U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir. 1994) (“‘What we state as ‘facts' in this opinion for purposes of reviewing the rulings on the summary judgment motion [] may not be the actual facts.'”) (citations omitted).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. # 7) alleges five causes of action against Defendant: (1) Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) Discrimination in Violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; (3) Retaliation in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (4) Retaliation in Violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; and (5) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Id.).

Both parties...